FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JVLY

1973

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October 1972–July 1973

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

Christa Armstrong

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG

EDITOR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1928–1972

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HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
1893-1973

Hamilton Fish Armstrong underwent a serious operation almost immediately after he laid down the editorship of this magazine with the 50th Anniversary Issue last October. He died in April. He was our friend, our mentor, and the principal source of the ideals we strive to continue. We have asked three friends and associates to write of him, and we conclude with an excerpt from one of his own early articles. It sums up what he stood for.

The Editors

For a full half-century Hamilton Fish Armstrong was associated with *Foreign Affairs,* first as managing editor and then as editor after the death of Archibald Cary Coolidge. When the journal was inaugurated by the Council on Foreign Relations, Coolidge, as a Harvard professor, remained in Cambridge, and Armstrong had to hold the little fort, then on Forty-Third Street. The two men worked admirably together and Armstrong often declared how much he gained from his all-too-brief collaboration with one of the wisest and most broad-minded unofficial statesmen this country has ever had.

When Armstrong took over the editorship in 1928, *Foreign Affairs* was already recognized for its authoritative and objective treatment of world affairs. But it was left for the new pilot to steer a course through the stormy seas of a world depression, and then to keep an even keel through a decade of aggression in Europe and Asia, culminating in the ordeal of the Second World War and eventually the anguish and uncertainty of the thermonuclear age.

No better guide could be imagined. He traveled widely, came to know at first hand the problems of many countries, and seized every opportunity, in New York and abroad, to assess the statesmen of foreign nations and their policies. His own writings, often full of foreboding, were nevertheless as well-balanced as they were well-informed. Under his stewardship the magazine attained a world reputation and an influence out of proportion to its circulation.

In 1925 I assumed charge of the Recent Books section of *Foreign Affairs* and from that time on remained in close collaboration with Ham Armstrong, in one capacity or another, until his

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retirement last fall. Every year increased my respect for his competence, his patience and kindness, his complete devotion to international relations and the cause of peace. We did not always agree. On several occasions, at his request, I wrote articles on imperialism or related topics. The conclusions were not always to his liking. He would argue vigorously to test them; while not always convinced, he would publish none the less.

It is a privilege to pay tribute to a devoted, loyal and lifelong friend. The imposing file of *Foreign Affairs* will forever stand as a monument to his dedicated and untiring service in the interest of his country and of world peace.

William L. Langer

There can surely be few others of whom it may be so justly said that they are born, not made, than of editors. The calling requires a special motivation, a special instinct, a special patience and persistence, that seem to lie in the very tissue of character and personality.

Hamilton Armstrong was one of these. He enjoyed editing. He believed in it. He had a firm and clear concept of what he wanted *Foreign Affairs* to be, and he never deviated from it. It was not the only concept one could have had; it did not always meet with agreement on the part of others; there were, obviously, many other ways in which a journal devoted to international affairs could have been conceived. But this conception was his; he had faith in it and he pursued it with patience, logic and consistency over the decades, steadily winning acceptance and respect for it, making no concessions to the passing fancies of the moment, resisting all the temptations of mass circulation and commercial success, filling with growing mastery and dignity, as the years went by, that narrow but commanding niche in the structure of American journalism which he had made it his life's purpose to fill.

A forum for the opinions of others, expressing no opinion of its own. A place for fact, for thought, for calmly reasoned argument, with no room in its columns for polemic, for anger, for personal attack. A literary tone that would be quiet and serious, but never pretentious. Importance, as the main criterion in the selection of material—whether the importance was to come from the significance and originality of the subject matter or from the authority of the author. But no concessions to any would-be con-

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tributor, humble or great, when it came to clarity of thought, significance of content, and moderation of language.

These, as I saw it, were the principles on which Ham Armstrong built up the journal that was the work of his life. Perhaps the greatest service he rendered to the rest of us was to demonstrate, by the success of his efforts, that there was still a place amid all the cacophony of modern communications—a valued, respected and appreciated place—for journalistic creativity based on principles of this kind.

George F. Kennan

I first met Hamilton Fish Armstrong twenty or so years ago when he was about sixty years old. I remember my surprise that the editor of what I had regarded as a rather stuffy magazine was so conspicuously lacking in pomposity and self-regard and so filled with charm and spirit. Later I also discovered that Ham was a far more cunning editor than I had realized. His was an ideal way to communicate dangerous thoughts to the American establishment. Among all those "Bulgaria at the Crossroads" pieces and those pronouncements by forgotten foreign ministers on forgotten problems, one encountered a surprising liveliness and ecumenicity of contribution—John Dewey, W. E. B. DuBois, John Gunther, Harold Nicolson, Isaiah Berlin, Harold Laski, not to mention Lenin, Radek and Bukharin.

As a first-class editor, Ham Armstrong came up with interesting ideas, set them forth with a skill that tempted the most overworked writer, and used his charm ruthlessly to get the pieces he wanted. He proposed subjects that tempted me in spite of myself, and overrode my doubts about whether I had time to do the job properly. Afterward, I was always grateful to him for having made me write the articles.

He was always on the lookout for younger contributors. This was because, having followed international affairs for a long time, he understood that foreign policies, unlike diamonds, were not forever and that what worked in one set of circumstances was not necessarily engraved on the tablets of the ages. He did not, like some contemporaries, suppose that ultimate wisdom on foreign policy had been confided to his own generation, or that the foreign relations of the United States had reached a degree of perfection at some point, probably 1949, that required no further amendment or revision.

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While Ham recognized that a rapidly changing international society required fresh assessments and prescriptions, he held fast to one general view—that America could not avoid a major role in the world and that this role must be as intelligent and magnanimous as possible. He had the highest standards for his country, took personal pride in both the ideals and the craftsmanship of foreign relations, and felt personal shame when America's performance fell below the standards he cherished. His last piece in *Foreign Affairs,* "Isolated America" in the 50th Anniversary Issue, is a deeply moving confession of faith, doubt and hope.

No account of Hamilton Fish Armstrong as a public force can do justice to his rare personal qualities. His memoirs, which so well combine historical solidity and literary charm, will remain, along with *Foreign Affairs,* as his public monuments. But what will endure in the minds of his friends is the memory of a New York gentleman of a vanishing school. He treated everyone, old or young, famous or unknown, with the same generous courtesy and concern. It was more than manner, though his manners were distinguished; it was a genuine youthfulness of mind and openness of heart. One remembers his marvelous humor, his infectious table talk, his unending delight in the house on West 10th Street where he was born and where he lived all his life, his Christmas parties over which Christa Armstrong presided with such grace and, above all, his own exceptional sweetness and indomitability of character.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

". . . we may perhaps pause for a backward glance and try to decide whether at any point our national policy has lacked in good faith, good manners, generosity, a proper sense of responsibility, or any other virtue by which, without being quixotic or emotional, we might have helped the journey of other peoples towards the goal which all profess to have in view—international understanding and peace."

Hamilton Fish Armstrong,
"After Ten Years: Europe and America," *Foreign Affairs,*
October 1928.

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*

The Editors

NOTE: AS ANNOUNCED IN OUR LAST ISSUE, *Foreign Affairs* WILL CONSIDER FOR PUBLICATION, IN A SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE SECTION, MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY READERS THAT DEALS WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF ARTICLES THAT HAVE APPEARED IN CURRENT ISSUES OF THE MAGAZINE.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 51 JULY 1973 No. 4

A PLAN FOR ENERGY INDEPENDENCE

By Carroll L. Wilson

I BELIEVE the United States is facing a national energy emergency. It arises from our extravagant and wasteful use of energy and from a shift in the sources of fuels. Per capita consumption is three times that of Western Europe, and we may ask ourselves whether our greater use enriches the quality of life by any such margin. Our cars are twice as heavy and use twice as much fuel as European cars which run about the same mileage each year, and the ratio is getting worse because of the sharp drop in fuel economy on recent models of American cars, owing to emission controls and air conditioners. We keep our houses and buildings too hot and use large amounts of fuel in air-conditioning everything. We have not given a thought to fuel conservation and efficiency since the days of rationing in World War II—an era which only 30 percent (those over 45) of the population can remember. These are some of the reasons why with six percent of the world's population the United States uses 33 percent of the world's energy—and why Europe and Japan are unlikely to be sympathetic to our plight as we ask them to share with us their traditional supply sources in the Middle East.

The costs and perils of dependence upon Middle East nations around the Persian Gulf were eloquently stated by James Akins of the State Department in the last issue of this journal.[1] His analysis of the expected scale of payments to Middle East countries and the inability of the largest producer, Saudi Arabia, to absorb or use a significant fraction of these payments for internal purposes underscores the perils of open-ended dependence upon these nations for our oil. The most critical aspects of the national energy emergency are the shift to such dependence and the enormous foreign-exchange drain it must progressively entail

[1] "The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf Is Here," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1973.

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by the late 1970s alone. Recent "symbolic" interruptions by some Middle East countries, in protest against U.S. policy toward Israel, may be one hint of what the future holds; the continued hard bargaining on price is another. Although we will have to live through a period of substantial reliance on Middle East oil, it is hardly an acceptable national policy to leave the emerging situation in this highly unsatisfactory state. There are simply too many cumulative problems and dangers involved.

The question, of course, is what *could* we do about it. The time has come to propose solutions. I propose a strategy to overcome this emergency, a program of action to implement such a strategy, the machinery needed for implementation, and an assessment of the global and environmental consequences of the adoption and execution of such a program by the United States. Obviously, the number of variables is immense and only by gross simplification can one define a strategy and program; there should be alternative strategies and plans. But this may be a place to begin.

II

The objectives of my proposal are to achieve, by 1985: first, the independence of the United States from critical reliance on imports of energy in any form—defining critical reliance as anything more than ten percent of our needs; second, energy costs below some target level, in dollars per million British Thermal Units (BTU), which is a common energy pricing unit for all fuels. I suggest as a goal keeping energy costs for premium fuels such as gas or oil below $1.00 per million BTU. This is equivalent to oil at $6.00 per barrel, roughly twice present prices, or to gas at $1.00 per thousand cubic feet, twice present wellhead prices on new contracts. The current cost of coal is very low in relation to its heat content, and the proposed ceiling gives great latitude for its use.

To see how we might reach these goals, let us start by examining the components of energy supply in the United States—past, present and future. Current projections make three key assumptions—that total energy consumption will continue to grow at the rate of 4.5 percent a year that has prevailed in the past decade, that the present pattern of use of particular energy sources will continue, and that nuclear power will be rapidly developed. As we shall see, all three of these assumptions can be challenged. If

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they were the case, however, the currently projected picture (seen in relation to present and past) would look as follows:

TABLE I

U.S. ENERGY SOURCES AT STATED PERIODS

	Actual 1960–63	*Actual 1970–73*	*Projected 1980–83*	*Projected 1985*
Oil	44%	44%	44%	47%
Natural Gas	29%	33%	28%	20%
Coal	23%	18%	17%	17%
Hydro/Geothermal	4%	4%	5%	6%
Nuclear	.5%	1%	6%	10%

As the table shows, the crux of the problem is that oil has had to assume a large and slowly increasing share of the total. Natural gas appears to have reached its peak and will decline as a proportion of total supply even if higher prices produce increased exploration and discovery. Hydro sources can at most hold their place.

There remains, of course, the question whether present geothermal sources can be expanded to a greater degree and whether new "miracle" sources of energy can be found from solar energy, nuclear fusion, hydrogen broken down by nuclear methods, or any other. In all of these there is hope if we look ahead on a 30-year projection—and in the most promising areas there is justification for much greater research and development effort. But if one puts together the theoretical possibilities and the best available sense of what it would take to develop any of these "miracle" sources to major production levels, the honest judgment at this stage must be that they will contribute nothing by 1985 nor be substantially operative before roughly the year 2000, if then. And we simply cannot wait that long.

Rather, then, we have to look to our present sources of energy within the 1985 time frame. Obviously, we must have the maximum possible expansion of domestic oil and natural gas production, but the increases cannot be large in relation to total need. In addition, we should establish synthetic oil industries based on shale and on coal, building some large-scale plants to demonstrate feasibility and costs and to test features that minimize environmental impact. Such developments might yield a few million barrels per day, and we might require refineries to mix such oil with regular crude oil for a fraction of their feedstocks—even if initial prices of synthetic crude oil exceeded the $6.00 per bar-

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rel ceiling target for 1985 energy costs.

Looking at all the technological possibilities, however, it is my conclusion that the best sources of energy that can be greatly expanded in this time frame, at reasonable cost and with an impact on resources and on the environment that we can bear, are nuclear fission and the production of gas from coal through gasification—a process which produces from coal a clean, all-purpose and readily transportable gaseous fuel. For this purpose, some of the necessary technology now exists, but some still requires additional development. Gasification itself has been demonstrated, and technologies are already in use that produce low-BTU gas. However, the technological obstacles to producing gas of pipeline quality from coal are still formidable; a massive crash program of parallel pilot and demonstration plants for the four or five processes that now appear possible should permit construction to start in two to three years on production plants that make use of whichever process or processes then look best.

This selection of technological possibilities is the first element in the proposed strategy. The second—at least equally important and urgent—is a program effectively to reduce the rate of growth in our energy consumption. Actually to lower our consumption substantially is not, I believe, acceptable without far too drastic changes in our whole society. But I believe it is feasible, and should be our target, to achieve and maintain a rate of growth in our energy consumption of three percent per year, rather than the present 4.5 percent. In arithmetic terms, instead of our energy consumption in 1985 being 70 percent greater than it is now, it would be "only" 43 percent greater—a large and critical difference without which no action program can, I believe, do the job.

This is still a drastic target. To achieve it requires a recognition and acceptance that we are in a national emergency. Since shortages are upon us, we will have to begin to practice conservation not because of price but because of shortages. Although the first guidelines for voluntary "sharing of shortages equitably" have been issued by the government, we have no rationing machinery except to give priority to domestic heating and to drop other loads if not enough energy is available. There are not even the rudiments of machinery for rationing fuel. The only serious study of an emergency program has been made by the Office of Emergency Preparedness, which has produced two very useful studies indicating measures that could be taken if the will existed

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to diminish significantly our energy demands, thereby reducing our dependence upon imported oil. Yet, before the year is out, shortages of gasoline and heating oil in many parts of the country will make it clear that a national emergency exists and that appropriate steps must be taken.

Some of the necessary measures will involve presently extravagant uses and waste, and some an increase in efficiency. Here it is striking to note how little scientific and technical effort now goes into this latter question; a very modest improvement in our present low fuel efficiency may turn out, over time, to be in itself sufficient to bring us close to the three percent growth rate. But in the meantime we must surely cut back painfully.

III

On the whole we do very well in dealing with national emergencies. Many examples come to mind from World War II when we created the machinery; gave it the necessary authority; provided the money; mobilized the parts of the society, public and private, which were needed to overcome the emergency or meet it; energized the program by a system of contracts; and achieved the target results.

A notable example was our action in dealing with the abrupt cessation of the natural rubber supply. We carried out a crash program to set up a synthetic rubber industry, quickly creating the necessary machinery, authority and money. The results were dramatically successful. Another example was the decision to produce an atomic bomb in time to be usable in World War II. The decision was taken at a time when there were four or five possible routes to securing fissionable material from uranium and only some clues as to how to make a weapon from fissionable material. Special machinery was set up with the needed authority, with superb leadership and organizing capability, and within the tradition of mobilizing the private sector by contract. The Manhattan District then conducted that remarkable program of carrying forward simultaneously four different approaches to producing fissionable material and two simultaneous approaches to making a weapon, while building everything from cities to railroads to huge and completely novel factories, all in the space of less than three years. It worked.

Another example of how we can mobilize resources against an explicit target was the space program. In 1960, for reasons then

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considered sufficient, we decided that we should put a man on the moon before the end of the decade. To accomplish this, we created a special agency with great authority and lots of money and manned it with extraordinarily capable leadership. The fantastically complex and difficult scientific, technical and logistical problems were overcome, and, indeed, we put the first man on the moon in July 1969.

These are a few examples of how we have acted successfully when we have accepted the existence of a national emergency and taken the necessary actions (through Congress and the President) to provide the authority, the money, the machinery and the leadership to meet and overcome it. It is our national style to be most effective in tackling concrete programs, or working toward specified goals. Sometimes that approach is not appropriate as, for example, in solving the problem of cancer; in this case, however, it is the right one.

What might be the action program aimed at 1985—the Decade Program if you will—if we accepted the existence of a national energy emergency and then took the necessary steps to cope with it through meeting the specific targets suggested?

The first element in any such program must concern the use of oil. To limit our oil imports to ten percent of energy requirements by 1985—using now the target three percent annual growth rate to estimate total 1985 energy consumption—would mean that we would be importing no more than five million barrels of oil per day at that time (compared to the roughly 15 million barrels now projected).[2] In the total energy picture shown in Table I, oil (domestic and imported) would have to drop markedly from its projected 47 percent to a proportion of roughly 30 percent in 1985.

This at once suggests the first component of the action program. Thirty percent is roughly the proportion of our energy that now goes to transportation, especially automotive uses—for which, of course, oil is uniquely suited. It will take work to keep our transportation uses down to this proportion, for they are now expanding faster than total energy consumption and this tendency

[2] Oil would not, of course, be the only energy source imported. As we know, substantial possibilities exist for the importation of natural gas from Canada and of liquefied gas from Algeria, the Soviet Union and perhaps other sources. Without judging the wisdom of expanding any of these sources, their proportion of total energy is not likely to add much to the ten percent of total energy represented, for this program, by imported oil. We would still be within reasonable overall margins of import dependence.

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will be accentuated by lowered efficiency due to tighter emission controls—not to mention the current sales rate of a million passenger cars a month! But if the proportion can be kept down—actually slightly reduced—then it can and should be met from oil, and oil should be withdrawn from other energy uses such as heating. This is a harsh measure but an indispensable one—the keystone of the whole program in fact.

The next component of the action program concerns nuclear power—currently providing one percent of our total energy, and projected in Table I to provide ten percent by 1985. In this respect, Table I reflects technological possibilities with proven techniques, but it does *not* reflect current political realities, nor, in my judgment, the true difficulty of meeting valid safety and environmental objections to the kind of major expansion it would take to achieve the projected figure.

Like others who have followed closely the development of nuclear fission as an energy source for more than 25 years now, I originally and for some time believed that it could, without undue difficulty, become the most important source of energy we have, especially for electricity. But problems have mounted, and delays, restrictions and technical uncertainties have dogged nearly every one of the many steps needed to bring a new nuclear plant into full operation, thus drastically slowing down the nuclear input to our energy system. The determined opposition of states and localities and citizen action groups, plus rising caution by the Atomic Energy Commission, has stretched out to ten years the interval between application for a plant permit and bringing the plant "on line" at an economic power level.

In part, the political forces at work reflect an exaggeration of the problems, or at least a failure to weigh fully the inevitable trade-offs between energy supply and other factors. But these politically reflected concerns do have a substantial basis, both as to safety and as to unnecessary and unacceptable environmental consequences. Only if we deal with these factors can nuclear fission play the role I believe it must play in our total energy picture by 1985.

On safety, a real uncertainty now exists concerning possible accidents which could have disastrous consequences—especially the failure of liquid cooling systems resulting in a meltdown of the highly radioactive core and release of the gaseous fraction of these radioactive products into the atmosphere. A year of hear-

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ings by the AEC has not persuaded the critics that current reactor plans are safe against such accidents, and the problem exists as well in the liquid-metal-cooled breeder reactor designs.

As I see it, the only way to meet these objections and so resolve the current impasse is to put all new plants underground. This is an entirely practicable course of action. Studies indicate that placing nuclear power plants underground would add only a small fraction to their cost. The extensive know-how of the mining industry plus that of the underground gas storage industry could be applied in placing such plants in suitable geological formations 500 or more feet underground near load centers. So located, with suitable locks in the elevator shafts to contain and hold back any pressure of radioactive gas in the event of an accident or a meltdown, these plants could meet the requirements for nuclear safety. Placed in a suitably impermeable geological formation, a meltdown, even if it buried itself below the underground chamber level, would not leak radioactive products into underground water or into the atmosphere.

The second big nuclear production problem today is primarily environmental; it concerns the effects of the water discharge from large reactors in heating up streams and larger bodies of water, thus altering the ecology in many harmful ways. Here Europe has pointed the way to the answer—large cooling towers, built on the surface to recycle and cool the hot water discharges with very low net water heating.

Finally, there are problems in the safety and security of handling and transporting plutonium, and in the perpetual storage of radioactive wastes. In these areas, risks cannot be totally eliminated, but they can and should be sharply reduced to an acceptable level by determined action—as we enter an era of massive production, transport and handling of plutonium, which is one of the most toxic substances known.

All in all, the measures required to permit expansion of nuclear-fission plants will not be cheap or easy. But if the necessary steps are taken, nuclear-fission plants should be able to provide roughly ten percent of our total 1985 energy needs at tolerable levels of risk and bearable costs. And experience in this next decade should tell us much about the degree to which we can hope to expand, by the end of the century, our use of nuclear fission, especially through the breeder reactor; in the 1985 time frame, the breeder is not likely to make a significant contribution.

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If roughly ten percent is the best we can hope to get from nuclear sources by 1985—the figure used in our original Table I —it follows that there remains a very large shortfall from the proposed reduction in overall oil use. Even if we now assume that total consumption would be less than assumed in Table I, the proportion to be made up is on the order of 15 percent. Indeed, on my own best guess about the amount of domestic natural gas we shall be able to find by 1985, I should think that natural gas (even with some imports) should not be counted on for more than 15 percent of the total, and perhaps as little as ten percent; perhaps new gas reserves will be found on a large scale, but at the moment much expert opinion doubts this. We would do well to plan prudently on a figure not exceeding ten percent, or a total shortfall of roughly 25 percent of the total to be made up from sources other than oil or gas.

Inevitably, we are drawn to coal—and to greatly expanded coal production and gasification as the third central element in an action program. To whatever extent possible, coal as a solid fuel should be expanded in its own right, especially in electric power plants—using processes to remove the sulfur from stack gas such as the Japanese now employ. But for every reason —adaptability, transportability and environmental consequences —gas from coal is particularly important.

Available options for processing coal include conversion to low-BTU gas, high-BTU pipeline-quality gas, oil or various combinations. Technical, economic and time criteria should guide the choices made. But the great advantages of pipeline-quality gas for most uses justify major emphasis on this choice. A massive crash program is needed to move present process options forward. Current estimates indicate that the cost of capital investment in new gasification plants should be on the order of $20,000 per ton of daily coal feed to process coal into pipeline-quality gas.

Any program to increase coal mining must face up fully to the problem of environmental impact. The necessary coal must come overwhelmingly from surface mines, predominantly west of the Mississippi. In the past, such strip mining has rightly acquired a bad reputation. Fortunately, a large part of the coal reserves in the West are located on public lands. Therefore, the federal government is in a position to set the conditions for mining operations. I believe it essential that such conditions

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include provision for restoring the land after the coal is extracted, putting solid waste from the mining process back underground and creating a land surface that must be at least as stable, fertile and valuable as the original. An allowance of $2,000 per acre for such purposes may be a fair approximation of what it would take, and this cost would have to be considered a basic cost of production. Underground mines must control pollution and use several practices which might increase costs up to a dollar per ton. Similarly, coal gasification plants can and must incorporate controls to avoid air and water pollution. Altogether, while the mere existence of the plants means that the countryside can never be quite the same in the future, the problem of environmental impact can at least be reduced to bearable proportions in view of the stakes involved.

Building up our reliance on coal would involve capital costs for mining production as well as for the gasification plants. In 1970 U.S. coal production was about 500 million tons and accounted for roughly 20 percent of our energy needs. To meet 50 percent of total energy needs in 1985 (at the three percent intervening growth rate) would require a production level of two billion tons per year—a quadrupling of the 1970 level and an average growth rate for the next 12 years of 12 percent per year. Investment needed to produce this basic production increase can be roughly estimated at $10 per ton, or $15 billion. If two-thirds of the increase, or one billion tons, went to gasification, the plant investment would be approximately $60 billion, and there would be a major additional investment in gas pipelines. Finally, for the one-third of increased coal output burned directly in power plants (to replace present oil and natural gas supplies), a substantial railway transport investment would be required, as well as costs of conversion to coal where feasible, and desulfurization of stack gases.

Obviously, such a buildup of coal production and coal gasification is a truly major undertaking, difficult from a technical standpoint and costly and complicated in terms of the mix of private and public effort involved. It is a big job, but no bigger than the Manhattan or Apollo projects—in fact substantially less in proportion to the scale of the American economy in the 1970s and 1980s.

One crucial question remains—the adequacy of reserves. Before embarking on a course designed to make coal our principal

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source of energy by 1985 and thereafter, we need to assess the scale of our coal reserves and how long they might last. While I have stated my proposal purely in terms of 1985, it is obvious that we would not wish to mount an effort on this scale and then change course quickly thereafter; on the contrary, it is my own belief that we should plan tentatively at this stage to meet not just 50 percent but as much as 75 percent of our energy needs from coal by the year 2000. It is now forecast that natural gas reserves will be gone before 2000 and that global oil reserves will be declining fast (even with less U.S. consumption than now forecast). Thus, coal and nuclear power *could* be our overwhelming energy sources by that time, with coal by then being converted on a large scale to oil for transportation needs. Oil from shale might also have become a substantial source; present reserves of oil shale are such that we could produce five million barrels of oil a day for more than 300 years before such reserves were exhausted. We need not be quite this futuristic for concrete planning—but we do need to assess reserves on the basis of large assumptions, to be sure of what we are doing in the 1985 time frame.

Happily, the coal reserve picture is reassuring even if all this comes true. The current Bureau of Mines estimate (1970) of U.S. coal reserves is 1,600 billion tons. If coal use now moves up steadily to 50 percent of total energy by 1985 and to 75 percent by 2000 (again allowing for a small but steady annual increase in energy use), then total consumption in the entire period from 1974 to 2000 would be on the order of 70 billion tons, or four and one-half percent of known reserves. Exhaustion of reserves would be roughly 100 years away in 2000, even if the use continued to increase at a steady rate.[3]

In sum, coal reserves are ample to meet the projected needs through the balance of this century and to leave us with supplies to last another century. Through the use of coal on this scale, coupled with the restriction of oil supplies to transportation uses and the regaining of our momentum on nuclear power, we could meet the strategic goals stated at the outset: minimal dependence on overseas supplies and reasonable rises in energy costs—to

[3] The actual calculation here is that 17 billion tons of coal would be consumed between now and 1985 and 50 billion in the next 15 years. The latter figure assumes that growth in total energy needs (in terms of BTU content of fuels) would have been reduced to two percent per year, versus the three percent target of the Decade Program and the present 4.5 percent.

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levels not over two or three times present rates. This is the best action program now available. It would get us through this period and buy crucial time for whatever innovations may develop, while allowing us to continue with expanded coal use if such innovations do not appear on a large scale.

IV

I have outlined this "Decade Program" first in order to define the key elements in our effort between now and 1985. These key elements are essential, they take time to bring about, and we must get started on them at once.

But as we do so we must also reckon that the required changes cannot be brought about immediately. The program needs at least the whole decade to take full effect, and in the meantime—even if we have cut our energy growth rate to three percent—we face extraordinarily serious problems. Hence, in addition to our Decade Program, we must have what might be called an "Emergency Program." This would dovetail as well as possible with the Decade Program but inevitably would not be wholly consistent with it.

Oil remains the crux of our present problem. The standstill on new refinery construction, partly for environmental and related political reasons and partly because of unattractive return on investment, may compel some rationing of gasoline this summer and of fuel oil next winter. And even if new refinery capacity existed today, an adequate supply of crude oil from abroad could not now be landed without at least one new "superport" and also large-scale new tanker construction. As for domestic oil development, the Alaska pipeline is still in abeyance, and offshore exploration is inhibited by state opposition and disputes with the federal government about royalties. Also significant is the public belief that all offshore operations are as disastrous as the Santa Barbara episode (which disregards the large-scale operations conducted in the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea for years without major accidents).

The fact is that we cannot avoid a continuing increase, for some years to come, in our imports of oil—especially from the Middle East. In 1973 we shall be importing 3.4 million barrels a day from the Middle East and North Africa, and two million from Latin America. These figures are bound to rise—for some years well above the Decade Program goal of only five million

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barrels a day of imports by 1985.

Finally, there is a basic policy question that must be faced—whether in common prudence the United States should now have a strategic reserve of crude oil or refined products to protect against interruptions. Crude stocks are currently below 20 days and refined products in the form of working inventories in the distribution system are less than 40 days—essentially minimum working levels with no strategic reserve. Such a reserve is something individual Americans have quietly urged on Europe for years, and in 1968 the members of the European Community accepted the obligation to build up oil stocks equivalent to 65 days' use. Now it has been proposed that this reserve be raised to 90 days. In the case of the United States, the targets need not be defined in terms of such periods of total oil use, but as our imports increase we should at least have a strategic reserve equal to perhaps 90 days of our imports, to cushion the shock of any interruption for political or bargaining reasons. To urge this does not indicate the slightest degree of hostility to the supplying countries; it is what businessmen all over the world prudently do in order to negotiate on a relatively even keel with suppliers.

Solving all of these emergency problems will take both resources and ingenuity. In the case of refineries, I believe inland sites must be found, and new refineries must adopt available technology which produces virtually no air or water pollution. Such refineries exist in Europe; they can be matched here, and not at excessive cost. Similarly, superports must be built with expensive safeguards—their cost would be perhaps as high as $1.5 billion to unload ten million barrels a day, with additional pipeline costs to bring the oil to inland refineries, and conceivably an investment of $15 billion for tankers adequate to haul the ten million barrels a day from the Persian Gulf. It is a daunting prospect—and underscores the vital importance of preventing our maximum import dependence from going beyond roughly the ten million figure at any time, and the importance of reducing dependence as soon as possible to our target ceiling of five million barrels. The painful fact is that some part of total refinery capacity, and as much as half of the planned superport capacity, will become obsolete or surplus as we carry out the shift to coal and the reduction in the proportion of our energy needs supplied by oil imports.[4] When a problem has been neglected as long as we

[4] It seems likely that substantial strategic reserves of crude and refined products may still be important to protect against the effects of important interruptions.

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have ignored or misjudged the energy situation, the short-term requirements may not mesh with the requirements for the medium and longer term—and so it is in this case. We have to fix the roof and build a new house at the same time.

V

In short, it will take a two-fold crash program to master the situation, part directed to a transformation in our energy pattern by 1985, part directed to getting along in the meantime. The dual task involves a series of massive new efforts, some of them within the capacity of private companies, some beyond that capacity, some which will be so clearly uneconomical that private companies would be reluctant or unable to undertake them with their own funds. No one can now say just what the mix of public and private effort will be—but what seems absolutely clear is that a much larger public role will be required than now exists, partly to pull together all the strands of both parts of the program, partly to support private effort, partly to undertake those aspects that cannot be handled by private companies.

I see no alternative to new government machinery at the federal level. Accordingly, I propose a National Energy Authority (NEA) with a ten-year life and with appropriate powers to deal with the national emergency. This will mean authority to override obstacles in regard to land acquisition, siting, environmental impact, and other areas as necessary to carry out the program. This should not relieve the NEA of a very serious obligation to make environmental assessments of its proposed projects and to hold public hearings to develop the best available means to minimize the environmental consequences and risks of the actions it takes, but it would authorize the NEA to proceed with its program and not be stopped by the obstacles which stall so many things today.

Under the NEA it would be essential to create a National Energy Finance Corporation (NEFC) to provide funds for parts of the program which may not be privately financeable, including the superport, a billion-barrel strategic stock and its storage facility, sites for refineries, offshore production units, tankers, coal gasification plants, and gas, oil and coal pipelines. Large amounts of capital are going to be needed. An important obstacle today is that some of these essential investments are not attractive to private capital. In designing the NEA and the

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NEFC we have many examples such as the TVA and the New York Port Authority, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank. There are ample precedents for the kinds of authority needed and the appropriate legislation, controls and accountability.

The NEA should be an independent agency, perhaps modelled on the original Atomic Energy Commission, in any event as resistant to political pressures as that Commission was. I propose that NEA have a ten-year life and go out of existence in 1985 except for the NEFC, which is likely to be needed beyond that time. There are several reasons for this proposal. First, the exercise of emergency powers is anomalous in our system and should be limited to as short a time as required to overcome the emergency. I believe the job will take a full ten years, but can be done in ten years if the program is geared to such a timetable. Second, when the job is done most of the programs should be carried forward by industry on a commercial basis, and necessary continuing governmental functions can be transferred to other agencies. Third, the best period in the life of any agency is the first ten years. After that the sclerosis of bureaucracy sets in and we certainly do not need any more bureaucracies. No one should seek a career in NEA—only the excitement and satisfaction of doing a critically important job and finishing it. Meeting numerical targets and being measured on performance in meeting them through frequent public reports is the kind of a challenge which should attract the kinds of people needed.

The NEA will have to undertake extensive research and development and pilot plant and demonstration operations. It should, for example, underwrite the incremental costs and use its authority to clear the way for the first two or three nuclear power plants which are built underground. It should back the construction of several demonstration units of large offshore oil production operations incorporating the maximum safeguards in technology and procedures and should use these for public education and to provide a model for the industry. NEA can work out with the AEC appropriate joint activities in regard to the underground power plants, waste disposal, plutonium shipment handling and so on.

In addition, in the Program for the Decade and beyond, conservation should be an important component; this might include the creation of a national fuel efficiency service to effect econ-

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omies in the use of fuels. Currently, there is an almost complete absence of professional interest, activity, or expertise in this subject—whether in universities, engineering firms, business enterprises or the government. A major task of NEA would be to stimulate such expertise and put it to work. As a result of coping with limited fuel supplies during the next few years, we may discover economies which are not only relatively painless but which reveal to us better life-styles. Adopting such life-styles might substantially reduce per capita energy use.

In the Emergency Program of NEA, one of the first projects will be a superport. It may be sufficient for the NEA to exercise the authority to establish the superport and to supplement its financing. Clearly the NEA must work in close collaboration with the oil industry in many of the things it does. It must be shown that gas and oil pipelines can come ashore on their way inland and leave no offensive trace of their transit across the coastline. A second project is to acquire inland sites for oil storage and refineries. It should be noted that even packed closely together a billion barrels of oil storage would take 10,000 acres, or 15 square miles. Inland sites will save our finite coastline for better public uses. Another major project is the question of supplementary finance for tankers—at a time when world shipyards are solidly booked.

The NEFC will have much to do. To repeat, one problem in the financing of facilities such as the superport, tankers and perhaps the refineries is that at the end of the Decade imports are to be brought down again to only five million barrels per day. Thus, the success of the Decade Program may mean a fairly early obsolescence for part of the capacity of the superports and tankers—hence one key need for significant public financing.

VI

In laying out this proposed program, I have indicated some specific steps to minimize its consequences for the physical environment. In some areas we should be better off in the new 1985 situation: our cars should be smaller and have reduced volumes of emissions; most fossil-fueled electric power plants would be taking sulfur out of the stack gases or burning clean non-polluting gas; new nuclear power plants would be safely underground and out of sight save for their enormous cooling towers; most important, a declining rate of energy expansion would make a

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great difference to the environment all across the board, at least as compared to what we are headed for at our current rate of expansion. This would represent a sensible modification of our past craze for growth, and the environment would be the gainer in some respects.

But not in others. Up to now we have behaved as if we had the luxury to have the best of both worlds. We have not made the tough choices. Now the energy emergency makes us choose, and the choices are few. Some environmental prices must be paid: one or more oil superports off the East coast, and added refineries (however pure) inland; the Alaska pipeline with residual risks that even the safest design and procedures cannot avoid; much increased offshore oil development, and much increased coal mining largely from surface sources—which even with the best possible measures would tend for a time to deface the particular area. I do not minimize these costs, but feel them keenly as one who has been active for several years in the scientific effort in support of national and international environment measures. In each case, the trade-off has been weighed, and it seems to me that the gain outweighs the loss.

VII

What I have proposed is a national program for the United States, calculated on the basis of particular American resources and American needs. One of its major purposes is, of course, an international one, to shorten the duration of the costs, pain and strain—and of the dangers to world harmony and peace—that lie in a situation of growing American dependence on external energy sources, especially Middle East oil. But it is primarily the United States that would be hitching up its belt and putting its energy house in order, by measures that do not in themselves harm any other nation.

Is the program, however, not only national but nationalistic? Would it affect the world energy picture indirectly to the disadvantage of others, whether suppliers or consumers? Does it mean an increase in American autarky, fortifying the tendency other countries now see for the United States to take care of its own needs and let the rest of the world go hang?

The answer to all these questions is a resounding "No." This is most obvious if we look at the relations between the United States and the other major industrialized countries, which are

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also the major consumers of energy. As things now stand, Western Europe and Japan are inescapably dependent, far more than the United States and far longer into both past and future, on imported oil and gas; if the United States becomes a vastly increased buyer of both, the effect can only be, at best, friction, and, at worst, price wars and preëmptive deals that would cut at the very roots of coöperation between the United States, Europe and Japan. This danger is indeed already visible, and it will take a good deal of statesmanship to avoid it as things stand now; by 1980 or 1985, on present trends, the seeds of strife could be beyond control.

Yet Japan and most of Europe have no alternative comparable to what coal can be for America. Only the United Kingdom, among the major European countries, can meet a significant part of its needs from coal and from North Sea natural gas—and the latter only at the expense of its neighbors' expectations.

Hence these countries should welcome a determined American effort to reduce dependence on the oil sources that are a "must" for them. And the same should hold true for the oil-consuming developing countries, now being badly hurt by the price rises of Middle East oil.

But does this mean that the oil-producing countries would be hurt? I think not. If Mr. Akins and others are correct, the 1980 prospect already assumes that at least two key countries (Saudi Arabia and Iran) will produce more oil, and tap a higher proportion of their predicted reserves, than they may like.[5] To prolong the life of these reserves and to space out the income of the producers can mean a net benefit to most of the producing countries. Their prices will rise in any event in the years to come, but the present prospect of runaway increases in production cannot be attractive compared to a more orderly expansion that prolongs their assets.

Indeed, I would go one step further. I believe that an American program such as I have described could be an essential ingredient in a new approach to the energy situation by the whole international community. On any rational look at the production and consumption of energy all over the world, the United States represents not only a statistical discrepancy and target for the role of villain (six percent consuming 33 percent, and getting greater), but a potential disruptive force in almost every market

[5] Akins, *loc. cit.*, p. 480.

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day by day; only if this is brought under control can the United States play any responsible role in the effort that may have to be undertaken within the next decade, or at least by the end of the century—to balance and distribute world energy supplies much more fairly and reasonably than nature or men have ever done to date. For unless we do this there is scant hope for human progress and peace in the long run.

Thus, I propose a program based in the first instance on American national interest. But I deeply believe that this program could make a vast difference to international relations in the next 10 to 20 years, and serve as a step toward a more rational world use of energy for the benefit of man.

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THE OIL STORY: FACTS, FICTION AND FAIR PLAY

By Jahangir Amuzegar

THE multitude of articles, news reports and commentaries on the energy "crisis" in recent months have been chiefly concerned with four basic issues: (1) a growing (and by implication, a worrisome) oil "shortage" in the United States and the industrial world; (2) an intimate (and by implication, an unholy) alliance between the major oil companies and the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) at the expense of the consuming public; (3) an increasing (and by implication, an undesirable) redistribution of oil revenues through higher oil prices in favor of producing countries, giving them significant (and by implication, excessive) controls over future oil supply and foreign exchange reserves; and (4) a need for concerted action (and by implication, "drastic measures") on the part of the oil-short countries vis-à-vis the "oil cartel."

An obsessive preoccupation with the superficial and adversary aspects of these issues has in turn given rise to some unfortunate misunderstandings regarding the real problems facing both oil producers and oil consumers in the next decades. The need for a more balanced assessment of these problems, and for a constructive world view of the situation, has never been so compelling.

II

The genesis of the present energy "crisis" is no mystery. Oil is being depleted much faster than other sources of energy, and its price has been on the rise. Oil suppliers, however, are not the *cause* of the oil "shortage." Rising oil prices are symptomatic of an expected imbalance between potential sources and uses of oil. And the oil demand and supply arithmetic within the whole energy picture is very simple. In the last three decades the world has used up more energy than in all previous history. In the next 15 years mankind is expected to use up as much energy as it has up to now. On reasonable present predictions, more than 70 percent of this energy need will have to be met by hydrocarbons, i.e. 16 percent by gas, 54 by oil. Yet despite such unprecedented demands, the supply of natural gas and crude oil has failed to keep pace because production incentives have been weak and

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inadequate—reflecting in part a deliberate and deceitfully plausible policy by the industrial world to keep premium energy prices below their true costs.

Between 1945 and 1960 the non-Communist world energy demand expanded at the rate of 4 percent a year. During the 1960s the annual growth rate reached nearly 6 percent. On the basis of past trends the total energy demand may double between 1970 and 1985, reaching over 145 million barrels per day (b/d) of oil-equivalent. Total U.S. energy consumption is estimated to double from 33 million to 63 million b/d between 1970 and 1985. Consumption in the European Economic Community (EEC) in the same period is expected to rise by 93 percent; that of Japan by 156 percent.

To meet such enormous energy demands there are three alternatives: (1) to raise the supply of conventional sources (e.g. coal, crude oil, natural gas and hydroelectricity); (2) to look more seriously into further development of more expensive substitutes (e.g. oil shales, tar sands and nuclear power); or (3) to develop exotic energy potentials (e.g. geothermal, solar power, tidal waves and hydrogen fusion). An increase in the supply of coal and hydroelectricity is time-consuming, costly or replete with significant technical and environmental limitations.[1] Exotic potentials—now in experimental use for heating and power in some countries—are expected to remain marginal, at least for the rest of the twentieth century, because of enormous technological complexities and high costs.

The combined supply of the first two categories in 1985 is now estimated to amount to 20.3 million b/d (of oil-equivalent) for coal; 23.2 million b/d for gas; 14.5 million b/d for nuclear energy; 8.7 million b/d for hydroelectric power; 1.4 million b/d for oil shales and tar sands. The lion's share of the total energy market—54 percent or 78.3 million b/d—will have to be provided by crude oil.

Oil reserves are not evenly distributed among nations. Nor is the thirst for oil. More than 63 percent of total world proven petroleum reserves are located in OPEC territories—mostly in the Persian Gulf area. The rest is chiefly owned by the United States (about 6 percent) and the Socialist or "non-market" camp (about

[1] The share of coal in total non-Communist world energy supply is now expected to fall to 14 percent in 1985, from 22 in 1970, 60 in 1950. Gas and hydroelectricity are to remain relatively constant, at 16 and 6 percent respectively. Only nuclear power is to increase by tenfold, although still no more than 10 percent of the total by 1985.

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15 percent).[2] On the demand side, the unevenness is equally striking. With six percent of the world population, the United States consumes almost one-third of all world energy and one-third of global oil consumption; it now produces about 11 million barrels of oil a day and consumes nearly 17 million b/d. The Common Market consumes 13 million b/d and produces only .5 million. Japan produces virtually no oil, but uses 4.6 million b/d. With an inadequate supply of indigenous hydrocarbons, the energy-hungry countries of the industrial world are, therefore, increasingly dependent upon oil imports—America 30 percent, the EEC 90 percent, and Japan almost totally.[3] Even the Soviet Union and China—so far self-sufficient in their energy requirements—may become oil importers by the close of this century.

III

The future imbalance between supply and demand for energy in general, and petroleum in particular, is indeed real and significant. But the present energy "crisis" is not a cataclysmic event. It has been in the making for years, and could have been predicted and dealt with long ago. What is novel in the energy picture is the public's awareness of the possibility of an oil-less world in the not too distant future. This, in turn, is caused by an about-face barrage of corporate advertising designed to sell the "crisis" instead of oil, and by the crucial role of oil imports ($4.6 billion in 1972) in U.S. overall trade deficits. To understand the embryonic origin of the present imbalance in the world petroleum market—chiefly, the U.S. oil "shortage"—one has to examine (a) the behavior of oil prices and profit distribution between 1946 and 1971, and (b) the gradual shift by industrial countries to oil and gas as a major source of fuel, with two unfortunate results: an accelerated depletion (and wasteful use) of premium hydrocarbon resources, and an inequitable distribution of world income.

First, a word on oil prices and profits. By a bounty of nature, the fossil fuel floating underneath the Middle East and North African sands and offshore waters is of such quality and ease of reach as to make extraction costs at the wellhead only a fraction of such costs in other parts of the world—10 cents a barrel on the average for the Middle East, compared with roughly 51

[2] *The Oil and Gas Journal*, December 25, 1972, pp. 82–83.

[3] By 1985 (or perhaps sooner), the U.S. need for oil imports is estimated to reach nearly 15 million b/d or more than 50 percent of consumption.

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cents in Venezuela, 82 cents in Indonesia, $1.31 in the United States and 80 cents in the U.S.S.R. in recent years). Since oil of the same quality is bound to obtain uniform f.o.b. prices in the world free markets, Middle East and North African crudes have up to now offered their owners an enormous windfall profit—what economists call Ricardian rent—stemming from the difference in production costs compared with Mexican Gulf suppliers and other high-cost producers.

The postwar history of the oil industry is a story of a continued jockeying among petroleum exporters and the oil majors, to divide (and appropriate) this rent. In the heyday of the seven major international oil companies and the oil boom at the end of World War II, the rent was divided pretty unevenly between the oil-producing countries (18 percent) and the oil concessionaires (82 percent). The consuming countries reaped the competitive benefits of low-price oil in the form of a Marshallian "consumer surplus." The low oil prices also permitted the oil-importing countries to finance part of their infrastructures through import duties on fuel and stiff excise taxes on gasoline, thus siphoning off part of the "surplus." The practice still continues.[4]

The companies' oligopolistic grip on world oil production, refining, transportation and marketing was gradually loosened by several new developments: the entry of independent oil producers in the world market; emergence of the Soviet Union as an oil exporter; creation of national oil companies in the producing countries; and declining political influence of the oil majors on their own governments. With each crack in the oligopolistic structure, a notch was added to the producers' share. The establishment of OPEC in 1960 served as a final turning point in the long struggle by the producers to get their due share. Thus the 18/82 ratio per barrel of oil in 1948 became 32/68 in 1952; 50/50 in 1960; and 70/30 in 1970. Nevertheless, rising volume of production and exports (without much additional new investment required) gave the oil majors a ratio of income to their net Mideast assets of 55 percent in 1970. The ratio of crude oil income to net assets in crude oil production in the same year was nearly 100 percent.

[4] Excise taxes alone on retail gasoline by industrial countries in 1972 ranged from a low of 32 percent in the United States to a high of 78 percent in Italy, with Japan, France, Great Britain and West Germany in the 55 to 70 percent range. In all these cases, taxes charged by consumer governments have exceeded oil producers' share per barrel of oil by more than three and one-half times.

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The gradual change in rent-sharing in favor of oil producers was only partly effective in taking from the Caesars that which was not theirs. As long as the oil concessionaires had the prerogative of determining the posted price of oil (i.e. the price on which royalties and taxes were based) the sharing formula was of only small benefit to the owners. The price of a barrel of crude oil (34° API), fixed by the companies at $2.17 in 1948, was gradually and unilaterally brought down by them to $1.80 in 1960 in order to capture European and Japanese markets. Right after its establishment, OPEC managed to put an end to unilateral price determination by the companies. But precipitous attempts on the part of most producers to increase their exports (partly to offset the effects of price reductions and partly for higher total revenues) resulted in further reducing effective oil prices by offers of 35 to 55 cent discounts per barrel below the posted price.[5]

The second aspect of the present energy "shortage" has to do with the excessive and inefficient use of oil. Without doubt, the rapid postwar exploitation of Mideast and North African oil resources and their export at bargain-basement prices to West Europe, America and Japan helped provide the basic underpinnings of fast economic growth and unprecedented material prosperity in the industrial world. But, in retrospect, the costs seem to have been devastatingly high. And therein lies the fallacy of cheap oil, and the paradox of prosperity in the midst of poverty.

The rich industrial countries favored the cheap oil policy because of a false sense of security, as if the world had an inexhaustible supply of energy—as though no end were in sight. By an economic myopia of incomprehensible dimensions, millions upon millions of energy-gobbling products—from impractically big and fast cars to profligately trivial household gadgets—were allowed to flood the market, only to be replaced soon by bigger, faster and more power-thirsty models. Awed by the marvels of high-energy technology and lulled by the borrowed affluence of unfettered growth, the West refused to believe that its immediate energy demands were on a collision course with long-term environmental considerations.

[5] To isolate itself from a deluge of "dirt-cheap" oil imports, the United States imposed restrictive quotas on Mideast oil in 1959, and American domestic prices soon rose to $3.50 per barrel on the average, giving quota-holders a new $1.25 to $1.50 a barrel "windfall" profit for access to the U.S. market. The quotas were removed in April 1973 and replaced by a "fee" still designed to protect domestic producers from foreign competition.

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Cheap oil as a matter of national policy was thus responsible not only for a worldwide shortage of energy, but for some possibly irretrievable damage to the earth's ecology.[6] By keeping the Mideast oil price deliberately below its true scarcity value (in terms of production costs in other parts of the world, equivalents in other sources of energy, or replacement costs), the industrial world inadvertently perpetrated four hoaxes on itself and on its unborn generations. The artificially low price of oil (a) discouraged oil producers from searching effectively for new sources of supply; (b) helped hold down prices of substitutes (e.g. coal, gas and hydroelectricity), and likewise dampened their development prospects despite their huge reserves; (c) stifled and/or delayed research in the development of more efficient technology for the economical use of nonconventional energy sources; and above all, (d) contributed to an inexcusably reckless waste and inefficient use of world premium fuels. In the United States, for example, automobiles reportedly use only about 20 percent of the energy potential in gasoline, and 23 percent of their passenger capacity. Factories waste power by useless lighting and inadequate recycling. Residential and commercial buildings use 20 to 50 percent more heating and air conditioning than needed for comfortable but intelligent use. Electric generators use about three BTU's of fuel to produce one BTU of electricity.

In short, the post-World War II miracle of material prosperity and soaring consumption was achieved, partly at least, at the expense of colossal environmental degradation—air and water pollution, soil erosion, nuclear hazards, noise, congestion, junk piles and other material and nonmaterial disamenities brought down upon Spaceship Earth. In some countries the substitution of fuel-based energy for human energy caused serious and protracted unemployment. Backed up behind this facade of material affluence and progress are the intolerably high costs of cleaning and restoring the environment—accumulated costs which, if recognized in time and charged against beneficiaries, would probably have been less burdensome.

IV

If the postwar miracle of GNP growth in Western Europe, Japan and the United States had been achieved mainly through

[6] The same short-sighted policy has been followed in the United States with regard to natural gas, the price of which at the wellhead has been fixed by the Federal Power Commission at about one-third of its full scarcity value.

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a foolishly fast depletion of their own energy sources, the trade-off might have looked less pointedly ironic. The staggering retribution which they must now pay to restore the earth's "finite, enclosed, life-support system" might have fit their self-inflicted sins both of omission and commission. But the irony of this economic miracle lies in the manner in which it was achieved —by subsidies from the oil-producing countries, mostly poor and struggling countries, at the expense of *their* limited irreplaceable assets.

Thanks partly to an uninterrupted supply of cheap oil—as low as $1.25 a barrel as late as 1970—the EEC countries and Japan raised their industrial production, boosted their exports, improved their balance of payments, saved their own solid fuel resources and amassed enormous foreign-exchange reserves. But now, not only does the affluent West feel no redeeming sympathy for such embarrassing enrichment at the expense of its unsuspecting and helpless partners; some Western politicians, economists and oil experts are self-righteously indignant about the prospect of having to pay the full scarcity value of imported oil through collective bargaining with OPEC.

OPEC was originally organized by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela in 1960 as a countervailing force to try to resist unilateral action by the oil majors to reduce the posted price of oil, action that was intensified particularly during 1959–60. Later, OPEC was joined by Algeria, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. But despite their heroic resolve to stabilize oil prices and to prevent further deterioration of their terms of trade with their rich partners, OPEC members fought in vain for ten long years. It was only under the 1971 Tehran agreement that the basic oil price was raised upward of its immediate postwar level.[7]

The news media accounts of OPEC negotiations since the 1971 Tehran agreement have been mostly concerned with price hikes and income boosts. Not surprisingly, little attention has been paid to four other and more positive features. First, the acceptance by the oil majors in February 1971 of a petroleum price policy based on "collective bargaining" instead of the previous practice of unilateral determination. Second, the introduction of an "escalator

[7] Even the $2.60 a barrel f.o.b. price of crude oil in the Persian Gulf in 1973, however, shows less than 20 percent increase over the 1947 price, while the index of manufactured imports by Mideast countries has risen by more than 50 percent.

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clause" or parity adjustment in income calculations—similar to the ones for wages—based on general price-level increases in industrial countries. Third, the establishment in December 1971 of a "real" price for oil based on "stable dollars" and free from exchange fluctuations, putting oil on more or less the same parity with gold. And, fourth, the acceptance in March 1972 by the oil majors of the principle of local equity participation in oil-company assets and profits.

The main thrust of OPEC's struggle for recognition and representation of producers' interests has thus been to see to it that the price of crude oil like other energy prices reflects its true cost, and that the legitimate interests of the owners are protected. This is neither an unreasonable goal nor necessarily a purely self-serving one. This is the way all prices should be set. This is what the environmentalists are asking for. This is what President Nixon has recommended in his recent energy message to Congress. If it looks like a sheep in wolf's clothing now, it is a blessing in disguise for the long-term interests of all mankind.[8]

V

Now, a word on OPEC's rise and its future. There has been ill-concealed apprehension over OPEC's "victories" and their effect on future oil supply and world monetary reserves. Dark hints are made about the possibility of a *"défi Arab"*—an Arab challenge—to the Western corporate structure and international monetary order. Suggestions for remedies have ranged all the way from the innocuous gesture of coöperation among importing countries to the preposterous notion of "a planned takeover of the oil lands." Among other proposals along this competition-confrontation spectrum there has been persistent demand for breaking up OPEC, and putting the "genie" back in the bottle.

The proposal to break up OPEC and remove the oil companies from crude oil marketing (so as to increase competition among oil producers) is, to be sure, incredibly naïve. Apart from the insurmountable political and technical difficulties of such a "mission impossible" (who is going to put the bell around the cat's neck?) the practical effects on reducing future oil prices

[8] Recent studies show that supply and demand for energy are significantly price-elastic. Market forces, through scarcity-value pricing, can thus be mobilized in favor of energy conservation instead of its historical plunder. By the same token, it can be shown that a rise in the price of oil and gas may in fact result in a *reduction* of BTU cost, not only through more efficient use but through the development of substitutes.

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are far from certain. OPEC is what OPEC does. If it has any strength—and the critics believe it has too much—the reasons must be sought in the awareness, wisdom and determination of its members. It is indeed amusingly paradoxical that the organization itself is often credited by its critics with so much clout in setting oil prices, imposing participation conditions, putting political pressure on uncoöperative nations, and even denying Western access to its resources. Yet its individual member-governments are expected to act impetuously and irrationally in cutting their own throats and those of their former allies after OPEC's fall. Not only do OPEC leaders fully realize the futility of such actions now; even in their sophomore years at Harvard and Cornell they knew that no producer of an irreplaceable and vital commodity (who can sell all he can prudently produce at the going or higher prices) is ever going to lower his price no matter how competitively he may be expected to act.

Oil is just such a commodity in the present energy situation. Even an elementary oligopoly matrix, portraying the behavior of a few rival sellers, suffices to show that for prices to follow an upward trend no formal collusion or concerted action is essential: every smart seller, mindful of the reactions of his rivals, will find it ultimately suicidal to undercut them. Not to grant OPEC leaders this much instinctive sagacity would be the height of incredulity, if not the dawn of prejudice.

Another serious proposal for dealing with the energy "crisis" is confrontation: the formation of an organization of oil importing countries within the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development or elsewhere to give backbone to the oil companies in any confrontation with OPEC, or to intervene directly in oil price negotiations. Whatever swashbuckling merits this type of confrontation may have, it looks both impractical and counterproductive. Impractical because, as is commonly recognized, the vital national interests of the oil-importing countries (particularly Japan, the EEC and the United States) do not always coincide; and they certainly do not tally with the interests of the oil companies. Japan, in particular, has been lukewarm toward this idea from the beginning. And EXXON officials have gone on record opposing the proposal on grounds of inflexibility, excessive bureaucratization, and undue interference by consuming governments in their business affairs. As *The Wall Street Journal* has put it, "the threat not to buy oil is totally incredible,

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while the threat not to sell it is only mildly incredible."

But even if such a united front could in fact be established and made effective, the results might aggravate the problem rather than solve it. As is well recognized by oil-industry leaders, the hostile atmosphere that ensues from such confrontations is bound to stiffen each party's position and lead to compulsive actions and reactions that may jeopardize the possibility of rational compromise and mutual accommodation. Some OPEC-member officials have made it clear that they regard an oil-consumer bloc designed as a cartel for purposes of confrontation as an "unhealthy and abrasive" development which is "never in the interests of the consumers."

Confrontation also seems undesirable because in the last analysis it is bound to be counterproductive. It can, at best, reintroduce past injustices (and inefficient use of oil) by denying oil exporters a fair price for their fast-dwindling assets. And, at worst, it can trigger needless interruptions of supply or export restrictions which would be in no one's interest.

There is, however, a third and more statesmanlike approach—closer international coöperation among oil-short and oil-surplus countries both in the intercountry allocation of available supply at reasonable prices, and in a joint endeavor for the development of other, cheaper sources of energy. The exact form of such coöperation is naturally subject to detailed and obviously difficult negotiations. A variant, frequently mentioned in America, is an international oil agreement—modeled after some of the more successful postwar commodity schemes—under which sovereign rights, economic interest and managerial prerogatives of the exporting countries are amply protected in return for an assurance of secure supplies at reasonable prices for the importers.

No matter what specific form and shape such international coöperation may take, however, its ultimate success will depend on the acceptance by the oil-importing nations of two unavoidable realities—unpleasant and unprecedented as they may appear. First, oil-short countries must realize that the era of cheap energy is past, and that they must be prepared to pay the true cost of their daily amenities powered by oil. Oil is relatively clean, easy to handle and still a comparatively cheap source of energy. For some uses, such as vehicular transportation, it is as yet unmatched. As a lubricant, it can perhaps never be totally replaced. It thus demands a price commensurate with its inherent qualities

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as compared with its substitutes.

The fact that some of the oil-exporting countries are small, sparsely populated, with no need for rising incomes, is legally absurd and morally baseless. "From each according to his need, to each according to his ability" is fortunately not yet a distributive criterion among civilized nations. The majority of OPEC countries are underdeveloped by Western norms. For almost all of them, petroleum is the mainstay of the economy. But oil is an exhaustible resource. Proven world reserves probably will last no more than a few decades at the present rate of exploitation. The OPEC members know that when oil is gone, the companies will be gone too. They are trying now to diversify their economies. They want to secure a decent standard of living for their unborn (and oil-less) generations—generations that shall, hopefully, be of little or no economic burden to other countries. Oil-producing countries are determined to develop their economies, not through foreign aid, not through concessionary loans, not by force, but through an improvement in the terms of trade with their rich partners—through full-cost pricing of their precious assets. They can hardly be denied this.

The second imperative for the success of mutual coöperation has to do with the provision of practical and profitable uses for the oil exporters' surplus investable funds. Much ado has been made of late about certain exponential (and by inference, alarming) projections of future "Arab wealth," and the Croesus-like flow of dollars to the Middle East in the years to come. Depending chiefly on world demand for imported oil during the next decade and a half, price increases per barrel of oil beyond 1975 (the termination of the Tehran agreement), and production policies followed by individual Mideast countries, OPEC's income in 1980 has been estimated at anywhere between $40 and $80 billion, with a cumulative total of some $250 to $360 billion. A third of these amounts is presumed to be saved by the recipients and added to world "excess" liquidity.

While the exaggerated and alarmist nature of these projections is acknowledged by some of the soothsayers themselves, there is no doubt that OPEC members are going to receive increasing amounts of foreign exchange for the sale of their oil assets, and part of the proceeds from these sales is going to be saved. But, for many reasons, this should be considered a welcome development instead of a disaster.

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The OPEC members fall into three categories: (a) those who are net debtors and are expected to remain so, at least for the next decade, because their rising oil revenues will still fall short of their capital needs for domestic economic development; (b) those who may be net creditors now and in the future, but whose annual oil production is expected to remain at about the present level, and whose future annual receipts will not increase except for possibly higher oil prices and inflation; and (c) those whose production and incomes are destined to rise, but whose domestic investment opportunities are not likely to absorb their total foreign exchange revenues. In the first category are such producers as Iran, Nigeria, Venezuela, Indonesia, Algeria and Iraq. The second category includes Kuwait and Libya (although the latter may fit partly into the first category as well). Only Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar fall into the third group.

Incidentally, as this summary shows, more than one-third of the OPEC members (including Iran as one of its two top producers) are non-Arab. So is nearly 45 percent of OPEC's crude oil production, and almost 25 percent of its total reserves. To treat OPEC itself as an "Arab group," or to identify the revenues of its members as "Arab wealth," is thus incorrect.

The countries in the third category above, plus Kuwait and Libya, may be the ones whose revenues transcend domestic needs. Their combined annual revenues by 1980, in my judgment, might be in the range of $25–30 billion, rather than the higher figures now being estimated in some quarters.[9] Better than half of these projected revenues will probably be spent internally by the recipients, with only the rest available for investment.

Now even a $10 to $15 billion surplus by 1980 (with an accumulation of, say, $50 to $75 billion by that time) may still seem like a lot of money available for speculation. But the caveats are numerous. If the possibilities of "drastic measures" should still loom on the horizon, or if profitable joint ventures should not be found, surplus nations would in all probability rather cut production than increase devaluation-prone reserves to be kept in

[9] My projections are based on the assumption of a 12 million b/d production for Saudi Arabia, three million b/d each for Kuwait and the Emirates, and two million b/d each for Qatar and Libya at the price scales laid down by the 1971 Tehran Agreement. These "middle-of-the-road" projections are clearly below those of James E. Akins (*Foreign Affairs,* April 1973, p. 480); he himself has pointed out that his demand estimates might not be met from the Middle East.

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foreign banks, subject to possible blockades. The Parkinson Law regarding revenues and expenditures works just as effectively in the Middle East as elsewhere. And, above all, whatever future surpluses may happen to be, they would look paltry in the context of (a) desperately needed development in the Arab world, (b) investment requirements in other developing sister countries, and (c) joint ventures with industrial nations.

To be sure, for every inhabitant of the "oil-rich" Arab countries there are eight Arabs living in other, oil-less, and relatively poor countries of the Middle East and in North Africa. Their annual per capita incomes range between about $80 (for the Arab Republic of Yemen) and $250 (for Tunisia); only Lebanon can claim as much as $600. For every dollar of increased per capita income in these relatively underdeveloped Arab lands, there is a need for three or four dollars of fixed capital investment. Thus even a modest increase of only $100 a year in income for the 90 million or so oil-less Arabs would require an investment of some $30 billion. And when the opportunities for investment in the West are contemplated, even the wildest estimates of Arab wealth would look quite modest. A "middle-of-the-road guess" regarding capital costs of meeting U.S.-projected energy requirements by 1985 is put at $500 billion. A similar sum may be required for the rest of the world. Why can Arab oil revenues not be attracted into such investment opportunities? And herein lies the importance of mutual coöperation in finding practical and businesslike outlets for future Arab reserves.

For obvious political reasons the West may not wish to see Arab money take a majority interest in General Motors or CBS or Imperial Chemical or Volkswagen. But why should it be difficult to designate industries, activities and degrees of control to which Mideast funds can be invited? The real catch is not the size of future Arab reserves, but how to use them peaceably, prudently and profitably. The West's real worries should not be about the principle of true-cost-pricing of oil, but the security of supply. And here, any workable coöperation between surplus and deficit countries should see to it that the flow of oil to the West not be interrupted under normal conditions, and that adequate provision be made for such an uninterrupted flow in all eventualities.

VI

The real issues in the present energy "crisis" are, therefore, not

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the ones sensationally publicized. First, oil "shortages" in the United States (and depleted world oil reserves) are not caused by Mideast Midases or their "tax-collecting agents," but by a deliberate (and only in retrospect a short-sighted) Western policy aimed at prolonging the ephemeral luxury of cheap oil. The Middle East cannot be expected to meet the entire world's energy demand; nor can it be expected to subsidize industrialized countries indefinitely. It can only coöperate with other nations toward a more permanent solution. Second, consumers have not been victimized by a collusion between oil producers and oil companies, but mainly tax-whipped by their own governments and partly self-deluded into believing there is no end to nature's patience and generosity. Third, leaving the Cassandras, nervous-Nellies and ax-grinders aside, the prospect of OPEC's affluence should be regarded by everyone as a fortunate and desirable development for its members and the world as a whole rather than an object of Western damnation. And fourth, any attempt to hold down OPEC's oil revenues by "drastic measures" may not only result in fruitless and even dangerous reprisals and counter-reprisals, but would indeed be self-defeating.

Potential coöperation between oil-importing and oil-producing nations should thus be regarded as a triumph of reason and decency and fair play over shortsightedness and greed and prejudice. No measure of saber-rattling and name-calling on either side can obscure the common interests of the oil-producing nations and the consuming public in maintaining a stable and abundant supply of oil at reasonable prices. Up to now, Mideast costs and supply have determined world oil prices as well as prices of other energy sources. In the future, U.S. demand and other energy costs will set the pace in world oil prices. And in this lies the possibility of a rational solution to the world energy "crisis."

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ONE YEAR AFTER STOCKHOLM

An Ecological Approach to Management

By Maurice F. Strong

"MAN has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being." He bears "a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations." And states have "the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."

A year after the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, few people have begun to grasp the radical implications of these principles, from the Declaration approved by their countries at Stockholm. Despite the worldwide growth in public awareness of complex and interrelated environmental problems, it is apparent that coping with these issues is a far more revolutionary matter than has yet been generally acknowledged or comprehended.

For environmental actions taken to date are still of fairly marginal significance compared with those yet to be confronted. The difficult choices—about the imbalances created by man's activities, about equity in the use of common resources, about the sharing of power both within national societies and internationally, about the fundamental purposes of growth and the sharing of its benefits as well as its costs—remain to be made. Above all are fundamental questions about participation in these decisions, to enable both peoples and societies to cope with, if you will to manage, world problems on a new scale.

II

Public awareness of the environmental problem has indeed expanded remarkably in a brief four and a half years. After all, it was only in the latter part of 1968 that the Swedish delegation to the United Nations first introduced a resolution in the General Assembly to convene a world conference in Stockholm, and only in mid-1969 that the consciousness of millions around the world

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was heightened dramatically by the view of Planet Earth as seen from outer space—that exhilarating yet sobering sight of a small, finite Spaceship Earth with its living cargo sustained by a unitary, limited and vulnerable life-support system.

For the first time we began to see that all mankind literally is in the same boat—that the world community is faced with its first truly global problem. It was the truth that ecologists and poets before them had been trying to tell us: in nature everything is tied together.

But the problem was still being thought about in relatively narrow terms, largely as a disease of the industrialized countries suffering from the very processes to which they owed their affluence. In Asia, Africa and Latin America, the disposition was to regard the environment as something remote from the interests and concerns of the poor. To a man faced with immediate starvation and other diseases of poverty, the risks he runs from contamination of the seas or the atmosphere seem so remote as to be irrelevant. To him factory smoke smells of money—and of jobs and needed consumer goods. And what if fly ash and sulfur dioxide afflict the surrounding area!

So, in my travels in the developing countries from mid-1970 on, I found—not surprisingly—that the word "environment" had no magic there. Yet the issues it properly embraced were in fact no less real: polluted water supplies, degradation of agricultural lands, depletion of wildlife and fisheries and, perhaps most urgent, the problem of cities growing at rates unprecedented in human history. Indeed, some of these cities faced—and still face—the prospect of water contamination and health hazards that will make them unfit for habitation within the next decade or so. Ironically, the "eco-catastrophes" of which we hear so much are much *more* likely to occur in the poorer countries than in the wealthier ones, since the latter have the resources to deal with these problems or at least to put off their full impact.

I also found in the poorer countries a widespread fear that preoccupation by the rich with the new environmental "fad" would divert attention and resources from the basic and compelling needs of the developing world—needs arising mainly out of their poverty and underdevelopment. Thus these countries wanted the Conference to direct its attention to issues that were to them the essence of their peoples' environment—food, health care, housing, education and jobs; the urgent demands of exploding urban

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populations; massive problems of soil contamination and erosion which rob them of much of their "natural capital;" and the critical need for clean water in both rural and urban areas.

They also wanted to know how the growing environmental concern of the more industrialized countries would affect the flow of finances for their development, the cost of the capital equipment they buy, their access to markets for products that may be subject to new environment-based restrictions, and their ability to attract new industry to their countries.

It was something of a paradox that representatives of developing countries at that point appreciated far more than many in the industrialized world that the environmental problem required a new view of man's relationship not only with the natural world, but with his fellow man. Involved was not only pollution, but a whole series of threatening imbalances in which the fate of rich and poor alike is joined. We have the representatives of the poor of the world to thank, then, for expanding both Stockholm's and the world's environmental awareness to embrace not just the effluence and wastes, the dangers, disamenities and aesthetic insults found in industrialized societies, but the malnutrition, disease, illiteracy and human degradation which are the dominant characteristics of the human environment for most of mankind.

The fact that the industrialized countries accepted this conception pointed up how far they had come from some previously expressed beliefs that they were to be the "watchdogs" of the world's environment.[1] They came to recognize that their initial approach had been inadequate to the size and scope of the problem, that they had really not fully understood or appreciated the true nature of the developing countries' environmental concern, that in the final analysis there can be no environmental immunity for some unless there is immunity for all.

III

Thus, the preparations for Stockholm embraced a steadily widening view of the total environment problem. Under the guidance of the 27-nation Preparatory Committee established by the General Assembly, a vast array of knowledge and opinions was brought together—not only from governments and international organizations, but from a broad cross section of the world's

[1] For an early and tentative expression of this view, see George F. Kennan, "To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1970.

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scientific and intellectual community. In making this first tentative inventory of what was known, and especially of what was not known, it was of critical importance from the outset that a maximum number of governments were engaged and brought to feel a sense of participation.

In the upshot, an East-West issue involving the status of the German Democratic Republic regrettably led the Soviet Union and several East European governments to absent themselves from Stockholm—but, as the realization of global interests in the environmental issue spread among the nations, many governments which originally did not intend to participate decided to do so, with many ultimately playing constructive and important roles.

Moreover, there was also significant involvement on the part of nongovernmental organizations, some already active in the field, others newly becoming so.

In this process, the Conference Secretariat did not stand in a hierarchical relationship to the players. It had no authority to wield from the top or from anywhere else. Rather, it served as activator, catalyst and orchestrator of work performed mainly by others.

In the end it was nothing short of remarkable that—given the tensions and realities of international life—113 nations were able to convene and in less than two weeks to achieve wide agreement on virtually all the specific proposals placed before the Conference. The Declaration on the Human Environment was the first acknowledgment by the community of nations of new principles of behavior and responsibility; it now provides an indispensable basis for the establishment and elaboration of new codes of international law and conduct. An Action Plan of 109 recommendations called for specific actions by national and international bodies. The Plan provided for an Earthwatch program of global assessment and monitoring for the systematic gathering of information, for its objective evaluation by scientists, and for its dissemination to policy-makers as a guide to help them better understand the consequences of the decisions by which we are shaping our future.

Then, at the General Assembly session last fall, there was set up a Governing Council for Environmental Programs, consisting of representatives of 58 governments with overall responsibility for policies and programs within the United Nations.[2] At the

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same time, an Executive Director was elected by the General Assembly to carry out measures approved by the Governing Council, and to bring to the attention of the Council the issues or concerns considered to merit the attention of governments. The Executive Director also chairs an Environmental Coördination Board, established to facilitate coördination and coöperation among the agencies of the U.N. system itself. Finally, the General Assembly approved a World Environment Fund, with an initial target of $100 million for the first five years, designed to provide the international control mechanisms and linkage that will enable national programs to operate as part of an international system or network in dealing with particular problem areas.

One of the actions of the General Assembly which surprised many people was the decision to establish the headquarters of the new Secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya. This resulted from the determination of the developing countries to have a significant new U.N. body headquartered in the developing world. It is thus the first global intergovernmental body to establish its headquarters outside of North America and Europe. In my view, the additional administrative costs and inconveniences which may temporarily result from this will be more than offset by the political advantages of assuring that the new body has the kind of global political constituency and support which will be so essential to the performance of its global task.

I dwell on these organizational features because they form the framework of the issues of management to which this article is addressed. But beyond the formal creation of these bodies, the Conference and the General Assembly action provided a critical stimulus for national activity, particularly in countries which previously had paid little attention to the environment issue. A total of 85 provided national reports to the Conference, comprising in most cases the first survey they had ever conducted of their own environmental concerns. Moreover, the majority of them initiated some form of governmental machinery, and many of them also enacted new environmental legislation—Brazil, for example, has recently announced a series of significant measures for environmental protection. While a number of these national measures might well have been taken anyway in the more indus-

[2] Here it is important to note that the universality which had eluded the Conference itself was reflected in the composition of the Governing Council—which includes both the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

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trialized countries, most of what was done in the developing countries clearly is attributable to the Conference and to the special assistance which was provided to many of them during the preparatory period. It can now be said that most countries in the world have taken at least the first step toward the development of an environmental policy, set up some form of governmental mechanism, and in many cases also enacted new environmental legislation.

Since the Stockholm Conference, three international conventions have already been enacted: an agreement reached in London in October, dealing with the need to control the dumping of toxic substances into the seas and oceans; an agreement establishing a world heritage trust to help preserve some of the unique cultural sites and natural areas which are part of man's common heritage; and an agreement concluded at a conference in Washington, D.C., seeking to limit international trade in certain species of wildlife. In addition, significant progress has been made on a convention for the preservation of special islands for science.

Finally, widespread concern with the very purpose of economic growth has been increasing in both industrialized and developing countries. In the presently affluent areas of the world, it is now widely felt that it is essential to identify and pursue new directions for growth—to perceive alternative patterns for consumption that have less impact on the natural environment, that are less energy-intensive, less demanding of nonrenewable resources, and more amenable to recycling and reuse—that, in a word, shift from quantitative toward qualitative criteria in national decision-making.

In most developing countries, prevailing plans for economic development are, not too surprisingly, patterned largely on models of countries which already have gone through the process of industrialization. Some leaders in the developing world are now beginning to ask whether this is what they and their peoples really want. There is a new searching for development goals that are more consistent with their own historical traditions and their own cultural proclivities. This may result in future patterns of growth with more emphasis on compatibility between the natural and man-made environments. It also would imply brighter long-term prospects for the perpetuation of cultural diversity—perhaps the most precious of all assets of the human race.

Thus a lively intellectual ferment goes on in both developing

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and industrialized societies, in response to growing understanding that the present scope and intensity of human activities have raised societal problems that are new in man's experience, and that these issues cannot be dealt with apart from the values and goals that people and societies set for themselves. Such an awareness obviously must precede and underlie effective action in the environmental field.

IV

Yet if man is to realize his fundamental right to "an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being," *something more than enlightened awareness is needed. Somehow* such an environment must be created through some form of management which will involve, on both national and international levels, new kinds of institutional arrangements and novel procedures for decision-making. It is here that the Age of the Environment will have its most radical impact.

What are the alternatives to learning how to deal with these environmental and societal problems? Nuclear holocaust and ecological disaster each, with some reason, have their prophets. One can never fully relax while governments hold in their arsenals weapons of mutual suicide; the prospect of Planet Earth as a radioactive wasteland, however, now seems rather remote, perhaps because the destructiveness of nuclear weapons has simply surpassed the outer limits of usable military power.

According to the ecological version of doomsday, a vast breakdown in an overloaded natural system would be followed by a new biospheric equilibrium in which there would be no place or role for the human race as we have known it. These projections cannot be entirely shrugged off—there *are* outer limits to the carrying capacity of the biosphere. Therefore simple prudence impels us to discover as much as we can about them on an urgent basis. A large-scale global scientific research effort to identify and measure these constraints should be mounted by national governments, the United Nations and, above all, the world's scientific community. We must know what we are putting into the environment; we must monitor the vital changes in the "life-system" of oceans, atmosphere, food chains, and plant and animal worlds—we must know when we are facing risks that may be irreversible.

Physical limits, however, do not pose the only threat and per-

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haps not even the most urgent one. Another vision of potential disaster is less dramatically cataclysmic than either nuclear destruction or catastrophic physical breakdown, but not less dangerous for that. It is the prospect of a slow but probably accelerating slide into chaos due to social limits on our ability to cope with the complexity inherent in a high-technology society. Political, psychological and institutional limitations could condemn the world to a vicious cycle of interlocking crises, with the institutional structure of society breaking down or becoming paralyzed by the sheer weight and complexity of problems it cannot handle. And this could happen well before resource limitations put physical restraints on man's activities.

In this gray scenario the human race would not be destroyed or rendered obsolete by a new equilibrium in nature. Man would prove once more his extraordinary capacity for adaptation. But to what? To the erosion of cultural and social structures, to the corruption of ideals and corrosion of dignity, to the collapse of respect and loss of loyalty, vision and hope—to the withering, in short, of all that makes him distinctively, admirably human. On the political level he would learn to adapt to mindless anarchy or the long night of tyranny.

This, then, is the measure of the social catastrophe we must avoid through prudent management. But what is it we must do and how should we set about doing it? To answer these questions requires analysis of the kinds of problems that fall under our new, broader—and more realistic—concept of the environment.

First, it should by now be axiomatic that these problems transcend the capacity of any nation to handle or to avoid. They are quintessentially, in the current jargon, transnational. Inevitably, environmental considerations have become basic factors in the whole structure of international relations.

Second—and I hope becoming axiomatic—environmental issues by their very nature involve trade-offs. If individual nations pursue their own goals without restraint, they will harm other nations. But equally, activities common to many nations must be assessed from the standpoint of competing goals. For example, to deal with many problems of the environment, especially the poverty of developing nations, requires a constantly growing and reasonably priced supply of energy—which has been after all a key to material progress in the whole Industrial Revolution. Thus, one form of environmental problem demands

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energy, while some of the means to produce that energy have costs in terms of other aspects of the environment. So the trade-off must be made—how much of one at what cost to the other? Or can some new form of action eliminate the conflict and enable both "environment" goals to be met?

The requisite action may be national or international. And it may be regulatory—setting up guidelines for national action, controlling activity within nations or in areas outside national jurisdiction; or it may be positive—meeting environmental problems by affirmative action that prevents damage or devises means to meet crucial resource needs without heavy penalties.

In the eventful past four years, nation after nation has moved to impose controls on the most manifest forms of environmental pollution; an obvious example is the legislation in the United States to purify air and water to acceptable standards. In this process, nations have moved to the water's edge of the truly big decisions that now loom—to engage in major conservation, changes in transportation habits, and in essence a change in national life-styles themselves. Costs of cleaning up to meet proper standards are heavy and will be more so; in the classic case of Japan, which had neglected the problem for years, the projected economic plans for the next five years, announced last January, envisage a basic diversion of effort and a significant alteration in the shape of the Japanese economy—including its emphasis on exports—to deal with pollution.

In addition, constructive measures have been taken to resolve problems that have appeared in specific areas of the world, such as the discovery that sulfur fumes from other parts of Europe have been causing substantial damage in Scandinavia. Negotiations for regional regulation of this hazard are now proceeding.

But inevitably, regulation is needed on a wider international basis. Here the prime example concerns the oceans of the world. A resource-hungry world will increasingly depend on exploitation of the oceans' beds beyond any national jurisdiction. The Law of the Sea Conference which will begin later this year will have an opportunity to make important progress in creating not only a new system of laws but a means for the coöperative international management of that 70 percent of the earth's surface which lies beyond national jurisdiction.

Here I have a specific suggestion. The protection of the vast international commons—the oceans and the atmosphere beyond

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national jurisdiction—will engender growing and continuing costs. Perhaps these might best be met by some form of international toll or levy based on the use of the commons by aircraft and ships—in effect, an "ocean toll-booth" system. Or perhaps the toll or levy could be based on the use of fossil fuels—at any rate a formula should be designed to have these costs borne by those who primarily utilize and benefit from, and thus deplete or damage, these resources. Estimates vary as to the amounts that would be realized, but one very preliminary and tentative study using the year 1970 as a basis indicates that the imposition of a one cent tariff on each net ton of maritime merchandise entering all countries with the exception of the developing countries would result in an annual total of $12.6 million. A toll on air passenger transport, assuming one dollar per passenger between Europe and North America, would bring in about $10 million. And a toll on petroleum whereby two cents per barrel would be charged in some cases and one cent in others—with the developing world charged nothing—would realize on the order of $100 million. This could be used for research, monitoring and cleanup operations in the international commons.

Another significant area for international coöperation is man's potential impact on world climate and weather. Quite apart from the danger of inadvertent modification of these, the technologies by which man may seek to make deliberate changes are advancing very rapidly. The use of such technologies promises to produce a number of significant benefits, but in some cases the benefits to the nation employing them might be bought at the expense of its neighbors. Certainly it is not at all uncommon these days to cause rainfall by seeding clouds with silver iodide. It might well happen that a country in need of added rainfall, or impelled by other reasons, might use techniques such as this to divert rain which otherwise might go to its neighbor, and this is but one possibility of weather manipulation that may be a potential area of international conflict. Would it not be advisable, therefore, to draw up guidelines now to help assure the constructive and beneficial use of such technologies, avoid unnecessary conflict and help resolve it if it does occur? In fact, is not the question of weather manipulation itself becoming ripe for a treaty or convention?

V

As one readily sees from these examples, the boundary between

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what is national and what is international quickly becomes blurred; the fact is, we need coöperative action at both levels. Similarly, the line between regulation and positive action can be quickly erased in practice: to bring the oceans back to an acceptable state takes a good measure of both restraint and new technology actively employed to deal with what has happened before or may be inescapable in the future.

The establishment of machinery for the prevention and settlement of environmental disputes and for the allocation of costs and benefits of development projects which have important environmental impacts across national boundaries will become increasingly necessary. Implementation of the principle of the Stockholm Declaration by which nations accept responsibility for the effects of their actions on the environment of others or on the global commons could lead to a growing number of cases in which the benefits which accrue to one country from a given development project must be reconciled with the environmental costs it engenders for others, particularly in respect to developments impinging on international waterways. In most cases, preventive action and predevelopment agreement on the sharing of costs and benefits will be the only viable alternatives.

Turning to the areas of positive action, the foremost example is surely the spreading effort to control population growth. The continuation of such growth in many parts of the world at a time when the borders of virtually all nations are being closed to large-scale immigration will generate mounting pressures on international life. While some countries can accommodate larger populations, others in which population pressures are already acute want and need much more in the way of international assistance for population control. This, of course, is a very delicate and complex issue on which each society must make its own decisions, but ultimately all societies will be required to achieve a balance between the level of their population and the standard of living which available resources can sustain. The already wide consensus that the question must receive international attention is evidenced in the U.N's World Population Conference that will be held next year.

To put it bluntly, just as the preparations for Stockholm uncovered major differences in outlook between rich and poor nations, so one must recognize that the handling of environmental problems can involve acute potential conflict between rich and

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poor. Meeting the problems will require a much more enlightened attitude on the part of the rich countries toward the poor. It would be unrealistic to assume that this can be achieved —or even should be achieved—through a greater manifestation of charity on the part of the rich. The real question is the self-interest of all, in a world fit for all.

For example, the environment issue points up some potentially large-scale shifts in comparative advantage which could give the developing countries significant new leverage in negotiating better arrangements with the rich countries. These derive from the growing dependence of the industrialized world on natural resources, particularly petroleum, and from the fact that the natural capacity of the environment to absorb and dissipate wastes without intolerable levels of damage must itself be regarded as an economic resource which is still under-utilized in the developing world and which can provide a basis for the attraction of new industry. This will be particularly true of labor-intensive industries based on use of local resources.

In those instances where it produces a significant dislocation in the interests of particular industries and areas, there will be a natural tendency in the industrialized countries to resist such shifts in comparative advantage. But this does not alter the fact that it is in their long-term interest to encourage and support a much broader and more equitable distribution of the world's industrial capacity and to deal with the short-term disruptions this may occasion as transitional problems.

Finally, there will have to be major changes in the deployment and use of the world's scientific and technological capability to facilitate the access of developing countries to new technologies and to support the accelerated development of their own research and development capabilities. Particular efforts must be made to deal with the loss of vital soil resources through erosion and encroaching deserts, problems of water-borne diseases, the need to provide pure water supplies and to cope with the unprecedented rates of urban growth.

VI

So, in every direction, the environment issue points to the need for a whole new set of approaches and adjustments. Man's future development is likely to be constrained by the difficulties of coping with problems arising from the distribution of natural

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resources well before it is limited by finite amounts of such resources. What we come back to is the need to develop at the national and international levels the kinds of structures and institutions required for societal management.

At the present time we lack the concepts and the institutional arrangements for this kind of management. By "management" I do not refer here to the technical, legal and administrative ability to direct, say, a system of water quality standards or to control the use of pastureland. I refer, rather, to arrangement of the decision-making process—to organizing the necessary research and analysis and monitoring functions, formulating alternative courses of action, and evolving procedures through which conscious choices can be made in the fullest possible knowledge of their consequences. These are essential, and largely missing, service and support functions for decision-making at the highest political level.

So construed, it is manifest that more rather than less management is in store for us. Yet there is little in our experience to guide us. Most public and private institutions through which decisions are now made and executed at local, national or international levels are designed to deal with sectors or sub-sectors of problems—agriculture, or aerial transport, or electric power—but not with the issues that cut across the whole of society, like environment or energy or population. And perhaps here we have a clue as to what went wrong, why we were so slow in perceiving many of our environmental dangers.

In the sphere of sectoral decision-making and action, simple tests such as profitability—often short-term—form the basis for embarking upon an activity which may impose severe, long-term costs on the public and may produce adverse effects that are outside the sector originating action. If one wanted to carry current concepts and methods to the extreme, it could be said that, given current interest rates and carrying present methods of cost-benefit analysis to their logical conclusion, it would not be good economics to preserve the oceans, the atmosphere or other precious resources of the earth for the next generation. On a purely economic basis, in fact, it would just not pay to save Planet Earth!

One of the dangers of a purely economic approach is its inherent narrowness and shortsightedness. Imagine how little would be left today of the impact of Greece and Rome on human development if these societies had made all their major decisions

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on the basis of the economic criteria we apply today to so many of our decisions.

Business and industry define their objectives and measure their accomplishments in terms of return on investment; universities and professional associations are organized around particular disciplines and fields of study; governments have largely been organized around functional ministries and agencies, and their counterparts in the intergovernmental organizations have been similarly structured. And in virtually all cases the characteristic form or organization is hierarchical, the power flowing from the top down.

This form of organization worked well in the past, and facilitated the rapid and even spectacular progress made in so many fields of human endeavor. But it has also made it difficult to perceive—and even more difficult to deal with—complex environmental cause-and-effect relationships that transcend traditional disciplinary and institutional boundaries.

For the inescapable fact is that the environment cannot be sectoralized. It is a system of interacting relationships that extends through all sectors of activity, and to manage these relationships requires an integrative approach for which present institutional structures were not designed.

What is required now is the addition of the ecological dimension to the management of man's activities. The basic function is to adjust and readjust the intricate balance of environmental integrity and social well-being. I believe that a drastically new concept of management is vital—one which leads in the opposite direction from overblown, centralized, permanent super-bureaucracies with decision-making authority concentrated at the top. Indeed I believe that we are fast approaching, and in some cases may have exceeded, the effective limits of centralized bureaucratic structures, especially in public institutions.

This means that lines of communication and decision-making must be given much greater horizontal and trans-sectoral dimensions than are provided for in existing structures. It means evaluation of important activities in terms of their social and environmental consequences as well as their economic consequences. It means allocating the real costs of activities to those who benefit from them, assigning real value to such traditionally free goods as water and air, and radically revising our concepts and methods of valuing the future.

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And it means a much broader and more extensive participation in decision-making by those who will be directly affected by the decisions made. For there is a direct linkage between individual and local attitudes and actions on the one hand, and a larger concern affecting the fate of all mankind. An example is the impact of petroleum-base pollutants. We hear a great deal about oil spills at sea and, indeed, they are extremely damaging to the environment, in particular the visible environment of our beaches and shorelines. But the total amount of petroleum-base pollutants that find their way into oceans from direct sources of all kinds, including oil spills, is on the order of 2.1 million metric tons a year. On the other hand, some 90 million metric tons are vaporized through the combustion of fossil fuels, primarily the internal combustion engine, and go into the atmosphere every year, ending up in the oceans. Thus there is a direct link between our willingness as consumers to take action that, on the one hand, would restrict our use of automobiles or leave us with higher costs of emission control, and what we do, on the other, as concerned citizens to help preserve the health of the oceans and to avoid risks of possibly decisive climate change.

And so it goes across the gamut of environmental problems and their relationship to societal decision-making. As nothing else it points up that the ecological society is an interdependent society—and why it so urgently needs new skills and institutional patterns, new attitudes and new values.

So the new patterns of organization in an era of societal management must be based on a multitude of centers of information and of energy and of power, linked together within a system in which they can interact with each other. Whether it be called a "systems concept" or an "ecological concept," this idea of management is not simply a new gimmick, but a necessary accommodation of our traditional linear concepts of management.

It is some help to refer again to the several lessons learned in the preparatory process for the Stockholm Conference a year ago. These were, first, the vital importance of the widest possible participation; second, the linking of the interests and expertise of many different specialized organizations—for multi-disciplinary study, for convergent approaches, and in the end for coöperative action; third, the active involvement of nongovernmental organizations; and fourth, a central group—then the Conference Secretariat—that does not stand in a hierarchical relation

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to others, but rather is the catalyst for work done mainly by others.

The relevant institutional networks for ecological management can and should take a great variety of forms and permit a diversity in size and orientation. The outcome must lead not to bigger and bigger bureaucracies, or greater centralization, but toward broader participation in managing complexity—not to more and more rigid hierarchies but toward flexible arrangements for pursuing the coöperative way of life. An integrative approach to society-wide problems might draw us, too, away from excessive concentration on strictly quantitative factors toward a more humane concern for the quality of the whole fabric of society.

VII

What, then, is the United Nations' role for the future? Before Stockholm many people were understandably skeptical of the United Nations' ability to deal with an issue so complex—an issue with so much potential for conflict among the industrialized and the developing nations. Stockholm, I believe, indicated that the United Nations *can* deal with it. At the global level, no one nation or group of nations commands the air and water. If we are to ensure the health of our common property, we have to act as the whole community of man—and here the United Nations alone has the necessary institutional framework to undertake the task.

Many of the main environmental issues must be dealt with at the regional level—such as the management of river valley systems, arid areas and enclosed seas. Here, the regional commissions of the United Nations have an especially important role and new opportunities for coöperation with other regional bodies.

We hear altogether too much these days about the limitations and shortcomings of the U.N. family of agencies. In my own experience over the past few years I have become equally aware of the resources, the skills and the strengths that reside within the U.N. system for coping with the environmental predicament. Certainly, without the United Nations the Conference could not have been proposed, authorized, organized and brought to fruition—nor could the new U.N. Environment Program be put into effect. Moreover, I believe that the environmental challenge and the new needs for preventing environmental conflict go directly to the basic purposes of the United Nations. They make

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the United Nations more essential than ever.

But the development of new international machinery to deal with the complex problems of an increasingly interdependent technological civilization will not come about through the surrender of sovereignty by national governments but only by the purposeful exercise of that sovereignty. It is only when nations find themselves incapable of exercising their sovereignty effectively or advantageously on a unilateral basis that they will agree —reluctantly—to exercise it collectively by agreement with other nations. It is seldom that nations enter into arrangements which restrict their ability to exercise their sovereignty until circumstances compel them to do so.

This is one of the basic dangers in the present situation. The threats to man's existence from nuclear warfare can be avoided right up to the moment that someone pushes the button. But the threat to man's survival which derives from his interventions in the natural environment is of a different nature.

Such dangers as contamination of the world's air and water supplies to the point of affecting man's genetic development and impairing the very qualities which make him human, changes in the world's climate which could destroy the heat balance on which human life depends, the large-scale destruction of plant and animal species—none of these seems to have immediately explosive manifestations. They will be beyond remedy by the time they are perceived as imminent threats. To deal with such issues we need a degree of enlightened political will on the part of the peoples and nations of the world that is without precedent in human history.

Our recent experience in dealing with other specific issues provides some hopeful examples of what can be done. The treaties which provided for coöperative scientific explorations of the Antarctic Continent and its insulation from military activities, as well as the treaties banning nuclear weapons from the seabeds and from outer space, demonstrate that important international agreements can be reached both for collective positive measures and the avoidance of mutual hazards. The interesting common denominator in all of these agreements is that they dealt with areas of concern in which the individual interests of nations had not yet developed to the point of significant conflict. I believe there is an important lesson for us in this which should encourage us to proceed as quickly as possible to seek agreements such as

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those I mentioned before environmental conflict becomes imminent.

The world is not likely to unite behind a common ideology or a super-government. The only practical hope is that it will now respond to a common concern for its own survival, an acknowledgement of the essential interdependence of its peoples and an awareness that coöperative action can enlarge the horizons and enrich the lives of all peoples.

In establishing its new Environment Program, the United Nations has a rare opportunity to take the lead in developing new approaches to the problems of managing the technological society at the international level, provide new impetus to its institutions, and thus find new ways of achieving the goals and realizing the hopes enshrined in the Charter.

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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: THE SEARCH FOR FOCUS

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

AMERICA was thrust into the world some 30 years ago. That jolting experience generated in America a degree of unity concerning foreign affairs unusual for a democratic and pluralist society. Largely as a consequence of that shock, America's foreign policy came to enjoy for a quarter of a century the advantage of broad popular support and of a seeming sense of direction.

Throughout much of that time, America's involvement in world affairs was characterized by an increasingly activist internationalism, by an idealistic optimism, and by a strong dose of populist Manichaeanism. The activist internationalism was in part a reaction to widely shared guilt feelings about America's earlier rejection of the League of Nations, and—as if to erase the past—America now became the most active promoter of international undertakings. The idealistic optimism combined a strong faith in the eventual emergence of a world of united nations with an unprecedented degree of popular willingness to share America's bounty with others. The populist Manichaeanism reflected the propensity of the masses to demonize foreign affairs, a tendency easily reinforced by the realities of Hitlerism and then of Stalinism.

Both World War II and the subsequent cold war gave America's involvement in world affairs a clear focus. The objectives of foreign policy were relatively easy to define, and they could be imbued with high moral content. To be sure, periodic frustrations in the conduct of the cold war prompted different Presidents to define their policies and priorities in varying terms, but the essential character of America's involvement remained unchanged. President Roosevelt focused public hopes on the "four freedoms," but the frustrations of Yalta—a case of unsuccessful Realpolitik at variance with the prevailing idealism—led not long afterward to President Truman's call for the containment of Stalinism and for the reconstruction of Europe. The frustrations of the Korean War in turn led to President Eisenhower's "Crusade for Freedom," including even the goal of liberating Eastern Europe (and thus repudiating Yalta). U.S. passivity in

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the face of the East European upheavals of 1956, and then the crisis of confidence produced by the launching of the Sputnik, led President Kennedy to articulate a doctrine of heroic universalism, combining strong anticommunism with a rhetoric of compassion for the poorer nations, but he and even more his successor, President Johnson, soon became the prisoners of the Vietnam War. By the time President Nixon assumed office the American consensus on foreign affairs was a thing of the past.

It would be premature to conclude from the foregoing that it was the Vietnam War that blurred America's vision and shattered her agreed perceptions on foreign affairs. That the change may be the product of more complex forces, and that consequently the Vietnam War was more of a catalyst than a cause, is suggested by a remarkable study of America's posture in foreign affairs, published in the early 1950s. Its author, having systematically collated data concerning foreign affairs—presidential messages, party platforms, election results, frequency of foreign treaties, naval expenditures, armed expeditions, wars, annexations, diplomatic warnings—argued that since 1776 America's relationship with the world has been characterized by alternating cycles of "extroversion" and "introversion." He concluded, with remarkable prescience, that "in view of America's past record, and of the presumed role of 'internal factors' in promoting the introvert-extrovert rhythm—it seems logical to expect America to retreat, to some extent at least, from so much world involvement, and perhaps to do so sometime in the 1960s."[1]

It is appropriate to begin our analysis by recalling this forecast, for it reinforces the proposition that the present change in America's mood may represent something deeper than a reaction to the war in Vietnam. The change that has taken place—cultural, political and social—is doubtless far-reaching. One senses it in the new generational values, especially in the dislike for "power politics" and in the widespread ambivalence about

[1] Frank L. Klingberg, "The Historical Alternation of Moods in American Foreign Policy," *World Politics,* January 1952. His phases are as follows:

Introversion	*Extroversion*
1776–1798	1798–1824
1824–1844	1844–1871
1871–1891	1891–1919
1919–1940	1940–

It is to be noted that the phases of extroversion have lasted about 27–28 years, and hence the last phase of extroversion should have ended around 1968, according to Klingberg's analysis.

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existing U.S. foreign commitments; in the mood in Congress, especially in regard to foreign involvements, including even altruistic ones such as foreign aid; and in the waning of the internationalist Eastern foreign affairs élite. "Come home, America" on the Democratic side and economic protectionism on the Republican side may thus reflect another fundamental shift, a new cycle in America's alternating relationship with the world.

II

There are many obvious parallels between the current change in American mood and earlier shifts from extroversion to introversion. Yet, in a more basic sense, these parallels are misleading. Neither on the objective plane nor on the subjective plane is the real choice today between internationalism and isolationism. Indeed, it is hard to define the practical meaning of these terms in the context of contemporary conditions.

On the objective level, the situation in which the United States finds itself is quite unlike that of the earlier cycles of introspection. In the area of economics the United States is now the leading international investor both in the less-developed and in the advanced industrial economies, with returns on these investments representing for some major U.S. enterprises the critical source of their margins of profit. This outward thrust of U.S. business and capital makes the United States very vulnerable to any new wave of protectionism, and it does create a powerful constituency with an enormous vested interest against any return to "introversion."

A related major historical change—one that has also transpired since World War II—involves the transformation of the resource-autarkic American economy into an increasingly resource-dependent economy. Some experts have estimated that the United States is already dependent on imports for 26 out of some 36 basic raw materials consumed by its industrial economy; and this dependence is growing most dramatically, but by no means exclusively, in the energy field. This shift is imposing a mounting fiscal drain on the U.S. economy (with mineral imports costing eight billion dollars in 1970 and likely to cost about 31 billion dollars by 1985) and it also heightens the U.S. stake in a stable and uninterrupted flow of international trade. As a consequence, America finds herself so deeply involved in the world economy, a condition reinforced by its special monetary role, that on the

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economic plane the concept of isolationism becomes at worst a suicidal policy and at best an irrelevance.

America's growing economic interdependence with the world economy is reinforced by social dynamics, involving massive growth in tourism, in the number of Americans studying abroad and of foreigners here, in communications in general—in all of which the United States is the pacesetter. This process creates further links, transforming America's relationship with the world from one which in the past could enjoy the alternatives of isolationism or internationalism into one in which only the forms and degrees of interdependence are the issue.

In international politics, America's options have been similarly transformed. In the past, the United States could exercise the luxury of choice between abstinence and involvement. Today, despite the debates over the desirability of the continued U.S. military presence in Europe, most Americans see their security tied closely to the continued independence and stability of Europe and Japan. The debate about troop levels is over the best means to enhance that interdependence, not on the question of its reality or even desirability. More generally, nuclear weapons have so transformed the nature of security that sudden shifts in the political-security balance are viewed as dangerous to all parties, even competing ones, and this creates interdependence even among rivals.

The question of subjective attitudes is more complicated, though it is revealing to note that those who favor policies of protectionism or of America's withdrawal from her various security-political engagements object to being described as isolationists and insist that the policies they advocate involve a higher and more responsible form of internationalism. Moreover, many vocal critics of American intervention abroad tend to be strongly opposed to American economic isolationism and to favor instead continued and even expanded American involvement in various forms of international coöperation. Overtones of old-fashioned isolationism, none the less, do make themselves heard, most notably within American labor concerned with the export of American jobs abroad by American multinational corporations and by the similar impact of foreign imports on employment. But here, too, the attitude is not a consistent one. Labor also tends to be strongly in favor of continued U.S. political and security engagements abroad—it is semi-isolationist at most.

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Isolationism on the level of policy thus tends to be a partial view and not a coherent all-embracing doctrine. Even its adherents accept the proposition that at least in some respects the United States should remain actively engaged in the world, and in that sense they partake of a residual though vague consensus that the world is becoming an interdependent entity, from which there is no complete withdrawal. A broad and undefined notion of global interdependence seems to represent the general principle which most Americans share.[2]

This underlying consensus, however, is vague. It lacks a sharp focus defining, as was the case in the past, the character and thrust of America's relationship to the world. Moreover, the shared notion of global interdependence is given philosophical and political substance in significantly divergent ways by two contending schools of thought which today represent the principal lines of division among the concerned and articulate public. The outlook of these two contending schools—each of which initially starts with the same basic premise of global interdependence—may be best capsulated by the terms "power realism" and "planetary humanism."

The power realists, generally more conservative in their values, tend to be preoccupied with the more traditional concerns of international affairs, particularly with such issues as strategy, the relationship of forces, the balance of power, diplomacy and monetary policy; they attach a very high value to stability, both as a concept and as a norm. They may often disagree on prescriptions and priorities (with the spectrum within the school neatly personalized by the contrasting positions of a George Ball and a John Connally), but they do hold a basic view in common in that they see the world as still dominated by *international* politics.

In contrast, the planetary humanists tend to think of the globe more as *a unit* beset by certain common problems. When attempting to translate into policy their basic predispositions, they tend to concentrate on such matters as ecology, nutrition, development, social justice and equality, or limits to growth. (An able example

[2] An attempt to quantify the attitude of the U.S. public has been made in *State of the Nation,* ed. by W. Watts and L. A. Free, New York, 1973, and it suggests surprising stability during the last decade. Between the years 1964 and 1972 the percentage of Americans whose views could be described as completely isolationist or as predominantly isolationist has increased from 8 to 9 percent; of those whose views are mixed, from 27 to 35 percent. A considerable majority thus holds to an internationalist perspective, with which in part presumably some of those with "mixed" views also identify.

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is Lester Brown's *World Without Borders,* but the range here, too, is wide, going beyond former Senator Eugene McCarthy to reach at one extreme some of the New Left writers). There are thus overtones in the above division of the older debate in America between "realists" and "idealists," but the differences are important: the new power realists accept more and more the notion of political interdependence, and their concern with stability preëmpts to some extent the idealists' earlier preoccupation with peace. Planetary humanists, unlike their predecessors the idealists, are much more concerned with social change—rather than peace—in a world which they see as beset by dynamically mounting socio-economic crises, and their remedies focus on socio-political reforms. Many of them decry stability and accept the desirability in some cases even of violent change.

The former tend to be older, and hence an element of generational conflict is doubtless involved here (providing a parallel to Klingberg's cycles). This generational variance in perspectives is in large measure a consequence of the historical discontinuity experienced lately by American society. The thrust of any society into a new age for which established generalizations are lacking creates a situation of uncertainty and division ably expressed by novelist Hermann Hesse, whose writings have been sensitive to historical change:

> Human life is reduced to real suffering, to hell, only when two ages, two cultures and religions overlap. . . . There are times when a whole generation is caught in this way between two ages, two modes of life, with the consequence that it loses all power to understand itself and has no standard, no security, no simple acquiescence.

Much of what has happened in America during the last decade and a half fits that evocative statement. It is no exaggeration to state that America has lately experienced—probably more so than any other contemporary society—a true cultural revolution. In the short time span of slightly more than a decade the United States has undergone a significant change in its social values, racial relations, sexual mores, esthetic and artistic standards; all of that is bound to produce especially sharp generational gaps, including disagreements about America's role in the world.

Uncertainty about America's world role has been intensified by the almost simultaneous waning within American society of the relatively cohesive Eastern élite which hitherto has served as the source both of inspiration and leadership for America's

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more focused post-World War II engagement in world affairs. The disintegration of this group, its loss of self-confidence, its generational splits, go hand in hand with the appearance in American society of new groups aspiring to leadership. These groups, reflecting new economic interests and located in the Far West and Middle West, have supplied some of the personnel for the new Nixon team, but unlike their predecessors, they still lack —with some obvious exceptions—a cohesive and comprehensive world view. The result has been a further blurring of focus.

Even the extremes, whose narrow vision usually makes for a clarity of focus, are today ambivalent. The Right, traditionally primitive in its anticommunism but now thrown off balance by Nixon's flexibility toward the Communist world, is flirting with nationalism and protectionism; it is, however, unwilling to break with the President, who so far has successfully straddled the issue of protectionism vs. internationalism. The New Left, demoralized by its failures, offers mainly slogans as guides to foreign policy, while its social base, resting largely on the highly conformist intellectual world of university students and professors and some left-liberal social and media circles in New York, is too fluid to provide the jumping-off point for a serious claim to power. Outside of a small circle of true believers, *The National Review* and *The New York Review of Books* are read more for provocation than for policy guidance.

Despite this division and confusion, the power realists and the planetary humanists still remain in fundamental agreement that global interdependence—regardless of whether priority is given to political security or to social well-being—is the inescapable reality of our time. But this underlying agreement merely refutes the proposition that introversion is a viable and appealing choice. By itself, it does not provide a relevant policy focus for America's relationship with the world.

III

America is thus not turning inward, but her vision is unclear. President Nixon's foreign policy is a response to this condition of ambiguity as well as a reflection of it. As a response, it has been effective and occasionally brilliant; as a reflection it remains beset by a basic conceptual difficulty. Richard Nixon, who prides himself on his pragmatism, has perceived more sharply than many of his contemporaries—certainly more clearly than his rivals—the

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nature of the changed circumstances in which America finds herself. He sees—in part correctly—his foreign policy as a realistic response to worldwide and domestic changes. Recognizing the ambivalence at home, he has striven to fashion a policy that would gradually reduce America's commitments abroad while shaping what he and his associates have occasionally called "the new structure of peace." It is, by and large, a policy much in keeping with the evolution of his own views; in that sense, Nixon —though obviously the beneficiary of able advice from his Special Assistant—is to a greater extent the conceptual architect of his Administration's policy than any other U.S. President since Wilson (a point rarely conceded by his critics, who prefer to deny Nixon any credit).[3]

The extraordinary concentration of foreign policymaking in the White House, particularly in the hands of the President and his Special Assistant, is due in part to the highly personal conceptual leadership which Nixon has provided. But the concentration is also very much the consequence of the basic thrust of the President's policy, which has put the highest priority on restructuring adversary relationships in the light of the perceived new power realities. The handling of adversary relationships is not suited to an institutionally implemented and openly articulated foreign policy; on the contrary, its very focus requires secrecy, surprise, maneuver and even some deception.

The basic conceptual framework of Nixon's foreign policy involves essentially a traditional balance-of-power approach, but more Bismarckian than Metternichian (as James Chace in *A World Elsewhere* has aptly pointed out). Unlike the static Metternichian balance, resting on a conservative ideological uniformity, the Bismarckian balance was based on movement and flexibility, on taking by surprise both friends and enemies alike. This is why the role of secret diplomacy under Nixon has risen to such heights; this is why the organizational setup requires such concentration of decision-making and the exclusion of institutionalized bureaucracies both from the action of foreign policy and from the making of foreign policy. In effect, we have a merger here of an operating mechanism, a personal proclivity, and a foreign policy concept.

[3] Instructive in this respect are his *Foreign Affairs* article of October 1967 which foreshadows the changed China policy, his acceptance speech of 1968 which pointed to the need for reshaping alliance relationships, and his Guam interview of early 1969, which spelled out the broad framework for the policies of subsequent years.

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During the first four years—outside of seeking to end the Vietnam War—Nixon has concentrated on manipulating the new U.S.-Chinese-Soviet triangle. The fruits of this manipulation have been the partial codification of the cold war and the transformation of it from a "game" in which each side played by its own rules and kept its own score into one in which at least the rules are becoming more common. Moreover, the centrality of the arms race in the U.S.-Soviet competition has been somewhat reduced and, as a consequence, the competition has shifted to other areas, where the United States has an advantage. In addition, the normalization of relations with China has in all probability reduced Soviet freedom of action against its former ally while putting a higher premium in Moscow on American-Soviet accommodation. At the same time, American-Soviet agreements have begun to create a web of relationships that may gradually serve to reduce the intensity of their competitive relationship, and the President has wisely (though not necessarily accurately) emphasized that the improvement in American-Chinese relations has not been aimed at the Soviet Union.

The above has been accompanied by intensified efforts to shift the distribution of alliance burdens from the United States to both Western Europe and Japan, including the drastic economic measures adopted in 1971 and again in 1973. The result has been both strain and tension—but all of that has also been in keeping with the dynamic Bismarckian-Nixonian balance of power, involving neither permanent enemies nor friends. Since this policy has been responsive to the widespread feeling at home that America has been doing too much on her own, the President's approach has had the special merit of neutralizing both the opposition of many of Nixon's liberal critics—who essentially welcomed his moves toward China and the U.S.S.R., even if not sharing their underlying philosophy—and of his more conservative supporters, who have been increasingly concerned by the adverse U.S. balance of payments.

Nixon's foreign policy has thus involved an admirably intelligent application of the power-realist approach, skillfully adapted to prevailing domestic circumstances. The proof of its skill is to be found in the fact that, despite profound domestic divisions, the President's foreign policy by and large has not been the object of a major national debate. Even those who reject its underlying premises and its priorities grudgingly concede its successes.

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None the less, President Nixon's foreign policy is open to several criticisms, on the operational level as well as on the broader level of historical pertinence. More specifically, three issues deserve critical consideration: the first pertains to the implicit indifference on the part of the Administration to the problems of the less-developed nations; the second criticism relates to the Administration's handling of alliance relationships; the third concerns the question of the historical relevance of the balance-of-power approach to world affairs in the 1970s.

The problem of the less-developed nations is the moral problem of our time. Given America's traditions, that dimension of the problem alone should make it an important one. Moreover, almost every index indicates that the problems of backwardness and poverty are becoming more acute: World Bank studies on the distribution of income, UNESCO studies on international education, and FAO studies of agricultural development, all agree that the gap is widening. Unlike industrial development in the nineteenth century, when objective change, by and large, was more rapid than subjective change, today subjective change is much more rapid than objective change. Access to literacy, circulation of newspapers, the impact of mass communications, increased political participation are more rapidly transforming the way people think than economic growth is transforming the way people live. The consequence is a heightened awareness of global inequality and an increased determination to erase it. Intensified social strife and global animosity are bound to be the consequence of mankind's failure to tackle the problem of global inequality.

The Administration has also been defective in its handling of alliance relationships. Though not isolationist, the Administration has certainly been unilateralist in dealing with problems affecting American-European and American-Japanese relations. As a result, Japan feels isolated and betrayed; resentment of American policies is on the rise in Canada; American relations with Europe have been by and large in a state of drift. The Japanese suspect that the United States is today assigning a higher priority to American-Chinese relations than to American-Japanese relations. Europeans are uneasy about America's longer-range intentions in Europe, and are baffled by America's willingness to deal directly with the Soviet Union while dragging her feet on such subjects as broader East-West talks or the recogni-

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tion of the present European territorial arrangements (with the United States remaining the only major power in the world not to have recognized the Oder-Neisse Line). Recent monetary difficulties have intensified the political malaise, in part because the United States has relied more on a unilateralist tactical approach than on the development of a broader and longer-range strategic policy.

Third, one may wonder whether the balance-of-power approach provides an adequate response to a world dominated by rapid change, by sharpening social disparities and by a widespread resentment of inequality. It has often been noted that the principal powers engaged in the balance-of-power game are of a highly asymmetrical character: the United States and the Soviet Union are reasonably well-matched militarily but are certainly not matched economically; Japan and Europe are the economic peers of the United States and/or Russia but they are certainly not military peers. China may be becoming a peer in certain military dimensions, but it is not likely to be an economic peer for quite some time. The search for balance among these five may thus prove to be elusive.

Moreover, there is the more basic question concerning the adequacy of the power-realist approach as a tool for a comprehensive understanding of our historical condition. The power realists have a strong case when they argue that the downgrading of national might, of diplomacy, and of the more traditional tools of international behavior could jeopardize the chances for peace by prompting international instability. They are also right when they argue that an exclusive concentration on the planetary issues, though morally much more appealing, ignores the reality of a world of nation-states, of a world of national rivalries, of national armies and of ideological hostilities. Even if not isolationist in spirit, planetary humanism can be charged with being in many ways escapist in essence.

Yet those who emphasize planetary humanism have a powerful argument when they warn that to ignore the longer-range threat is to invite within a mere decade or two a situation of global anarchy, of the fragmentation of social and political institutions, of the collapse of the very stability to which the power realists attach such a high value. Moreover, the balance which the power realists advocate, is based primarily on convenience and not on principle. It implies no fidelity to common goals and no shared

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definition of common concepts. In a rapidly changing world, such a balance could at some point become inconvenient to those whom the United States has considered as its allies, especially after the treatment meted out to them by the United States in 1971. Thus, the notion of no permanent enemies or friends could become contagious, rebounding against the United States sooner than one thinks.

Moreover, on the more immediate, domestic plane, the planetary humanists can rightly assert that an essentially Machiavellian foreign policy is incapable of tapping the moral resources of the American people. Indeed, by alienating a significant portion of the American people, it contributes to further domestic division. With moral considerations becoming a more compelling force than ever before, and given America's traditional world role, it also weakens America on the international scene. A morally indifferent America is automatically a weaker America; an amoral America is also likely to become a lonely America.[4]

IV

The difficulty of articulating acceptable priorities for the United States, a difficulty already enormous because of the domestic split between the two major contending schools of thought, is compounded by the transformation which foreign affairs have undergone in the years since World War II. In brief, that transformation involves a shift from international politics, in which the political, security and economic sectors have been relatively compartmentalized, to a new global politics, in which political, security and economic issues are intermeshed and in which the distinction between the domestic and the foreign aspects is becoming increasingly blurred.

For much of the cold war, foreign affairs were preëminent in the thinking of American statesmen, with security issues dominant. Today, the situation is rather different. The politics of interdependence—largely the consequence of America's economic and social intimacy with Western Europe and Japan—are beginning to overshadow the politics of confrontation with the Com-

[4] It is noteworthy also that either the isolation of America (brought on by obsessive application of the balance-of-power approach), or an escapist America (prompting global insecurity and perhaps even precipitating nuclear proliferation), could only prompt an increasingly conservative America, more and more preoccupied with its own well-being and security. Thus, the domestic political dynamics of both the power-realistic approach and of the planetary-humanist approach point in the same direction.

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munist world, and a major aspect of this is the close linkage between economic and political issues. That linkage, in turn, works to render irrelevant the former distinctions between domestic and foreign policy. The blurring of these dividing lines may well preclude altogether a return to the conceptual clarity about the world, and about America's place in it, which Americans enjoyed during the preceding several decades. That clarity was largely a crisis phenomenon, the product of unprecedented global polarization. In a world of overlapping interests, such clarity of focus simply cannot be replicated.

None the less, even within this more complex setting, one can affirm certain basic priorities for American policy toward the rest of the world. The overt definition of such priorities—and the resulting debate over them—may help eventually to create a new sense of direction for America's global engagement, an engagement which—it has been argued here—most Americans are prepared to accept as an inescapable reality. Some of these priorities are not new, but they need to be restated; some do involve new emphasis.

Despite the partial codification of the competitive relationship prevailing between the United States and the U.S.S.R., the problem of security remains, as a legacy of the past, a high-priority item. For one thing, the danger of war has not disappeared entirely, though war as an act of policy has become a luxury which only the poor and the backward non-nuclear nations can now afford. Indeed, the possibility of an accidental war may now be higher than in the past, given the extraordinary complexity and abundance of modern weapons. To reduce this danger, efforts to codify and expand the developing U.S.-Soviet arms control arrangements must be continued. In any case, one hopes that the Soviet side has a co-equal interest in the avoidance of accidental war. The vigorous pursuit of SALT II is the logical conclusion.

In addition, there is reason to be concerned that at some point the Soviet leaders may be tempted to try to exploit a claimed or imagined margin of superiority in the weaponry of mass destruction, to extract, under the threat of war, significant and one-sided political gains. How to avoid this essentially incalculable political, even psychological, threat is difficult to analyze, for that threat is meaningful only in the degree to which asymmetry of power is perceived by the threatened side as being of significance. Still, sheer prudence requires the maintenance of a security pos-

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ture which by itself reduces the likelihood that the Soviet leaders could at some point conclude that the moment is ripe for the extraction of political gains through the generation of a severe atmosphere of crisis. In addition to obvious security precautions, expansion of U.S. relations with China, including even some form of aid designed to create greater stability in the Sino-Soviet nuclear standoff (such as transfer to China of sophisticated communications systems), is also a contribution to the shaping of a more stable U.S.-Soviet relationship, in addition to the more cooperative initiatives which are already underway in trade and science.

These initiatives, especially if conducted on a broad front, including in them both the Soviet Union and the East European countries, are likely to promote the subtle process of philosophical reconciliation with the Communist élites, ending the increasingly irrelevant doctrinal civil war which has divided the West for more than a hundred years. This process, to be sure, will be slow; moreover, reversals in it are to be expected, especially as the more conservative, neo-Stalinist elements stage occasional counteroffensives designed to make certain the East-West links leave the Soviet and East European peoples ideologically uncontaminated. Such elements are even likely to intensify at home their efforts at ideological-political controls. However, a broadly based process of intensified peaceful East-West engagement, going beyond the purely economic aspects, will almost imperceptibly chip away at the more outmoded edges of the Communist doctrinal edifice, thereby strengthening the pressures for East-West accommodation.

How to deal with the Communist world remains a key problem for U.S. foreign policy but it may no longer represent the central problem. The power realists, moreover, have been dealing with it effectively and—as Nixon has shown—not without some success in making the competitive U.S.-Soviet relationship more stable. But the other two major problems confronting U.S. policy —namely, that of the less-developed countries and that of alliance relationships among the advanced countries—cannot be effectively tackled on the basis of the power-realist approach. The condition of the less-developed countries, indeed of the planet as a whole, requires greater concentration on the issues raised by planetary humanists, while the question of alliance relationships calls for a creative blend of both approaches.

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This blend is needed because of the transformation which international affairs are undergoing—a transformation which introduces novel elements even as the old ones still remain partially operative. We noted earlier the appearance of the new global politics, which makes the older international politics increasingly irrelevant as the organizing-conceptual framework for dealing with world affairs. These emerging global politics are yet to acquire a clear-cut character: they might become the politics of growing global responsibility and interdependence—or they might become characterized more and more by anarchy, social fragmentation, intensified racial, ethnic and ideological conflicts, with even the older international rivalries resurfacing in a new form. The desperate problem of the less-developed nations is central here, but an important issue at stake also is the very character of social and political organization in the more advanced states.

Modern society is thrusting into a new age, the character of which we do not still fully understand. Material wealth is creating a strange spiritual emptiness in some of the more advanced industrial societies, while scientific developments pose an ominous threat to the integrity of the human being himself by raising the specter of human malleability through social engineering. There is thus a growing need for more sustained reflection on the condition of modern man and for a mutual learning process among the societies that are in the forefront of the technetronic revolution. It is doubtful that an effective response to this internal problem—not to speak of external relations among advanced industrial countries—can be mounted on the basis of a single society, however rich or powerful.

It is to this newer and enormously complex task that American policy will have to address itself, and in so doing seek to respond to the central concerns both of the power realists and of the planetary humanists. Realism and the lessons of the past show clearly that the United States alone cannot mount the needed response, that the process of shaping a more stable and socially progressive world calls for a wider effort among those who share both certain philosophical assumptions and the needed resources. This condition imposes a special obligation, in the first instance, on the United States, Western Europe and Japan to shape their policies with broader concerns in mind than the dictates of national interest alone. Unless these advanced sectors of the world move

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toward greater and more active collaboration there is a high probability that the fragile global economy and the barely emerging sense of global community will be shattered, pitching the world back into international animosities, fragmenting the world economy and intensifying the social strains within both the advanced and the developing countries.

Closer coöperation among the advanced industrial societies, which share certain political values in common, would help to create a stable core for global politics, on the basis of which a more sustained response to the traditional threats of war, or to the new danger of social fragmentation brought about by poverty, or to the broader image of collapse of the global eco-system, can be undertaken. The Atlantic concept was a creative response to the problems of the cold war era. Today, the Atlantic framework is too narrow to encompass the multitude of challenges—and opportunities—that confront the international community. It is a recognition of this reality to propose that without closer American-European-Japanese coöperation the major problems of today cannot be effectively tackled, and that *the active promotion of such trilateral coöperation must now become the central priority of U.S. policy.*

This means nothing less than deliberate, closer and more institutionalized political consultation among these three power centers. Without such consultations, formal proclamations, including even a "new Atlantic Charter," are likely to lack substance. These consultations, designed to develop common policies with regard to the various problems confronting the global community, must be *ab initio* on the basis of trilateral parity. It simply is not enough, and psychologically wrong, to strengthen Atlantic ties and *then* invite Japan to come in—an approach which the Administration seems to be favoring, judging from Henry Kissinger's important and thoughtful speech of April 1973 on U.S.-European relations. Moreover, in President Nixon's State of the World message for 1973, Japan was accused of a "free ride" on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty; such affirmations can only exacerbate the already strained U.S.-Japanese relationship. (Indeed, it is time that Japan be given more public credit for her accommodation to various recent U.S. economic and political desiderata.) In any case, Japan must be included in any new initiative from the very start, and not only "ultimately."

More specifically, implementation of a decision to seek closer

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consultative relationships could take several forms, all of them initially modest and far short of anything resembling an alliance or formal community. First of all, to stimulate a greater degree of shared political perspective among the governmental bodies of the three units, to promote the practice of regular and ever more formal political consultation, to develop common political planning with regard to problems or areas of mutual interest, it would be desirable: (1) to adopt as a matter of regular practice the holding of annual trilateral cabinet meetings, somewhat on the model of the U.S.-Japanese cabinet meetings. In the trilateral setting, this could involve the Common Market countries as well as the Japanese and American sides; in addition, perhaps regular meetings of the respective heads of government might also be scheduled on a less frequent basis; (2) to reinforce the above with a standing secretariat, particularly with a common policy planning and review staff, in part as back-up for the above and in part as a stimulant to the emergence and crystallization of common perspectives and policies; (3) to promote consultations in a larger framework, involving states outside the formal confines of the "coöperative triangle," with more frequent meetings of the foreign ministers of the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development both to review common political problems and to work out joint responses to the problems of development in the Third World; (4) to hold regular three-way meetings of the respective parliamentarians, on as wide a party basis as possible.

The important point to bear in mind with regard to the foregoing proposals is that movement toward a community of the developed nations involves a long and gradual process, the pursuit of which has to be deliberate. Articulation of this very concept as the desirable goal would represent by itself a step in that direction, even though it must be recognized that the word "community" involves at best a distant objective. None the less, out of such consultations, there may eventually emerge a wider consensus—though not necessarily coördinated policies—on the specifics of political collaboration, on global security and on relations with the Communist world, as well as a more enduring response to the monetary and trade difficulties that have already strained Atlantic and Pacific relations. Free trade has been the underlying principle of world economics during the last two and a half decades, but the imbalances that have lately developed have posed the

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threat of new trade wars under the banner of protectionism. Closer trilateral consultations may facilitate the emergence of a third and healthier alternative, involving more deliberate periodic adjustments, reinforced by new monetary institutions.

Such a trilateral relationship also rests upon the linkage of security concerns that bind the United States, Europe and Japan. Such a linkage already exists, and will most likely become more apparent with the passage of time. The Chinese are developing a policy toward Western Europe to encourage West European integration as a counterweight to the Soviet presence in Europe. Their attitude toward the upcoming conference on European security has already been made felt in this regard. Further, they continue to encourage any stirrings of independence within the East European Soviet bloc. A coördinated response to the Chinese-Russian rivalry as it affects Europe is a matter of simple realism. The interests of the West Europeans, in turn, overlap those of the Japanese in the Middle East as a result of their common dependence on oil, and, consequently, in such strategic areas as the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean. Such security considerations cannot easily be divorced from those economic interests that are vital to their wellbeing; and it is not desirable, particularly as America reduces her global role, for the United States to assume unilaterally the overarching security needs of its major allies.

Doubtless, many obstacles to such trilateral coöperation will have to be overcome. Some Europeans may resent an approach which seems to place Atlantic relations on a par with Pacific relations and suspect that it represents essentially an American effort to shift onto European shoulders some of the imbalances in U.S.-Japanese relations. Some Japanese may feel that the initiative reflects a desire to entangle them in an expanded NATO. These fears are real, even though they are not justified. For good historical and cultural reasons, Atlantic relations will remain for some time to come of a different order than Pacific links, while trade and monetary problems between the United States and Japan have already had such a major impact on Atlantic relations that they simply cannot be compartmentalized. To acknowledge this reality, and to postulate the need for a wider political response on the above matters, as well as on the broader global problems, is not, however, to extend the framework of NATO to the Pacific, but to respond jointly to joint concerns.

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Thus rather than refute, the above fears highlight the need for more sustained trilateral consultations and additional trilateral links.

The adoption of these objectives would entail some operational consequences for the way in which policy is made and executed in Washington. A secretive and highly personal foreign policy, heavily reliant on maneuver and surprise, is admirably suited to handling adversary relationships. It is bound to have a short life, and the longer it lasts, the more likely it is to backfire, since it is inadequate for dealing with the complex problems involving U.S.-Japanese-European relations. Recent Japanese reactions, including the cancellation of Emperor Hirohito's trip to the United States, indicate that a secretive unilateralism is contagious. Trilateral relations, be they monetary, trade or security, must be nurtured by stable and extensive negotiations and reinforced by further institutional growth. The recovery of the State Department and of the Treasury are thus the operational requirements of the broader strategy outlined above.

The very process of seeking to shape a community of the developed nations would inescapably involve a greater degree of consultation concerning the major longer-range problems of global politics, most notably that of backwardness and poverty in the Third World, a concern uppermost in the minds of the planetary humanists. It is to be expected that in the next two or three decades we will witness an intensified crisis in the Third World, brought about by the twin impacts of demographic growth and the spread of education. Both will make global inequality even more intolerable at a time when equality is becoming the most powerful moral imperative of our time, thus paralleling the appeal of the concept of liberty during the nineteenth century.

This quest for equality is already being felt both within societies and on a global scale; it is, therefore, essential that the richer nations develop more comprehensive, more coöperative and more planned policies toward the poorer parts of the world. They must further increase the participation by all of the advanced countries in institutions designed to improve the lot of the Third World (for example, Japan might usefully participate as a member of the Latin American Development Bank, and Europe and America might participate in other regional activities of this sort as well). One of the frequent objections to the concept of the com-

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munity of the developed nations is that it will be "a rich man's club," insensitive to the problems of the Third World. Yet it is difficult to see how the monumental problems which the Third World confronts can be resolved unless advanced countries do coöperate in generating a major response. Social stability and progress are not going to be achieved if the three most powerful units of the world are pushed by their internal and external dynamics into increasing protectionism as well as other economic conflicts.

Similarly, objections have been made that closer trilateral cooperation as the central goal of U.S. policy runs counter to the aim of improving relations with the Communist world. Yet that improvement is not likely to be attained in a setting which is unstable and thus feeds the residual revolutionary aspirations of the Communist leaders. A coöperative component, embracing the richest and the most powerful countries, seriously seeking to develop common policies designed to promote more rapid growth in the Third World, is hence more likely to develop enduring and constructive relations with the Communist states than individual policies of détente, often competitively pursued.

Indeed, a gradually emerging community of the developed nations will be in a better position to pursue true détente, the aim of which is not an artificially compartmentalized globe, fundamentally in conflict with basic global dynamics, but a world in which spheres of exclusive predominance fade. Just as American hegemony in Latin America must decline—and the United States is beginning to accept that reality—and just as a Japanese co-prosperity sphere in Asia is not compatible with Asian nationalisms, so Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe will have to be gradually replaced by an Eastern Europe that—though retaining some links with the U.S.S.R.—is part of a wider European association.

The policy outlined above would involve a building-block approach toward the goal of creating a global community that is stable and progressive. By being responsive to the central concerns of the power realists and of the planetary humanists—both of whom recognize the reality of global interdependence though they define its priorities differently—it might also lead to greater clarity in America's global engagement.

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TRIBALISM THROUGH CORRECTIVE LENSES

By Aristide R. Zolberg

WELL in evidence in Herodotus and Thucydides, the idea that peoples have an aggregate moral character and political temperament is one of the foundations of Western statecraft. It appears in a modern version in Machiavelli, who asserts that prediction of human events, for the purpose of making foreign policy, is facilitated if one observes that "nations preserve for a long time the same character, ever exhibiting the same disposition to avarice, or bad faith, or to some other special vice or virtue." At its worst, the "national character" approach consists of a litany of ethnocentric stereotypes which tells us more about the prejudices of the observer than about the characteristics of the observed. At its best, as in Tocqueville's analysis of the character of Americans, it seeks to derive from historical experience and observable cultural patterns features which are likely to have a lasting effect on the formation of habits and beliefs in the political realm.

Knowledge of this sort is often the foundation for the organization of "civilization" courses in institutions of higher education and is incorporated into the general education of future decision-makers. For better or for worse, whether they are treated as explicit working hypotheses or remain unspoken assumptions, whether they are triggered off by journalistic images or learned from scholarly accounts, such general notions are almost always a major starting point for the analysis of societies other than our own. The impressions formed on first contact, the initial discovery of the others, generally have a long life. They act as the durable lenses through which distant realities are perceived.

What are the lenses through which we perceive Black Africa, a region of great diversity, whose 300 million people are allocated by anthropologists into a multitude of ethnographic units, and whose states occupy nearly one-fourth of the seats in the General Assembly? It is significant that there are few statements concerning African culture or civilization which can be used as the sort of starting point for general understanding we have for other regions of the world, including even other parts of the Third World. Indeed, it can be argued that the absence of such

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a beginning is the most important characteristic of the thought-set we bring to bear on that continent. There is, instead, another beginning, associated with the images of blackness and darkness which are among the fundamental concepts of Western civilization. In the modern literature of the English-speaking world, the only great work of literary imagination that uses Africa as a central place is Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness,* a novel about many things, including the corrupting consequences of colonialism for the colonizer. What is most relevant for the present purpose, however, is that the novel casts Africa in the role of the black mirror of our own selves; the savage in Africa is the savage in us; life in Africa is life deprived of civilization, the id unbounded.

While it is unlikely that many recent observers of Africa made a conscious connection between Conrad's powerful images and the continent they now observe, it is likely that the image of a Dark Continent, inhabited by savage black men, remains a central, albeit often unspoken, assumption behind many of our perceptions of contemporary African political life. The news from Africa more often than not confirms our black thoughts. The first headlines, two decades ago, triggered off for newspaper readers in the English-speaking world the fearsome image of Mau Mau, crystallized for many into Robert Ruark's sensational best-selling potboiler, *Something of Value.* The nightmare of savages disembarking at Idlewild to occupy their seats at the United Nations was confirmed by the Congo. Born prematurely amid turmoil, bereft of all prerequisites for political viability, abandoned on the doorstep of an international system still in the throes of the cold war, divided into a multitude of tribes, led by political caricatures, the Congo seemed to exhibit during the first half of the 1960s a degree of savage violence which confirmed Joseph Conrad's acumen in selecting that country as his locale.

For many Africa-watchers, this horrifying nightmare heightened the contrast between the Congo and Nigeria, a country which clearly demonstrated the benefits of enlightened colonialism: the best-prepared, the most promising, the least pusillanimous, the best-led country in Black Africa. . . . But no sooner had the Congo disappeared from the headlines—in an apocalyptic vision of drug-crazed Simba warriors, their ferocity heightened by cannibalistic orgies, marching on Stanleyville where huddled whites waited for rescue from the skies—than Nigeria

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experienced the bloodiest military coup to date. During the ensuing five years, the international spotlight revealed there horrors which vied with the Congo's. Meanwhile, in Rwanda, on and off, rivers of blood. . . .

Not the least source of our stereotype of the unrestrained savage is the particular form that violent clashes take when they do erupt in Africa. Particularly shocking to the sensibilities of observers accustomed to the ways of death in more industrialized societies are the ways of death that occur under conditions of low-level technology. We view as more civilized death inflicted at a distance by means of bullets, or preferably even more impersonally by means of bombs, than death inflicted by the blade at the end of an arm. Civilized warriors clean up the battlefield, savages leave mutilated corpses to rot on a jungle path. That the former kill more comfortably and hence more massively than the latter is not the basis on which we choose to compare. Faced with the horrible fact that in Africa the ravages of even a small war, consisting of intermittent skirmishes, can cause famine among millions deprived of the meager harvest of a single annual crop, we are more concerned with attributing blame than with reflecting on the even graver long-term consequences of our own wars, or on the fundamental obligations the persistence of such possibilities imposes on us. Our filter selects features that emphasize the great gap which separates us from Africans. It is the most powerful means we can summon to deny our common brotherhood.

II

The central image is by now well established. The author of a recent book on Africa sponsored by a highly respected Washington institution summarizes the past as follows: "Animism was the dominant religion. . . . Tribal wars were frequent and savage by modern Western standards. Ritual cannibalism and indigenous slavery were widespread."[1] Citing as his authority the statement by a journalist, "A female continent, Black Africa was to be 'discovered,' penetrated and dominated by others," the same author concludes his analysis of the past as follows: "Physically and politically, tropical Africa was passive." And what sort of life does this savage-passive tribal female lead today? It is not surprising

[1] Ernest W. Lefever, *Spear and Scepter: Army, Police and Politics in Tropical Africa*, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1970, pp. 2–3.

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that after a "premature transfer of sovereignty" from "mature metropolitan governments in Europe" to "fledgling leaders with little experience in the art of state politics," savagery came to the fore: "In the Congo, Nigeria, the Sudan and elsewhere, Western rules of war—respect for civilians, fair treatment for prisoners, etc.—have given way to atavistic and brutal behavior that shows no mercy for civilians or prisoners. . . ."[2]

The clincher in this sort of analysis is the old-fashioned word "atavism." Scratch an African, remove the English, French or Belgian veneer, and you will find the Ancestor. Not the Noble Savage of yore, nor the Brainy Savage of contemporary structuralist anthropology, but the Savage *tout court*—in other words, the Cannibal—who does not even practice homicide in the approved manner. Even when it is expressed in less blatantly racist form, the message is the same: Most of the countries of Black Africa are tribal cockpits, contained within artificial boundaries, whose terrifying potential for violence is barely held in check by unreliable leaders and a rapidly receding façade of Western civilization. Whereas our images of the European or of the Asian past, expressed in such terms as "feudalism," "piety," "familism," "hierarchic order," evoke at least some ambivalence toward waning traditions, our key recurring concept in connection with Africa is strictly negative—"tribalism." The word "tribe," which referred originally to a Roman social group comprising numerous families, clans or generations together with slaves, dependents or adopted strangers, has become a pejorative concept. Countries whose social and political organization we view as "tribal" necessarily suffer from "tribalism," the irrational exaltation of tribes above all other groups. This exaltation leads to violence; and the violence itself takes horrible forms, a phenomenon which confirms the validity of our analysis.

Like other concepts of this sort, "tribalism" explains too little or too much. If it explains the Congo in 1960–1965, and Nigeria in 1966–1971, then how do we account for the peacefulness of the former (now Zaïre) in the last seven years, and for the state of Nigeria before and after the civil war? If this dreaded force looms so large throughout Africa, then why is there no permanent war of all against all? When applied to Africa, the concept "tribalism" hides more than it reveals, Another starting point is needed.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

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III

We have two basic maps of Africa: one, updated since 1960, shows the boundaries of states; the other, established without specific time-reference, is ethnographic. The establishment of ethnographic maps for individual territories and for Africa as a whole, often for the purpose of facilitating colonial administration, fostered a view of it as a region divided into permanent, mutually exclusive entities, to which individuals were bound by very strong and exclusive ties. But the strongest attachments of individuals, at the time of the establishment of the maps as well as today, were to social groups smaller than the designated units, segments to which direct descent could be traced and which retained a daily reality. At the same time, there existed in Africa a variety of nonethnic or transethnic membership groups based on occupation, economic exchange, religious identity, political alliance or mere proximity of residence. Most larger African societies made provisions for the presence of "strangers" in their midst.

Furthermore, the accumulating evidence based on the history of particular groups indicates very clearly that these were neither socially nor geographically immobile. As in other parts of the world, individuals and populations were absorbed into groups other than the one into which they were born—by necessity or by choice. Smaller units were amalgamated into larger ones, larger ones fell apart. Therefore, African ethnographic units should be viewed as *historical* entities, in some sense as "artificial" as contemporary African countries are said to be. Ethnographic maps of Africa should be viewed as pages in a yet unwritten historical atlas, which, when it is completed, will also contain pages revealing other dimensions of culture and society, all of them changing over time.

To say that the boundaries of contemporary African countries are "artificial" tells us less about Africa than about our own historical myths concerning the emergence of nation-states. The boundaries of France, Germany or of the United States of America were established by an equally artificial process, but usually over a longer period of time and in the more distant past. What is probably most distinctive about Africa in this respect is that the establishment of a particular territorial claim did not require the ability to enforce that claim against those of others, as it usually did in Europe. Hence, for nearly three-quarters of a century,

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the European colonies in Africa were ruled lightly in comparison with other parts of the world. Very little effort was made to transform the population of these territories into subjects, let alone citizens.

The changes that began to occur can be viewed as a dialectical interaction between European and African intentions, and including unintentional consequences of both. Some aspects of the ethnographic map were frozen at the time of contact. For example, processes of conquest were usually arrested at the point they had reached; this ensured, on the one hand, that amalgamation was not completed, and on the other hand, that decay would not set in. Simultaneously, other aspects of the map experienced accelerated change. While the geographical movement of entire societies was generally arrested, there was greater movement of individuals and families. The inhabitants of several village societies might be grouped together for administrative purposes and be given a common designation; peoples might be separated into different administrative districts or even countries, and be given distinct names. New distinctions, stemming from the importation of a new religion (including in some countries mutually hostile varieties of Christianity), from growing economic, educational and political differentiations, as well as from residence in new towns, began to appear.

An awareness of these processes of change, vastly accelerated during the quarter-century since World War II, should help us understand that some "ethnic groups" or "tribes" to which "traditional attachments" came to be expressed are, in fact, of recent creation. Moreover, the very real appearance of an ethnic dimension in the politics of African states during the period of decolonization and after independence does not mean that the dimension is exhaustive, overwhelming or determinative. Other forms of social differentiation are relevant for African political life. And it is usually the combination of ethnic distinctiveness with these other forms that creates very severe problems in Africa as in all other contemporary societies. In such cases, it is not simply the fact that Africans are attached to their ethnic units which is a determinative source of conflict; it is rather that, in a given situation, ethnic identities take on new meanings.

Tense situations occur wherever the impact of colonization has produced very differentiated patterns of regional change. Take the simple situation of a country containing two groups, the Y's

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and the X's. The Y's are a minority of the population, located near the sea. Regardless of past relationships between them when there were merely X's and Y's, there are now *poor* X's and *rich* Y's, *lesser-educated* X's and *better-educated* Y's. The Y's were the clerks and the technicians of colonization, and as such were associated with its dominion; but they were also its intellectuals, and as such its most active opponents. The Y's were naturally one jump ahead in the organization of the movements and parties that led to independence and gained access to the spoils of political power. But the introduction of representative government founded on universal suffrage in such a situation is a source of great tension, as the X's constitute a numerical majority. The Y's can maintain themselves in power only by reducing the consequences of democracy, thus confirming in the eyes of the X's that their own ethnic group is being discriminated against by the new oppressors. If the X's ("tough up-country men") had been recruited preferentially into the colonial army, the remedy is obvious. If, to complicate matters, the Y's had previously established their own dominion over the X's by conquest, a dominion taken for granted and sustained by the colonizing power under a system of indirect rule, the potential consequences of the introduction of representative democracy amount to nothing more or less than a social revolution.

Such clear-cut situations are by no means typical of contemporary Africa. In rare cases, they *are* the situation (Rwanda, Zanzibar). More commonly, a multitude of situations can be found in a single country, and the sort of sharp antagonism which arises in the above cases may characterize the relationships between two particular groups in one small or large region. Communal conflict may arise, but it is generally contained, or at least less visible to outside observers. It also stands to reason that when severe disturbances occur at the very center of the society, whether related or unrelated to situations of this sort, the antagonisms tend to be expressed with fewer constraints. The interruption of normal processes of government in the capital provides the occasion for a *règlement de comptes* in the country.

IV

To the above qualifications of "tribalism" one could add a lengthy discussion of its less obvious positive aspects, in particular how much the persistence of ethnic attachments in Africa

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operates against the unchecked development of urban-rural and class cleavages. But even if that is kept in mind, and even if it is acknowledged that the least traditional aspects of ethnicity are the most significant in relation to contemporary politics, and that communal conflict is as much a consequence as a cause of political disturbances, it nevertheless remains the case that tensions involving an ethnic component, and especially large-scale violence, surfaced more prominently after independence than before. This phenomenon confirms the view that while before independence Black Africa experienced development, after independence it experienced decay. Since the most obvious thing that happened was a change in the race of the rulers, this view in turn evokes an invidious comparison between the political acumen of the white masters of Africa and the incompetence of their black successors. An alternative way of comparing their performances is to examine whether they face the same political tasks and have the same means at their disposal.

Beneath the variations in the specific components of their colonial policies, the British, French and Belgian colonizers of Africa developed over time for the government of their possessions a strikingly uniform regime which might be called the "administrative state." This sort of regime came most naturally to the French, who had experienced it at home in recent times and where it had left important sequels; but even the British and the Belgians were Napoleonic in Africa. In such a state the bureaucracy is nearly sovereign as long as it acts in accordance with the interests of key economic groups and is able to contain gross civil disturbances. Its rule is based primarily on strength, displayed by a powerful constabulary force (army, police, gendarmerie), and on competence, by a hierarchically organized field administration with authority over specialized services at all levels. The key personage between the uppermost level of the state and the local level is some form of prefect—in Africa, the District Officer or the *Commandant de Cercle*. Below, the administrative state extends its rule through a system of alliances with notables—in Africa, more or less traditional "chiefs." Such alliances add to strength, or force, an element of exchange founded on the mutual interest of the state and various groups in the population.

When a degree of popular representation and democracy becomes necessary, the administrative state is normally able to adjust accordingly. But the resulting pattern is very different

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from the one associated with the more liberal tradition of statecraft: the state is not merely a government to be entrusted to the winners of competitive marketplace politics. The administrative state, with a political purpose of its own, remains above parties, or becomes the dominant, if not exclusive, party. In any case, the process of exchange or of bargaining between state and society, conceived of as separate entities, is always controlled by the state itself. Great care is always exercised to avoid uncertainty about the outcome of social interactions, a major source of insecurity for the state. Backed by its coercive apparatus, the bureaucracy can consult the population, but on its own terms—by defining the categories which will be consulted, the problems to be placed on the agenda, and by organizing the necessary structures (including interest groups and even parties) in a suitable manner.

The initial demonstration of strength, sustained by the ability of Europeans to repress disturbances, fostered respect mixed with envy, fear and emulation. Toward the end of the colonial period, the exchange aspect of colonial regimes had become more prominent in most cases than the coercive aspect. Nevertheless, the coercive potential available to European governors remained a prominent feature of the situation and was used to control the very terms of bargaining which led to independence. The final act of exchange placed the administrative state's apparatus in the hands of Africans. Much as Tocqueville argued that beneath the upheavals that accompanied the French Revolution there was great continuity with the state-building project launched under the *ancien régime,* so it can be asserted that in Africa the fundamental character of the administrative state was not affected by racial change among its rulers.

What did change significantly were the tasks which the state assigned itself. While much has been said about the "revolution of rising expectations" among the general population of Third World countries, what is being stressed here is the "revolution of rising expectations" among their post-independence rulers. This stems less from the fact that they are "unrealistic" in comparison with their predecessors than from the fact that they necessarily define realities in very different ways. Nowhere is this more apparent than with regard to social and economic development. To put it rather bluntly, development was *not* one of the goals of the colonial state. Its concern was, at best, with *improvement,* which is not at all the same thing. Annual colonial reports could

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almost always look back with satisfaction upon the past and note how far the territory had come from the way it had been before: where there had been no schools, roads, hospitals, exports, imports, administrative buildings, there were now some . . . and some more every year. The same statistics, viewed by leaders of newly independent states, merely revealed how far behind their country was in relation to the rest of the world. In the same sense that they were concerned with improvement rather than with development, colonial rulers were concerned with the maintenance of peace rather than with nation-building. If the consequences of the transfer of outlook which accompanied the transfer of rulers are most cruelly obvious when they entail quantifiable indicators, they are not less dramatic when they entail the more qualitative indicators of nationhood.

The drastic increases in the burdens of African states since independence stem not merely from the subjective factor of the changes in the aspirations of their rulers. The new African rulers were left holding a most unruly bag. The very process of decolonization ensured that objective conditions would be much more difficult after independence than before. This is not to impute evil intentions to the European rulers, but rather to draw attention to the conjuncture produced by the timing of processes of change and the timing of independence.

For example, the development of a bureaucracy suitable to the needs of the "welfare-state" version of the colonial regime after World War II required the vast development of educational institutions. Given the relationship of the colonial state to African society, however, it was then possible to regulate educational development in keeping with an overall administrative plan, e.g. to produce or not to produce university graduates. Since these bureaucracies were being simultaneously developed and Africanized, it was relatively easy to absorb the flow of educated claimants to bureaucratic posts. With few exceptions, the process had barely begun in the post-World War II period; in most cases, the problem was more likely to be a shortage of educated Africans than an oversupply; and even where the supply surpassed local needs, it was possible to transfer the surplus to other territories within the same colonial empire.

But the new institutions, once created, continued to churn out graduates, regardless of need. The consequences of this inexorable process had their full impact only a few years later, when

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yearly cohorts of graduates knocked at the door only to find that offices were already staffed. The colonial rulers had the rather pleasant task of encouraging Africans to become educated and the rather reasonable task of building up clearly needed bureaucracies; their successors were faced with the choice of shutting off educational valves or of expanding bureaucracies needlessly. In any case, it was they who had to bear the full brunt of the anger of their youth.

Further consideration of the time lag between the origins of problems and their political consequences leads us back to our starting point, "tribalism." It was argued earlier that the extension of suffrage and the institutionalization of representative bodies dramatically reveal, both to the population affected by these changes and to outside observers, the inequities occasioned by the uneven impact of modernization. It was further argued that it is often this sort of dramatic revelation—involving what social scientists call "status reversals"—which is at the root of tragic communal conflicts. Now it becomes understandable that the political consequences of such sociological monstrosities will become visible only after a while and that, in the history of contemporary Africa, this "after a while" was sufficient to account for their appearance after independence rather than before. It must be remembered that almost everywhere, universal suffrage was granted as the very last political concession on the road to independence, often less than a year before the appointed date. Where conflicts arose immediately, they could still be contained by coercion because that instrument of government remained to the last minute under European command. Alternatively, the very appearance of such conflicts speeded up rather than slowed down the schedule of European departure. Their attitude could generally be described as *après moi le déluge*.

In other cases, the conflicts were exacerbated by an additional difference between the pre- and post-independence state: Whereas European rulers could add sufficient coercive weight to one side, defined as the legitimate side, to bring the conflict to a rapid conclusion, African rulers are faced with the problem of the permeability of their own states to external influences. This is not to say that the state is always right; it simply draws attention to the difference between a conflict where one rather than both sides has access to reinforcements, both in materiel and in manpower. Without external aid, some secessions would not

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occur; left to their own devices, some African states would not be able to contain secessions. Whatever the outcome, and whatever injustice might be involved, it is unlikely that the horror would reach the level it can reach when outsiders intervene.

The consequences of some of the more monstrous aspects of colonial legacies are still coming to light. What demonic race of philosopher-kings would construct a pyramidal society stratified into three racial compartments, their own at the top, indigenes at the bottom, and an imported intermediate race—"Wogs"—in the middle? Would anyone expect such a society to work except under the watchful control of the philosopher-kings themselves? And if they depart from the scene, leaving the other two races to fend for themselves, can we consider those as anything but victims of a past that was not of their making?

V

In most of Africa, the War of the Tribes did not take place. Will not? Or not yet? Must we account for its nonoccurrence by the absence of problems, by a sort of sociological inertia which provides some respite, or by the wisdom and skill of Africans themselves? For reasons suggested, few African countries are immune to the possibility of communal conflict. It may well be that the situations with the greatest conflict potential have already exploded. In at least some of the situations where that occurred, there is evidence that peace can return through the concerted efforts of black men. What they endured and what they later achieved may help those who have benefited from a period of respite to tackle the problems of "tribalism" at their source, by moving toward greater equity of political and economic life.

Some African leaders, it turns out, have been doing so all along, usually by combining the structures and processes of the administrative state with a form of permanent consultation based on their deep knowledge of African society—not as it is alleged to have been "in the traditional past" but as it is today. The result, which might be called the "palaver state," may provide the beginnings of a formula of government adapted to African needs in this age. That not all the rulers of Black Africa, whether civilians or men in uniform, possess the wisdom and skill to devise equitable solutions to the problems of political life in ethnically and racially heterogeneous societies is something which we, of all people, should understand.

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COPING WITH CODE WORDS

By Sidney Weintraub

I RECENTLY attended a round-table discussion of distinguished and imaginative Latin American leaders during which two speakers berated various countries for lack of "political will." In the first instance, what the United States needed to do to demonstrate its political will was to provide tariff preferences for imports of manufactured goods from less-developed countries. In the second case, political will was needed for Latin America to achieve an integrated, Hemisphere-wide, common market. To repeat: the speakers were men of substantial intellect.

What they were saying was true. But it was so obvious that it did not need saying. A lack of political will must reflect an unwillingness for some reason(s) by some country(ies) to do something. That, too, is self-evident. And yet the code words "political will" were used.

That set me to thinking about code words in international conferences, particularly those on political-economic issues, such as this round-table discussion. The American public knows a good deal these days about code words: about busing, neighborhood schools, workfare and welfare, job quotas, increases in employment as opposed to rising unemployment, budget limitations, disclosure deadlines for campaign contributions. But all these are domestic usages. A glossary is needed in the foreign field.

There are more international conferences than is generally realized. I counted the number during the month of October 1972 listed in a State Department publication, and it added up to 74. This is more than three conferences getting under way every working day of the month, and did not include the General Assembly of the United Nations or any of Henry Kissinger's meetings in Paris or Saigon or any other bilateral or informal get-togethers. Thousands of delegates go to these meetings; hundreds of newspapermen report on them; millions of persons read about them. I became concerned that without a glossary none of these hundreds, or thousands, or millions understood what was being said. Hence, this partial compilation of international code words as a service to persons interested in foreign political-economic affairs.

Not much space need be given to definitions that are generally

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understood. For example, in U.N. parlance, all delegates know that a centrally planned economy refers to a Communist country, and a market economy to what we call free-enterprise societies and the Communists label capitalist countries. There are developed countries, developing countries, and least-developed among the developing countries. Resolutions of international conferences refer to countries, most countries, many countries, some countries, several countries, one country, as the nuance may be and the negotiating situation will allow. Countries will agree to do things, or to do things "as appropriate," or "in accordance with their domestic procedures," or in conformity with some other previously approved resolution—all of these implying some degree of escape.

It is generally known that liberation may mean enslavement, counterrevolution the restoration of a previous legal authority, and that many peace-loving states foment war and revolution. Recent experience has demonstrated that racism often refers only to the type practiced in other countries. A good many countries appealed to the concept of universality in demanding that Communist China be seated in the United Nations, only to later observe Communist China veto the admission of Bangladesh. Since these conventional usages of doublespeak are well known, it may be of some service to run down some less well-known usages.

II

Political will, to start with what started me out, means that somebody else—some other country or group of countries—is unwilling to do something you want him or them to do. In the Latin American context of the round-table discussion, it may mean that countries are unwilling to undertake free-trade obligations among themselves that international civil servants want them to undertake. Another current and commonly used example: "The United States lacks the political will to provide sufficient foreign aid to meet the one-percent target." The target is something that all insiders know about. It refers to various U.N. resolutions calling on developed countries to provide net capital flows to developing countries of one percent of their respective gross national products.

Political reality is the obverse of political will. This is the expression used by a country about itself when it is unwilling to do something others are seeking to make it do. For example: "Polit-

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ical reality makes it impossible for us to commit ourselves to a precise date for meeting the one-percent target." Or: "Political reality is such that countries will never allow the marketplace alone to determine exchange-rate relationships." Or, for developing countries with clearly overvalued exchange rates: "Domestic political reality prevents any devaluation." Or for a country with too much inflation: "Political reality will not permit cutting back on budget expenditures."

The problem is *political, not technical* is a much-used phrase that belongs to the same genre as the foregoing. "The reason for Latin American countries' failure to eliminate tariffs in trade among themselves is political, not technical." This means much the same as lack of political will, i.e. somebody else does not want to do something you want him to do: "United States opposition to a cocoa agreement is political, not technical."

Sometimes the phrase is reversed, that the problem is *technical, not political,* and, peculiarly, this often means the same thing. "United States opposition to a cocoa agreement is technical, not political." Or, in the case of the current negotiations on international monetary reform: "The use of a single criterion, like reserve changes, as a guide to the need for adjustment, is a technical, not a political, problem," which in this arcane field refers to the reluctance of countries which are gaining foreign reserves to take measures to stanch the flow.

This is *a job for technicians* has a slightly different and derogatory connotation. When those who consider themselves to be "policy" officials cannot reach agreement, the subject matter can be downgraded by labeling it as a task for technicians.

This is *a decision for policy-making officials to make* has the subservient-superior hierarchical ring that conference-goers love. It is used when the "technicians" are unable to reach agreement and the problem is kicked upstairs.

This is a task for *political leaders, not technicians,* means much the same thing. This is a favorite of some of the countries in the European Common Market: "We need decisions by political leaders, not technicians, in order to move to the next phase." Depending on the precise circumstances, this means either that the other technicians do not agree with your technicians, or it may mean that you wish to stop some forward movement on which the other technicians all agree.

Lack of imagination means that you have not convinced the

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other country to do what you want it to do: "There is a complete lack of imagination in the proposals of what the rich countries will do to help the poor countries."

We are making a maximum effort means that you are expecting more from somebody else. This is a favorite among developing countries: "Since we are making a maximum effort in behalf of our own development, we look to more imaginative ideas from the developed world."

Acceptance in principle, in international conferences as in many other aspects of life, usually means rejection in practice, at least for the time being: "We accept in principle the need to do more to help ourselves." Or: "The United States accepts the principle of generalized trade preferences." Or, in mixed college dormitories: "In principle, the men and women sleep in different rooms."

III

Since this last example is a crude use of code words in that the phrase "in principle" is a dead giveaway to the catch, countries have developed more sophisticated escapes geared to the particular circumstances in question. The one-percent aid target lends itself admirably to this. Thus, the United States has accepted the principle of the target, but without setting a date for meeting it. One issue under discussion in the international monetary reform negotiations is to link the issuance of new Special Drawing Rights—paper gold to the layman—with development aid; this is outwardly an abstruse subject but intrinsically deals with transferring resources from rich to poor countries. France recently suggested that the SDR-aid link might be a good idea for countries which have not met the one-percent aid target—which France has met because of the large amount of aid she devotes to her former African colonies. This more specialized use of code words demonstrates that many glossaries may be needed to deal with specialized subjects, such as aid, trade, monetary reform, disarmament, foreign investment and the like.

One specialized term in the aid field is *burden sharing.* It usually means that the country using it wants to provide less aid and that it believes it is up to somebody else to provide more. During the early-to-mid-1960s, it was common for the United States to argue: "Now that Europe and Japan have recovered, they must share more of the burden of providing aid to the developing

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countries." Or, as Senator Fulbright might urge: "By providing foreign assistance through the multilateral financial institutions, we get an appropriate sharing of the burden." When we seek to reduce the U.S. proportionate share in the next replenishment of the International Development Association (the affiliate of the World Bank that makes loans on concessional terms), which some administration officials have promised the Congress we will try to do, this is justified on grounds of more equitable burden sharing.

Conversely, the Europeans and Japanese have agreed to various schemes to provide tariff preferences for their imports of manufactured goods from less-developed countries. The United States has not; now we are being berated for failing to share the burden equitably.

As times changed from the 1950s and 1960s, and aid from the United States, measured as a percentage of gross national product, declined to less than that of practically any other developed country, burden sharing began to undergo a subtle shift in meaning. When the Europeans and Japanese use it, they mean they want to give less and the United States to give more. When the United States uses it, it means that we want to look not only at aid, but also at military expenditures. We are saying that when the latter is looked at alone, or coupled with aid, the United States is providing the bulk of the defense cover for the world and thereby permitting the economies of other rich countries to grow unhampered by excessive military expenditures. Thus, "Europe and Japan must do more for themselves and thereby reduce the burden on the United States for the defense of the free world."

Many Europeans also have a view of their burden regarding Africa, Mediterranean countries, and even some countries in the Caribbean, which goes under the heading of *political responsibility*. In the trade field, what this means is that their producers must get favored treatment over those of other exporters in return for the tariff preferences they give to the less-developed countries. "We have a political responsibility toward these countries, and they are too proud to accept trade preferences from us without also giving reciprocal preferences to us."

The trade field has a particularly harsh term that is popular in Latin America—that their development programs are being *strangulated* by world-trading patterns. This often means they

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have not developed the requisite efficiency to compete effectively in world markets. It also means they want higher prices for their primary commodities. E.g., "The adverse terms of trade are strangulating our growth." (Terms of trade refer to the ratio between prices of a country's exports and its imports; when they move adversely, such as when primary product prices decline, a country has to export more of its products in order to import the same quantity of the products of others.) Or: "A new international division of labor is needed to undo the strangulation of our foreign trade."

Strangulation also refers to the fact that producers of certain primary products do not have the monopoly clout to raise prices unilaterally as the oil-producing nations have done, either because there are too many producers or because if the price gets too high, the consumer can live with a lot less of the product. Strangulation in this context thus means that they want the help of the consuming countries in order to raise prices in the consuming countries.

IV

Let me return to some terms that are less specialized.

The results did not meet our expectations means that one party to a negotiation did not get everything he demanded at the outset. This is a particularly favored phrase of the less-developed countries in certain international economic forums: "While we welcome the progress made in the resolution on trade preferences, the results of the conference did not meet our expectations." Or: "The Kennedy Round of trade negotiations was valuable, but the results did not meet our expectations." Or: "The understanding on aid volume targets does not fully meet our expectations."

When a country says that *discussion is premature,* this means it wishes no discussion and hopes the subject will go away. When a country clearly has to alter its exchange rate and does not wish to do so, discussion is always premature. The United States has not wished to face the policy aspects of the Special Drawing Rights-aid link, and we have found "that discussion is premature until the SDR first firmly establishes itself as an accepted instrument of reserve liquidity for official monetary authorities." Developing countries with overprotected domestic industries, and hence with an inability to export because of relative inefficiency, often find it premature to discuss their trading regimes.

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We have to explain this to our Congress: when used by an American, this means "no" to a proposal, and that he would rather pass the buck for the refusal: "I could never explain to Congress why I gave you terms more favorable than we give to others." Or: "Congress would never accept the one-percent aid target." In outright dictatorships, the phrase has an interesting variant: *We have to explain this to our public.* This means the same thing: No.

Clarion calls to *national sovereignty* in international forums, like those to patriotism in the domestic context, are rarely unambiguous. Thus Latin America appeals to national sovereignty when it rejects the idea of some impartial international procedure to settle expropriation-compensation disputes. All countries allude to sovereignty when they insist on maintaining a clearly inappropriate exchange rate.

This translation of codes only scratches the surface. As one who has sat through scores, really hundreds, of international conference sessions, and at 4 a.m. found himself doodling on note paper, *"Resolves,* to carry out . . ." or ". . . to request governments to carry out," or ". . . to carry out as necessary," and pondering the differing acceptability of different codes to the various agencies of the executive branch, the Congress and to the other participants, and wondering whether the addition of the words "frankly speaking" would add an aura of sincerity or dissimulation, I have come to realize that the loudmouths were often shouting at the deaf. It took me a long time to decipher many of the codes and some still remain a mystery to me. Clarity of intention is sometimes in the mind of the speaker and only infrequently in that of the listener.

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THE COMMUNITY IS WORKING

By Theo Sommer

"DEFICIT" seems to be the word for Europe these days. The Community of the Nine, so we are told, has a democratic deficit, a social deficit, a deficit of visionary power and, most noticeably, a deficit of unified political will in world affairs. It is hard to deny that there is a great deal of truth to such jeremiads. The Community does indeed find itself in the awkward position of being neither here nor there. Its member-states no longer possess a number of important political instruments; collective tools have not yet been fashioned. Clearly, the evolution of joint political institutions has not reached the point where they match the problems in the world.

But if there are glaring deficits in today's Europe, there is also, perhaps, a surfeit of skepticism. For despite all its obvious deficiencies the Community is definitely on the move again. Europe lost the 1950s through British aloofness, then the 1960s through French obstinacy. Now the moment of slack water in the tide of European affairs is obviously past. The Community of the Six has finally grown into the wider grouping of the Nine. At the Paris summit last October, the leaders of the new Community made a number of important decisions about the internal structure of their association. They defined a long-term political goal —European union by 1980—and set themselves a provisional timetable. Whatever procedural snags this renewed effort at pulling together may run into, and whatever vagueness may still becloud the ultimate objective, the *relance européenne* is finally underway. If the Treaty of Rome is the Community's Old Testament, the Paris Communiqué is its New Testament. And it goes a long way beyond the earlier document. Nowhere will this become more clearly visible than in the Community's external relations.

The range of choices has narrowed considerably since Herman Kahn sketched 88 possible Europes in the mid-1960s, even since Alastair Buchan's ISS study of 1969 outlined six different models of thinkable European futures. We may not see a federated Western Europe emerge by 1980, but we will see something close to it, arrived at in a much more pragmatic fashion than the European idealists of the early postwar period were able to visualize.

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There will not be an *American Europe,* the kind of U.S.-led Western Europe we had in 1949—divided, powerless, frightened states willingly following American leadership because it provided the only avenue toward physical survival—although close links with the United States are no doubt going to be maintained. Despite the growing prospect of a more conflictive relationship between the European Community and the United States, there will not be a *Gaullist Europe,* led by France in the basically anti-American spirit of Charles de Gaulle—although French influence will doubtlessly be significant. A *fragmented Europe*—once more back to its component parts, its community organs and institutions having come unstuck again—can likewise be rated very improbable. At the same time, a *pan-European evolution* leading to a Europe free from Brest to Brest does not, in view both of Soviet hegemonial rigidity and the still systemic inability of Communist régimes to coöperate with open societies, constitute a viable or attractive alternative to continued West European integration. Steadfast development of their Community to the point of *full-fledged political union* is the only option now open to the Nine.

II

Western Europe's approaches to community-building have undergone significant changes in the course of the past 20 years. In fact, there are three clearly distinguishable phases of development, each one characterized by a different approach:

Europe I, originally conceived in the 1950s, was connected with the name of Jean Monnet; its propellant and policy executor was to be the European Commission; its essence was supranational.

Europe II, which France attempted to impose on her partners in the 1960s, is linked with the name of Charles de Gaulle. The driving force behind it was the General's hegemonial ambition for his country; its essence was national, even nationalistic.

Europe III, as it has slowly been evolving, is a different kind of animal. It carries the name tag of Belgian Ambassador Etienne Davignon; its main instrument is the systematic coöperation of governments, leading to the negotiated, agreed-upon extension of collective policies to a rapidly widening range of questions. Its essence is, as it were, transnational.

This Europe III is likely to be with us for some time to come.

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It will neither be dominated by a technocratic structure nor overwhelmed by one man's autocratic will. It will be a Europe of the possible: pragmatic, without fanfare or panache, but dynamic nevertheless. Joint action will emerge from negotiated communality rather than from agreed Commission plans. But as the nine members formulate collective policies affecting an ever-growing number of sectors, the sheer quantity of joint decisions is bound to change the basic quality of the Community. No doubt, its component parts will not disappear, national governments not dwindle into insignificance: they are going to be the constituent parts of tomorrow's Europe as well. Yet in the eyes of the outside world the Community will more and more assume the character of one single entity, speaking, although in different tongues, with one voice, and implementing a collective will.

Contrary to earlier expectations, the Commission will not, or not for some time yet, become the main instrument of unity, the chief locus of political imagination and implementation. This may be a disheartening prospect for the Brussels apparatus, but it is not necessarily a disaster so long as the member-governments themselves provide the impetus toward more unity. Recent history seems to suggest that this is precisely what is happening. There are limits to the technocratic approach. Real progress toward fusion must rest on the political consent of Europe's component parts; it can be inspired but not assured by the Commission. The main point, as Andrew Shonfield has pointed out, is to "reduce each nation's capacity for making separate decisions without consulting the interests and wishes of its partners in the group." Yet if the frontiers of the nation-state are to be eroded, the nation-states themselves will have to take part in that process by voluntarily surrendering bits of national power. There is no way to circumvent them.

III

In part, the European Community is already a palpable reality; in part it is still a dream, a hope, an aspiration. The reality is made up of such dreary paper stuff as beef regulations and directives about barbed-wire fences, or shopkeepers' compromises about low-grade wines and cheap onions. But already it is more than that—for one thing because the outside world sees more in it and expects more from it. Close to 100 states maintain

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accredited representatives at the Commission headquarters in Brussels. The Community has established formalized relations with a number of international bodies like the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development (OECD), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and concluded a score of trade and association agreements with as many different countries. National ministers of the Nine traveling abroad have found to their surprise that their interlocutors invariably regard them as European as much as Dutch, French or German ministers.

To be sure, only a small part of the reality encompasses Europe's external relations. These are still basically the prerogative of the member-states. As Ralf Dahrendorf, a German Commissioner, pointed out in the January 1973 *Round Table:* "There is an almost absurd disproportion between the expectations of Europe's partners in the world, and the instruments which the European Community has at its disposal in order to respond to these expectations." But to do the West Europeans justice, it must be emphasized that during the past few years they have created habits of consultation, coöperation and concentration in many more fields than would have been thought possible even three years ago. And if there was, for a long time, a pitiful shortage of ideas about what the Community's place and role in the world ought to be, Europe now stands at "the brink of a moment of creative tension," to borrow a phrase from Italian Commissioner Altiero Spinelli. Slowly the new European idea is taking root. The goals are being defined for tomorrow's Community. A sense of togetherness is growing despite all the workaday squabbles about nuts and bolts, chicken feed and oranges.

The summit conference at The Hague (December 1969) and the subsequent Paris summit meeting (October 1972) have set a pattern for progress through negotiated communality of action. At The Hague, the enlargement of the original European Economic Community (EEC) was finally agreed upon. In Paris, European sights were raised to the more distant goal of union by 1980, but at the same time the summiteers laid down a detailed calendar for action. They agreed further to improve political coöperation on foreign policy matters. Foreign ministers will in future meet four times a year instead of twice for this purpose. The aim, as the communiqué put it, is "to deal with problems of

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current interest and, where possible, to formulate common medium- and long-term positions."

It is easy to sneer that doubling the number of ministerial meetings will not effect any major change in Europe's world role. But as a matter of fact this kind of political coöperation has made considerable headway in recent years. As the Paris Communiqué states, Western Europe is indeed on the road to "establish[ing] its position in world affairs as a distinct entity"—slowly so, sometimes in a rather fumbling fashion, and all too frequently still by declarations rather than by actions. However, there is now an institutionalized process, largely through the Davignon Committee, of comparing notes and agreeing on joint language as well as joint lines of approach; this by no means stops short at regular conferences of department chiefs and meetings of their political directors but reaches well down into the middle echelons of the nine foreign offices. On many issues, EEC ambassadors receive joint instructions. EEC ministers conducting talks abroad often personally inform the Community ambassadors about their conversations. This is what Chancellor Brandt referred to when he told the London *Times* recently: "Nowadays, in outside countries, in many cases our ambassadors meet. Not too much is said about this in public. . . . Our ambassador saw Gromyko two days ago, and only a few hours after he had reported to his own government he reported to his colleagues from the Community."

Beyond this, policy papers define the member-states' attitude toward important questions such as the Middle East or the Conference on Security and Coöperation in Europe (CSCE). Recognition of East Germany, establishment of diplomatic relations with Hanoi, joint reconstruction plans for Vietnam provide further examples of policy coördination among the Nine. In this context, the intensive joint preparations for the CSCE preliminary talks in Helsinki have been particularly significant. Not only did the Community members harmonize their individual views on both substance and procedure, they also assured the physical presence of the Commission at the talks and agreed that in all matters legally falling within the competence of the Community organs, standard EEC procedures must be observed in the formulation of policy statements or decisions. For the rest, there is no denying the fact that a great deal of the Community's own work is coming to have important policy implications. The

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basic positions taken by the Nine on such matters as the next GATT round, associated countries and preferential tariff treatment involve central issues in Europe's relationship with the United States, Japan and the Third World.

Thus, Western Europe is on the way toward a joint foreign policy. But its evolution is bound to be slow. Deeply ingrained parochial attitudes will not vanish overnight. Furthermore, even imaginative European leaders find it difficult to visualize Europe's place in the world of the 1980s. The Community of the Nine is still in search of a role.

IV

It is comparatively easy to define what Europe is *not* going to be like. First, it is hard to imagine that the Community will want to become a superpower in the sense in which this term is currently used: a power with global aspirations toward imposing a certain kind of order. Certainly it will have worldwide interests, and must resist any attempt to be relegated to a minor regional league. But I do not envisage European gunboats patrolling the Straits of Malacca, or EEC paratroopers supporting wobbly régimes in faraway countries against rebellious populations. The Community will have to have a military capacity to defend its territory but not to exercise its power far from its shores. It will not try to export any particular way of life. It will neither substitute for nor compete with American or Russian efforts to avert or mitigate conflicts in the developing world by direct intervention. Its role could be assertive only where its immediate interests were impinged upon, for example, if its oil supplies from the Middle East were jeopardized.

Second, although the echoes of past glories still reverberate faintly in some quarters, the peoples of the Community at large will feel no temptation to resume a colonial role. Europe, whatever its special interests and links with certain neighboring areas, will not be a vehicle for the continuation of colonialism by collective action. The idea that the Community might develop into a regional power with its own satellites in the Mediterranean and in Africa is quite preposterous. It may appeal to the systems ideologues of a pentagonal world order in which each of the five dominant powers possesses its private sphere of influence and dependence in the south: the United States in Latin America, Europe in Africa, the Soviet Union on the Indian subcontinent,

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China in Southeast Asia, Japan in Oceania. But it has little to do with the real world. Europe cannot become a closed bloc, extending from the North Cape to the Cape of Good Hope. It must remain open to partnership with everyone: with North America as well as Eastern Europe, with Asian groupings as well as Latin American countries.

Third, the Europe of 1980 will not simply be a Switzerland cast on a larger scale. To be sure, it is inevitably going to be a community of producers and traders, manufacturing, selling and buying. Yet for its own self-preservation it must actively participate in the web of international organizations from which Switzerland keeps largely aloof. It is not small enough to pass unnoticed—and not big enough to be immune from pressure if it fails to stand up and speak for itself.

But if Europe is not going to be imperialist, colonialist or helveticized, what then is it going to be like?

First, the European Community has to see to it that it cannot be pushed around by anyone. It must safeguard its existence, its prosperity and its growth potential. On the one hand, the EEC states must seek to prevent *Finlandization*—being swallowed up politically, if not militarily, by the Soviet Union, with only a semblance of autonomy left to them. On the other hand, they have to ward off what might be called *Canadianization*—being pressed into economic subservience to the United States, their autonomy and freedom of choice threatened by dollar diplomacy. Finally, the EEC must resist unfettered activities on the part of U.S.-dominated multinational companies.

Second, beyond these fundamental requisites of self-preservation and self-respect, the Community must establish itself as a totally new type of entity—neither parochial nor imperial, neither unassuming nor overbearing—a building-block for a broader and more complex international order; a "new intermediary between the national states and the world system," to quote Andrew Shonfield once more. Perhaps, as Jean Monnet has always seen it, it is the beginning of a "process of civilization" whose repercussions extend well beyond Community borders. Europe can serve as a model of how to achieve unity despite diversity. It is bound to be a force for openness and liberalism. And it can demonstrate especially to the Third World what Ralf Dahrendorf has termed "coöperation without dependence."

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Third, Europe has a moral role to play, and should unabashedly do so. This may strike some as censorious, as in its time did American moralizing. But as Peregrine Worsthorne pointed out in the London *Sunday Telegraph,* it is important that someone act as the conscience of humanity: "The world would be a much poorer place if there were no area which could be relied upon to preach a plausible sermon with some semblance of conviction from a posture of sufficient authority." America, Russia, China, the Third World, Worsthorne suggested, could not fulfill this role. Europe could: "The memory of how we ourselves used to behave badly in the past is too faint to be embarrassing and the likelihood of having to behave as badly in the future too remote to be worrying."

V

Peering into the future of transatlantic relations, it is hard to detect a rationale for fundamental change. At the same time, it is difficult not to predict growing friction between Europe and the United States. Separation impossible, accommodation implausible—this appears to be the most likely outlook.

The causes of disaffection are easy to see. On the one hand, they stem from the nature of the problems confronting the Atlantic Community. On the other hand, they derive from the very basic uncertainties which have come to mark the attitudes of the main actors. In the 1950s and 1960s the West's problems were chiefly military. There was a clear and present danger from the Communist East, strongly and urgently perceived by Europeans and Americans alike. Their security was at stake. Of course, they squabbled over force levels, strategic postures, various national contributions. But underneath it all there was an unmistakable unity of purpose. Security problems have an enormously integrative effect: they draw the most different partners together. In the 1970s, the problems are chiefly economic. The fear of Communist Russia is lower than ever; commercial and monetary issues within the West loom much larger now. Such issues, however, are inherently divisive. They appeal to parochial rather than common interests, in the process engendering protectionist pride and prejudice. In the absence of a powerful political will to the contrary they tend to ruin the most steady friendships.

In recent years, U.S. leadership has been lacking. Under President Johnson, Washington's attitude vis-à-vis Europe was

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one of sneering contempt ("Europe is not where the action is"); under President Nixon it has long been one of neglect. The United States was stuck with its feet in the Vietnam quagmire while its mind was busy with visions of superpower rapprochement. Europe, apart from two brief presidential visits, did not seem to figure on the world map of the Nixon administration.

It is only fair to add that the Europeans were not in a transatlantic frame of mind either. The agony of Gaullism, with its built-in anti-American bias, turned into a protracted affair; Vietnam constantly provided new arguments against the American connection, especially to the young; and Ostpolitik kept some Europeans spellbound to the exclusion of most everything else. On top of it all, Western Europe was divided against itself. No single figure was able to speak on its behalf, and the machinery which could crank out a European consensus was still pitifully inadequate.

Now we have moved into a new phase. The Vietnam War has come to an end. The European Community has taken a new lease on life. Both superpower rapprochement and European Ostpolitik, although they still agitate suspicious minds, have lost their spectacular quality; SALT II, the Security Conference in Helsinki or the mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) talks in Geneva will be nothing but hard work in the quarries of sub-summit diplomacy.

The question now is: can we muster the strength for a new departure, or shall we indulge in the delights of economic quibbling to the detriment of the whole transatlantic relationship? Will leadership now be provided to deal with the roots of our problems and to put them into the perspective of a common future, or will the structure of the Atlantic Community be allowed to come unstuck by default? And will leadership be provided not by preëmption on the part of the United States but by a dedicated joint effort to put together a new consensus—on trade, monetary problems, defense issues?

There is a general sense of relief in Europe over the fact that the United States has finally disentangled itself from Vietnam. But it would be less than honest not to add that there is also a widespread feeling of uneasiness. Uncertainty prevails with regard to future American policies vis-à-vis the Old World. Anyone who cares to dig a little deeper can easily uncover at least three roots of the transatlantic malaise.

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For one thing the Europeans are frightened by America's addiction to doctrines, however applicable or inapplicable these may be to a particular situation. The Vietnam War began when an American doctrine originally formulated for Europe, the Truman Doctrine, was unthinkingly applied to Asia. Now that the United States has largely ended its war-fighting role in Indochina, many Europeans cannot help wondering whether Washington might not make the same mistake once again—this time by applying to Europe a presidential doctrine first designed to deal with Asia, the Nixon Doctrine. The result could be equally disastrous. If the American effort at containing communism on the ground proved futile in Asia, withdrawing beyond the horizon in Europe would jeopardize the precarious balance on which the postwar order of things has come to rest.

Furthermore, the Europeans are worried by the present mood of the American people. After the vicissitudes of their Asian war, they seem desperate for tranquillity, for an end to or at least a respite from world involvement. This mood seems to bear out the "Klingberg Theory" of 1952, according to which, throughout American history, phases of introversion (average duration: 21 years) have alternated with phases of extroversion (average duration: 27 years). Since 1967 the prevailing trend has again been one of introversion. Politically, the switch has manifested itself in several important developments: a threat to the power of the executive by the legislative branch of government; a loss of budget power by the military-industrial complex; finally the growth of neo-isolationist tendencies in many quarters, portending more withdrawal and disengagement to come elsewhere. The Administration's benign (and sometimes not so benign) neglect of much of the outside world—Europe, the Middle East, Japan, Africa, Latin America—has seemed to reflect the nation's increasing disinterestedness in foreign affairs.

Finally, the Europeans are perplexed by the mood of the President. Not many have read Mr. Nixon's Kansas City speech of mid-1971, or his *Time* interview of January 1972, but they have noticed the outcome of his curious obsession with global geometry—his (or Dr. Kissinger's) idea of a pentagonal world in which five major units, all equidistant from each other, keep the world in balance. By inferring equidistance, the President has seemed to deny the possibility of closer relations among some of the five poles; by putting the emphasis on balance of power

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rather than on community of interest, he has appeared to turn his back on the earlier concept of interdependence; by ignoring Atlantic solidarity, he has run the risk of inciting a bitter trans-atlantic contest.

Nor can all this be played down as figments of academic fancy. The "Nixon shocks" administered to America's partners in the trade and currency crisis of August 1971, and the subsequent peregrinations of the President in China and Russia seemed to prove the point that he was bent on transforming the old adversary relationship with Peking and Moscow into something much more coöperative, while at the same time deliberately infusing a conflictive, quasi-adversary element into U.S. relations with Japan and Western Europe. Suspicion lingers in some minds that superpower bilateralism is really what the President has in mind, and that in SALT II, MBFR, even in trade, he might make, especially after Watergate, concessions to the Russians which would violate Community interests.

Apart from all this, Europeans have not failed to note Mr. Nixon's proclivity for the spectacular in foreign affairs. Except for Vietnam, they have been unable to detect a strong sense of process in recent White House diplomacy. And, of course, they worry about the possibility that the Nixon administration might use Europe's continuing security dependence on the United States to extort trade and monetary concessions from the Community. This would either force the West Europeans into frustrating submission or drive them into a senseless effort to provide for their security all on their own (as would, by the way, the excessive pursuit of superpower bilateralism).

But if Europeans are worrying about the United States for a variety of reasons, they are far from despondent. There is a great deal of confidence that the President's common sense, reinforced by Henry Kissinger's historical perspective—shown in his recent speech calling for a new "Atlantic Charter"—will in the end prove stronger than his penchant for hyperbole and pageantry. Most of Europe, after all, was pro-Nixon during last year's election campaign. And it is simply not true that Western Europe is being swept by a tide of anti-Americanism. Local troubles around some U.S. garrisons are one thing, protests against the last phase of the Vietnam War another, commercial rivalry something else again. Insulated incidents should not be mistaken for a ground swell. The protest movement is waning

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anyway, and the economic problems can and should be dealt with in a truly businesslike manner.

It will not be easy to hammer out the new ground rules for future transatlantic politics. An infusion of conflictual elements in the old relationship is inevitable. There will be tough bargaining, contention, probably an occasional attempt at blackmail, and sometimes even swollen necks. But we should take this in stride. The main thing is not to allow our differences to precipitate an ideological confrontation between us. Western Europe and the United States should not drift into an adversary relationship with each other. It would indeed be supremely ironic if the burial of the political and military cold war with the East were accompanied by an economic cold war between the Western allies. Neither would stand to gain if it severed the ties that have grown between them over the past quarter-century. Détente presumes a viable Atlantic Alliance. So does the prosperity of all in today's interdependent world.

Some of the problems will undoubtedly be solved, others will not. Perhaps we have to learn how to live with a certain untidiness without clamoring for divorce right away. We all have our Congress, Parliament, Bundestag. Each one has a domestic situation to take into account; no one, for this reason, can afford to be absolutely preëmptive. We must all make concessions, either to achieve solutions or to get by without them.

Fortunately, a number of recent American decisions seem to indicate that the phase of studied American rudeness toward Europe is over: first the dollar devaluation, then the declared readiness of the United States to help the Europeans man the breach in the last currency crisis, the announcement that President Nixon will visit Europe in the fall, and Henry Kissinger's speech of late April. These give cause for hope that other difficult issues—U.S. troop deployments in Europe, the next GATT round, the reform of the Bretton Woods system—can now be tackled jointly, with Europeans and Americans lined up on the same side of the table facing the problems together, rather than confronting each other with the issues standing between them.

VI

Europe's relations with the rest of the world proceed on several tracks. In truth, one must admit that a coherent policy has not yet taken shape. Inevitably, the Community is according

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first priority to the task of internal construction. In foreign affairs, a recognizable pattern is evolving rather more slowly. But already its contours are vaguely discernible.

The Nine will continue their slow drift toward more and more integration. Their preparedness in principle to conduct a good neighbor policy toward everyone will be subject to only one qualification: *in dubio pro communitate,* as Ralf Dahrendorf forcefully put it—when in doubt act in the interests of the Community. As a corollary he suggested: *in dubio pro libertate.*

These tenets will guide the Community's dealings with the non-Communist industrial states, especially the United States and Japan, not as ideological prescriptions but as a matter of practical reason. In the interests of both growth and freedom, a close partnership must be maintained among these nations. More attention than hitherto will have to be given to Japan.

The strong element of economic rivalry in the Community's relationship with the United States should not be permitted to interfere with close and good relations with the United States. These remain of highest importance to Western Europe. In the security field, there is no substitute for America's contribution to European defense. A breakdown of the Atlantic Alliance—for economic reasons or because of superpower "complicity"—might force the West Europeans into an armaments effort which, if extended to the nuclear field, would be financially wasteful, strategically dubious and politically destabilizing. On the other hand, the gradual evolution of a European defense identity, possibly crystallizing around the Eurogroup and, perhaps, a resuscitated Western European Union, is a likely prospect. But even a more clearly drawn military profile of the Community would make sense only against the background of a continuing U.S. commitment to the security of Europe.

Efforts at détente with Eastern Europe will be continued, chiefly multilaterally, but not to the detriment of the Community. This is the lesson the West Europeans learned from the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968. There is no use in slowing down their own integration process in the vague hope that East Europe might soon be able to join in. West European integration ranks before all-European coöperation. The Community will be open to such coöperation whenever and wherever the Eastern countries are ready for it, but it will not subordinate its internal order and its external orientation to this goal. Détente

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cannot realistically include any measures which could hinder, decelerate or stop the transformation of EEC into a more tightly knit economic unit and ultimately into a political union. At the same time, West Europeans will be well advised to keep insuring against the possible miscarriage of the détente process.

Toward the Third World, Europe must adopt a posture of increasing openness. This does not preclude special attention to the Mediterranean littoral and to the francophone and anglophone states of Africa. Nor should it place any restrictions on an enlightened aid policy, perhaps concentrating on "threshold countries" about to reach the take-off stage rather than spreading the available funds far and thin. Six of the nine Community members are ex-colonial powers; this imposes on them a particular obligation to help the ex-colonials. Here Europe has a role to play as an association of compassionate, beneficent states. In the impending GATT round, it can best help the developing countries by adopting a liberal stance on tariffs and non-tariff barriers.

VII

Despite all lamentable deficits then, the European Community is on the move again. It is not so monolithic as many might wish, but neither is it as amorphous as others seem to fear. At this particular juncture, Europe is perhaps less a precise entity than a mood. But it is the mood of a new departure, and it is visibly hardening into a program of action. Results are slow in coming, yet it would be wrong to wax impatient. The Community will grow through practice and with experience. We are witnessing the first phases of a protracted historical process. What counts above all is the fact that it has begun, and that all the recent crises have not been able to weaken the new resolve toward unity but have indeed helped to reinforce it.

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CAN EUROPE'S SECURITY BE "DECOUPLED" FROM AMERICA?

By Andrew J. Pierre

A NEW and contentious concept has seeped into the transatlantic dialogue in recent times. It has been suggested that the United States may "decouple" itself from its strategic commitment to Western Europe in the future, or perhaps is in the process of doing so now. The codification of mutual deterrence in the SALT agreements of a year ago, combined with the earlier loss of U.S. nuclear superiority, is seen as having considerably eroded the remaining credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe. Some go further to find in the agreements an implicit understanding between the two superpowers that neither will henceforth initiate the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances short of the direct defense of its own territory. And even thoughtful Europeans who still observe the litany of faith in the nuclear guarantee do so with diminished conviction and look for opportunities through coöperative European actions to compensate for a substantial degree of American disengagement.[1]

The issue is, of course, further complicated by growing transatlantic dissonance on trade and monetary issues, which threatens to poison the political-security relationship. Increasingly, the economic interests of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States are seen as pointing more to rivalry than partnership in the future. The emphasis of American leaders on bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and China confirms for many Europeans the loosening of the alignments associated with the postwar balance between East and West. And even the general reassurance in Henry Kissinger's recent epistle to the Europeans calling for a new Atlantic Charter included a reference to "radically different strategic conditions," the full implications of which "have yet to be faced."

That the security relationship between the United States and Europe is in a process of change has long been clear. This is well understood by the Western governments involved in the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and at the preparatory phase of the Conference on Security and Coöpera-

[1] E.g. Lord Gladwyn, "The Defense of Western Europe," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1973.

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tion in Europe (CSCE) even though these negotiations are directed toward the East. For some time, only the myopic or the obstinate have expected the number of American troops in Europe to remain at the present level, barring an unfavorable change in Soviet behavior, throughout this decade. As a result of nuclear parity a subtle psychological change may now be occurring in fundamental strategic perceptions. What is significant in the notion of decoupling is that it questions the validity of the American nuclear posture as it relates to the defense of Western Europe—and thereby implicitly casts doubts on whether and how the United States will over the long run remain centrally involved in the security of the continent.

II

When the SALT negotiations began in the fall of 1969 there were many observers who feared that the arms-limitation talks, both in substance and in process, would have serious divisive consequences within the Alliance. The precedents of the handling of the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) and the negotiation of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) were hardly favorable. At SALT the two superpowers were agreeing upon a strategic nuclear balance around which the structure of much of today's international relations has been built. Europe's security at the western end of the large Eurasian landmass had long been perceived as dependent upon the ability and willingness of the United States to initiate the use of nuclear weapons for the defense of Western Europe if ultimately necessary. Now negotiations on this bedrock of security were in progress and, it was anxiously noted, for the first time the NATO allies were excluded from a major arms-control undertaking. There was no assurance, moreover, that the United States and the Soviet Union would not let their bilateral talks spill over into the political realm and discuss European questions without the direct participation of Europeans. As the late Leonard Beaton wrote, the danger was of a drift toward a condominium or "two-power standard" in which European interests would be given short shrift and relegated to second-order priority.

Given these dire portents the West European response to the first stage of SALT has been surprisingly calm and favorable. The allied governments had been carefully informed of the progress of the negotiations before and after each round in Helsinki

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and Vienna, and were satisfied on that score. There was far less public debate on SALT than there had been on the MLF or the NPT, in part because there was no direct European involvement in the negotiations, but also because the attention of those concerned with foreign affairs was distracted by the debates over Ostpolitik and Vietnam. Many politically informed Europeans concentrated their attention on CSCE, MBFR and the EEC where they could have a more direct influence, letting SALT be taken care of by the Americans.

Moreover, the SALT I agreements as a whole were well received because of the belief that they would add stability to the Soviet-American relationship. The ABM Treaty did this by ratifying the concept of mutual deterrence. In addition it assured the West Europeans that the superpowers would not move on to a higher technological plateau in which they were defended themselves but Europe was left nuclear-naked. A welcome bonus of the ABM Treaty for the British and French was that it lengthened the lifespan and viability of their nuclear forces. These independent European forces will now continue to be able to strike at a significant number of Soviet industrial and population targets. In time, the possibility of penetrating a missile defense of Moscow may diminish. Although some Whitehall and Quai d'Orsay officials attach importance to the ability to threaten the Soviet capital, it is a questionable necessity for purposes of deterrence since almost everything else in the Soviet Union will remain vulnerable.

In addition, the concern regarding the numerical imbalance in strategic offensive missiles, which fed the debate on the Jackson Amendment in the Congress, found little parallel in Europe. American strategic strength is seen by Europeans as assured through her technological superiority, particularly in warheads. Since the U.S. technological lead could in time be eroded, the European satisfaction with SALT I does not necessarily extend, it should be noted, beyond the five-year term of the present Interim Agreement governing offensive capabilities.

This outwardly tranquil state of affairs may be misleading, however, in that it fails to take into account several important issues which must be resolved, as well as some broad political and psychological considerations. The SALT agreements represent more than a pragmatic accord of limited scope between the two superpowers. Through the Standing Consultative Commission

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which was established, as well as the intention to continue SALT, the two nations made clear their commitment to maintain this special relationship. Moreover, the other agreements reached in Moscow last May in such fields as environment, health, science and technology, when added to the 1971 accords on reducing the risk of nuclear war and preventing incidents at sea, and to the trade agreement of October 1972, suggest that Soviet-American relations—as well as the Moscow-Washington-Peking triangular relationship—have now been placed on a new plane.

European anxieties about "excessive bilateralism" have therefore almost inevitably been increased; and with them the fear that Washington and Moscow will discuss and agree upon the critical issues affecting European security and only thereafter inform their respective allies. With the full CSCE and MBFR due to begin this year, along with the resumed SALT, the dangers of increasing friction within the Alliance are obvious.

The complexities of these multi-nation negotiations, compounded by the varying national interests and motivations, will inevitably lead to differences of views between the United States and its allies, as has already occurred to some extent in MBFR. The ongoing American relations with the Soviet Union, reinforced by the Brezhnev visit to Washington this June, have increased the European concern that the stage has now been set for a growing U.S. practice of pragmatically working out bilateral accommodations. These are often strongly influenced by domestic politics in Washington and Moscow and tend to preëmpt what will take place in the multilateral forum. The largely cursory consultations with NATO that apparently preceded the declaration of basic principles signed in Moscow last May are seen as a striking example of what may come about.

So much for the general European concern. Whether it is valid or not, whether it will be augmented or diminished, will depend considerably on the results of Nixon's "Year of Europe" and the summit diplomacy which lies ahead. Meanwhile, the Alliance faces three specific military problems, each of which in its own way raises the question of American decoupling. These are the handling of the so-called "forward-based systems" (FBS) in SALT, the American response to Soviet demands in the same negotiations for a prohibition on the transfer of nuclear technology to her allies, and finally the perennially sensitive problem of the reduction of U.S. forces in Europe.

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III

During SALT I, the issue of the forward-based systems was temporarily set aside because of the great difficulties it created. Early in the discussions the Soviet Union indicated that the negotiations must deal with all strategic nuclear forces, which it defined as those stationed so as to be capable of reaching the homeland of the other. According to this definition the FBS, primarily U.S. nuclear-strike aircraft and land-based missiles in Western Europe able to reach the Soviet Union, would have to be included. (There are no fully comparable Soviet FBS capable of reaching the United States.) Because of the complexities raised by this question and the sensitivity of the Western European countries, on whose soil most of these systems are based, an impasse was quickly reached. In May 1971 the two parties agreed to bypass the FBS issue in order to make progress in other areas of SALT. Now discussions in Geneva earlier this year have already made it clear that this will be a key problem in the continuing SALT negotiations.

Let us look at the specific elements of the FBS issue. The United States has approximately 420 F-4 Phantom II and 70 F-111 fighter-bombers stationed in Europe that are "dual-capable"—aircraft built to carry both nuclear and conventional loads—plus about another 75 A-6 and A-7 strike planes on two aircraft carriers with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. These figures exclude non-nuclear U.S. tactical aircraft deployed in Western Europe, four NATO-committed F-4 squadrons on call in the United States, and the "dual-capable" aircraft of our allies. The forward-based systems relevant to the present phase of SALT consist of this group of American aircraft based so as to be capable of reaching the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, even though not all are intended to be used for such a purpose. One of the many complicating factors is that some U.S. aircraft deployed in South Korea and with the Seventh Fleet in the Far East are able to reach Soviet territory and could also be classified as FBS.[2] Moreover, there are Pershing missiles in West Germany with a 450-mile range which could strike into the Ukraine if they were positioned closer to the border.

[2] The unstated assumption of defense planners is that all missions would be two-way, capable of returning to friendly soil. This excludes a large number of shorter-range aircraft plus the Soviet medium-range bombers which might reach the United States if their return were abandoned. But is such exclusion a valid assumption for all conceivable crises?

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From the perspective of the Soviet Union it should be quite clear why the forward-based systems are seen as a military threat. A nuclear warhead placed on a Soviet city by an F-111 can be just as lethal as one delivered from a Polaris submarine in the Mediterranean or an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in North Dakota. It has been estimated that up to 20 percent of the industrial capacity and population of the Soviet Union could be destroyed by FBS alone. In SALT the Soviet Union has stated that these are "strategic" systems which must be included in a permanent treaty on overall offensive forces, whereas the United States has viewed FBS as "non-central," local theater forces, deployed for European defense and not to be equated with the intercontinental strategic forces.

The Soviet position has an undeniable logic and rationality. It has not always been clear, however, whether the FBS issue was being pressed because of the military question at hand, because of its bargaining value in negotiations or because of its potential to create problems between the United States and its NATO allies. The traditional Soviet fear of encirclement could well be an important psychological and political factor; the reported Soviet demand in SALT I for a dismantling of American bases on foreign soil reflects this fear. But the value of the FBS issue as a means of forcing American concessions in SALT and as a bargaining tactic in the wider negotiations is equally evident.

For the West Europeans the FBS have a particularly significant political role. They are perceived by many political, military and bureaucratic observers as a symbol of the American commitment to defend Europe as well as being part of the military strategy for that purpose. The FBS are seen by European governments as part of the "community property" of NATO. Their presence is taken as ensuring American involvement in a war in Europe and as a show of intent to the Soviet Union that such a war could easily escalate to a major nuclear confrontation. The Europeans have traditionally been more interested in deterrence than in defense. They give a higher priority to avoiding the outbreak of hostilities than to fighting a war on their soil once it has started. Accordingly the West Europeans see the FBS, like American ground forces in Germany, as part of the mechanism "coupling" the United States with the defense of Europe. A withdrawal or reduction of FBS could provoke serious political anxieties unless it were done in close consultation with the Allies.

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The relative importance of the FBS issue in the total context of SALT is still difficult to determine. If the Soviet Union insists upon dealing with FBS as a strategic weapons system roughly comparable to ICBMs or missile-firing submarines, then the achievement of a treaty or permanent agreement on offensive forces beyond the present Interim Agreement could be blocked until some resolution of the FBS question is achieved. At the other extreme, the FBS issue could be set aside by the negotiators much as it was midway through SALT I. A number of possible solutions to the impasse deserve examination:

(1) *A trade-off of FBS for Soviet Intermediate/Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (I/MRBMs).* On initial examination a rough equivalency appears to exist between Soviet I/MRBMs and American FBS in that they are both medium range and located in Europe, broadly defined. The West Europeans would undoubtedly like to see the I/MRBMs targeted upon their cities dismantled. A trade-off with FBS for this purpose might not, however, appreciably reduce the threat to them, for the Soviets still would have medium range bombers and they could also target some of their ICBMs or missile submarines on Western Europe. In some way the Soviet Union will surely maintain an "assured destruction" capability against Western Europe, particularly as long as the British and French maintain strategic nuclear forces targeted upon Russia. (A trade-off between the European nuclear forces and the I/MRBMs at a further stage of SALT might therefore seem logical, but it is extremely improbable. The British and French will want to maintain an independent means of deterrence and the size of their nuclear submarine fleets are the minimum necessary to constitute what they perceive to be an adequate deterrent.) The I/MRBMs are a vastly greater threat to Europe than the FBS to the Soviet Union. Even a substantial reduction in the number of Soviet missiles would only partially reduce their capacity against Western Europe.

(2) *Compensation for FBS in an agreement on aggregate offensive forces.* A more permanent agreement on strategic offensive capabilities will presumably have a more equal numerical balance than presently exists in the Interim Agreement. The Soviet Union might be compensated for what it perceives to be "strategic" FBS with an advantage in numbers of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs),

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or long-range bombers. Conceivably the FBS could be counted in some proportional ratio with strategic long-range bombers in an agreement covering total limits of Soviet and American bombers capable of reaching each other's territory. Alternatively it would be necessary to devise a system for computing compensation between FBS and ICBMs or SLBMs. Although this seems extremely difficult given the different characteristics of these systems, a precedent for permitting national decisions on how to mix forces was established in SALT I.

(3) *A "freeze" on existing "non-central" systems or a numerical limitation.* The Soviet Union and the United States could negotiate a permanent offensive force limitation agreement with a corollary provision that the level and deployment of present "non-central" systems be frozen. This could be in the form of an accord not to circumvent an agreement on central forces by raising the level of systems not expressly limited. Alternatively, the number of FBS could be limited. Whether this could be achieved in parallel to an agreement providing for equality in strategic offensive forces is uncertain, particularly since the United States justified the numerical imbalance in the SALT I agreements by its lead in other systems such as FBS and long-range bombers. Moreover, the Soviets presumably include the American FBS and the West European forces in their calculations of the threat to them. We are, accordingly, led back to the question of compensation and how to make an appropriate computation of it. Any agreement that can be reached "freezing" or limiting FBS would also need some provision permitting modernization of the forces.

(4) *Replacement of FBS aircraft and their redeployment to the United States.* Much of the FBS problem could be eliminated with the introduction of shorter-range, tactical aircraft not capable of reaching Soviet territory. It is often forgotten that the long-range F-111s were not placed in Europe until two years ago. Over a period of several years, these planes might be removed and the present carrier-based aircraft and F-4 fighter-bombers replaced by planned shorter-range tactical aircraft, such as the A-10 and F-15. Indeed these have the added advantage of having been designed for an essentially non-nuclear role. An understanding might then be reached in SALT that no aircraft of certain ranges and capabilities should be permanently based within a set distance

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of the borders of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Looking at these various approaches, it seems to me that the first two are so difficult as to be impractical, although the third has some possibilities. On the whole, however, it may be best to approach the problem through a mix of unilateral action and tacit understanding in accordance with the fourth approach.

The fact is that the military significance of the American FBS in U.S. strategy and in the overall Soviet-American strategic nuclear balance is not very great. Targets in the Soviet Union can, one would think, be more than adequately covered by Minuteman ICBMs and Polaris/Poseidon SLBMs, especially as the number of multiple independently-targeted reëntry vehicles (MIRVs) is increased. American defense planners have always viewed the FBS more as theater nuclear forces to support NATO strategy for European defense than as strategic systems targeted upon the Soviet Union.

The primary role of the American FBS has all along been to provide air superiority, close air support for ground forces in Western Europe and an interdiction capability in Eastern Europe. It is likely that NATO strategy will in any case become more defensively oriented, relying less on offensive capabilities in coming years because of reductions in manpower levels and conventional forces. In such circumstances, the present primarily tactical missions of the FBS may become more important than ever. On the other hand, the "strategic" role of deep penetration into the Soviet Union may become less necessary—not of such value that it should be permitted to block a SALT agreement on strategic offensive forces which might otherwise be reached.

Accordingly, it should be possible for the United States to come to a common understanding with its NATO allies that the gradual replacement of present FBS aircraft, particularly a return of the F-111 to the United States, would not necessarily be damaging to the defense of Europe. Indeed, the possibility might remain that the F-111s could be returned to Europe for short periods in any time of crisis, although while stationed across the Atlantic they would not be considered as strategic systems.

Because of insufficient public knowledge in Europe, the American FBS have taken on a political and symbolic role out of all proportion to their true military importance. Accordingly they are seen by many Europeans concerned with these matters as part

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of the coupling that assures that the United States would go to strategic nuclear war on behalf of Western Europe. The FBS are viewed as part of the escalatory mechanism that makes the American security commitment credible to a potential opponent. Eliminate the FBS, some would argue, and European defense has been decoupled.

Of the 7,000 U.S.-controlled tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe only a fraction, however, are related to American forward-based systems. Even if they were withdrawn there would still be a high level of tactical nuclear weapons sufficient, in all probability, to deter the Soviet Union. The Allies themselves possess a large number of nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe. The concept of "sufficiency," as it has been applied to strategic nuclear forces since 1969, might also be applied to the probably excessive level of tactical nuclear forces now in the European theater. In sum, there is more flexibility in how to handle FBS in SALT than is generally appreciated.

The question remains whether it is best to deal with the forward-based systems in the SALT context or as part of mutual and balanced force reductions. Inclusion in MBFR would permit the NATO allies to participate directly. There is much to be said for the MBFR forum, in that the Soviet tactical aircraft in Eastern Europe, and possibly the I/MRBMs and Soviet medium range bombers, would then be thrown into the negotiations. On the other hand, the NATO countries with their own "dual-capable" aircraft (the F-104 Starfighters, British Vulcan B-2s and the French Mirage III-E) would probably also have to be included, as well as the next generation of European aircraft such as the Anglo-French Jaguar and the British-West German-Italian MRCA. Moreover, the MBFR negotiations will be slow and complex; they may not get to trade-offs on nuclear weapons for some years hence. A widening of the geographical area to be covered by MBFR beyond Central Europe to include the Mediterranean, and a broader definition of what weapons systems are to be covered, including various types of "mixed packages" such as bartering a reduction in Western strike aircraft for Soviet tanks, would make agreement in MBFR even more difficult and elusive.

IV

Another apparent aim of the Soviet Union in SALT I was

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to have a ban on transfer of nuclear technology to allies which are already nuclear powers (permitted under the NPT) and possibly also on the transfer of nuclear-capable systems such as tactical aircraft to allies. Such a non-transfer provision was in fact written into the ABM Treaty, which prohibits the transfer to other states of ABM systems or their components. In order that it be clear that this provision did not create a precedent, the U.S. delegation on April 18, 1972 made the following unilateral statement:

> The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a treaty on limiting strategic offensive arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.

The non-transfer issue is likely to come up again, however, because of several Soviet aims. Above all, Moscow will do everything possible to block the construction of a full-fledged and independent European nuclear deterrent. It is watching the evolution of the European Community with some foreboding and is apprehensive about the eventual development of joint European defense and foreign-policy institutions. Closely related to this concern is the dread of West German acquisition of control over nuclear weapons. The latter fear has deep historical and psychological roots which transcend any real likelihood of West Germany becoming a nuclear power. Finally, the non-transfer issue could embarrass the United States in its relations with the United Kingdom—and eventually France—and constrain the development of European defense coöperation.

A true European nuclear deterrent, which would permit decoupling by giving Western Europe full independence from the United States in terms of security, is highly implausible for this decade and probably far beyond. The military requirements for such a deterrent are roughly equal to the panoply of nuclear forces of the superpowers; the political requisites are even more daunting. The control arrangement for such a force would require a political authority capable of deciding on its use on behalf of Europe. For this, the necessary psychological cohesion, political unity and institutional loyalty are lacking. Only a President of Europe with full authority in a nuclear crisis could endow a European deterrent with credibility.

What is possible, however, by the late 1970s is the coördination of the British and French nuclear forces and some arrangements

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for joint operation and production of strategic systems. This might become more desirable if the West Europeans perceive the United States to be reducing its engagement in Europe and if such an Anglo-French pooling is underpinned with a wider European base, such as a European Nuclear Committee roughly comparable in task and methods to NATO's present Nuclear Planning Group. In such circumstances the United States might wish to assist an Anglo-French nuclear force with nuclear technology, somewhat as it has been assisting the British alone to this point. The issue could also come up in the form of direct aid to France. With respect to this contingency the recent dropping of Michel Debré as French defense minister, the swing to the center-left in the March election to the Assemblée Nationale, and the strong Pompidou support for U.S. troops in Europe are all noteworthy. Gaullist orthodoxy is slowly fading, and one can see the possibility of a French return to NATO within this decade.

Of more immediate consequence, however, is the future of U.S. nuclear assistance to Britain. The Whitehall attitude of recent years has been to wait and see what would come out of SALT I. With the results now known, the British are beginning to give considerable thought to the evolution of their nuclear force. Prime Minister Heath, on his visit to Washington last March, is reported to have inquired about the availability of future assistance for the modernization of the U.K. Polaris fleet. This question was due to come up in any case since the Anglo-American nuclear exchange accords, first begun in the 1950s, are subject to termination at the end of 1974. The provisions for exchange of weapons-grade fissile materials will end unless extended, while the exchange of information on nuclear weapons will be automatically extended for another five years unless notice of intent to terminate is given by December 1973.

A number of long-term options are open to Britain for the continuation of her nuclear force, ranging from further assistance from the United States or coöperation with France to a more autonomous national nuclear program. Because there remain political impediments to Anglo-French coöperation, London at this time will probably give priority to seeking new technological assistance from the United States. This could be in the form of MIRV technology for the British Polaris fleet, the Poseidon missile with MIRVs, or an agreement to sell the Trident submarine and its long-range missiles when they become available.

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The United States should give careful thought to a British request and do this within the broadest foreign policy context. It should not succumb to the natural bureaucratic inclination to approve a British request for assistance in a routine manner. Remember Nassau! A new Anglo-American deal which excluded France could have important repercussions in U.S.-French relations and significant implications for the possible evolution of a European defense identity. The favorable discriminatory treatment given to Britain for the past two decades has long been deeply resented in Paris. For some French officials this issue is the acid test of London's true political loyalties, and it is also often used as an excuse for not adopting a more coöperative attitude toward the United States and NATO. With Britain in Europe, the special Anglo-American nuclear relationship has become in some ways an anachronism.

Future decisions on U.S. nuclear-sharing policy with Britain should therefore be taken in the wider context of our European policy as a whole. This means paying attention to West German and Soviet concerns as well as our desire to have the West Europeans take on a greater share of their own defense. Such decisions should also be considered in the context of non-proliferation policy and U.S. security policy beyond Europe.

In my view the United States should adopt a policy of nuclear equality in dealing with Britain and France. The latter is now a full nuclear power and Britain is her partner in the European Community. The United States might announce that it is prepared to offer assistance to the two countries on an equal basis and that it hopes for equity in reciprocity. The nuclear forces of both countries would remain fully independent—nationally owned and controlled—but their targeting plans would be coördinated with those of the United States. If this is not acceptable to France, however, we should not take action against Britain by bringing a halt to the present sharing arrangements.

Accordingly, we should also firmly resist a Soviet proposal in SALT for an agreement on non-transfer of nuclear technology. This is not really directly related to SALT and its concern for the Soviet-American arms race. As signatories of the NPT both countries are pledged not to help create additional nuclear powers or to pass on nuclear warheads—this is the nub of the proliferation problem. A non-transfer agreement in SALT II, particularly if it did not exclude present nuclear arrangements with

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Britain and possible new ones with France, would strengthen the notion of decoupling, add to Europe's sense of vulnerability, and could have unfavorable consequences for European-American relations.

V

Alongside the nuclear guarantee, American ground forces in Western Europe remain a principal element coupling the defense of the Continent with the United States. These forces are in theory designed to deter and resist Soviet aggression, should it start, and by their presence to enhance the political confidence and sense of security of the Allies. To the West Europeans, however, these forces are above all hostages which guarantee the immediate involvement of the United States in a war in Europe; the U.S. Seventh Army is seen as the main link in the escalatory chain which can eventually trigger the U.S. strategic retaliatory forces. For this reason American efforts in the Kennedy-McNamara years to increase European conventional-force levels and delay the use of nuclear weapons received less than total support from European governments.

Pressures to reduce U.S. force levels in Europe are once again in resurgence. With the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam complete, Senator Mansfield and members of the Senate Democratic Caucus have suggested heavy cuts in all overseas forces. It is not yet clear that the all-volunteer armed forces will in fact induce sufficient volunteers to fill the presently planned thirteen-division, 800,000-man army. The balance-of-payments situation remains unsatisfactory in spite of the successive devaluations of the dollar. As the U.S. defense budget rises, due to the greatly increased costs of manpower and new weapons systems, the temptation within the defense establishment will be to look to Europe for any reductions which are unavoidable.

Since Brezhnev's welcome Tiflis speech of May 1971 the Nixon administration has used the imminence of East-West negotiations on force reductions to argue against and forestall pressures for unilateral reductions. Has it unwittingly entered a cul-de-sac?

The complexities of MBFR—geographical asymmetries, manpower and weapons asymmetries, varied political and security interests—are such that an agreement of important military proportions is hard to envisage for at least several years. We do not

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know very much about the intentions of the Warsaw Pact countries or the extent to which they are serious about negotiated force reductions. Nor have the Western countries agreed on a negotiating package eventually permitting significant American force reductions in Europe. At best one can see the possibility within a year or two of a first-stage MBFR agreement which circumvents many of the complexities by simply providing for a reduction of 10 to 15 percent in Soviet and American forces in Central Europe, plus some collateral measures.

Welcome as such an agreement would be, it is doubtful that a reduction of American forces from 315,000 to 270,000 by 1975 would be adequate to forestall congressional and public pressures for unilateral reductions if the climate of international relations and domestic politics continues in its present trend. Unilateral force reductions would then seriously threaten to undercut MBFR.

This suggests that the NATO countries should now engage in a broad political and military review for the purpose of designing a military strategy which would be sustainable for the next decade. The assumption would be that American force levels would not be withdrawn but substantially and gradually reduced to perhaps 200,000; in return the United States would make a long-term commitment to maintain its forces in Europe. Although there are constitutional difficulties involved in making such a long-term commitment binding, bipartisan support for such an arrangement through an overwhelmingly supported congressional resolution would add to its sticking power and might well be available if sought. If carefully managed a West-West review within NATO need not undercut efforts in MBFR, so that the two could go on simultaneously. A modification in NATO's military strategy toward a more defensive emphasis is in any case unavoidable if more than token cuts are to be made in the coming years. Such a broad and deep West-West review would have as its primary purpose the avoidance of the unraveling of the Alliance during a period of diminishing threat perceptions, reduced defense budgets, the elimination of conscription in most of Western Europe and the United States, and the continuation of détente.

VI

In the last analysis, the security of Western Europe simply can-

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not be decoupled from America, because of the fact that there is no European replacement available for the U.S. nuclear guarantee. Progress in the Eurogroup toward European defense coöperation has been encouraging, but these efforts will necessarily remain limited. In time, with the transformation of relations with the East, the need for such a guarantee may disappear, or a politically and militarily independent Western Europe may be constructed. Neither of these prospects is now within sight.

The era of negotiations, which in 1973 has truly arrived in Europe, will be more taxing upon our political wisdom than the earlier, simpler period. Anxiety in Europe about superpower bilateralism could impose a great strain upon European-American relations. The East-West negotiations now commencing will thus require a higher degree of consultation and consensus-building than has been necessary in the past. This, in turn, will call for some new institutional approaches.

The past practice in SALT I of informing the NATO allies before and after each negotiating round is unlikely to be adequate in the next stages of SALT. The forward-based systems are likely to become one of the most critical issues in the Soviet-American negotiations. Yet there are very different perspectives on the FBS on the two sides of the Atlantic. For many Europeans they have acquired an overblown political symbolism that is not justified by their true military importance. Accordingly, it will be necessary to reach a common European-American evaluation of the utility of the FBS and how to deal with them in SALT. This may require that the views of the principally concerned allies be brought into the internal policy-making process in Washington *before* U.S. negotiating positions are fixed. Some new institutional mechanism, such as the Berlin ambassadorial group of 1961–62, might be formed in Washington for real policy coördination rather than the past practice of consultations.

In time it may prove necessary to widen the arms negotiations by creating a Four Power SALT for Europe. The Soviet Union brought the question of the British and French nuclear forces into SALT I in the closing days of the talks. The leader of the Soviet delegation, Minister Vladimir Semenov, issued a unilateral statement on May 17, 1972 indicating that the then-existing and planned European ballistic missile submarines were considered by the Soviet Union to be part of the total Western count under the Interim Agreement on offensive forces. Any increase

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in the European forces, it was claimed, would give the Soviet Union the right to a corresponding increase in the number of its own submarines. Semenov suggested that this be a matter of further negotiations, as it undoubtedly will be. Discussions in SALT concerning anti-submarine warfare would also be a matter of concern to the Europeans.

The multilateralization of SALT, however, may not come soon if for no other reason than that the Europeans have little interest in limiting their relatively small nuclear forces. Nor would they want to discuss their own tactical aircraft, some of which could be classified as forward-based systems. It would, of course, also raise the question of China's participation. Meanwhile, in conducting the current bilateral SALT discussions, the United States, as already noted, should resist the Soviet proposal for a prohibition on transfer of nuclear technology to allies already having a nuclear capability.

As to how best to handle MBFR, it would have been preferable to have reached an agreement within NATO on a defense strategy for the 1970s, including the necessary level of forces, prior to the opening of the talks with the East. Such a review, along the lines suggested, is now a matter of urgency, apart from the immediate task of working out the best possible first-stage MBFR agreement. The half-life of present American troop levels in Europe has created an uncertainty which makes for instability in the Alliance relationship.

To a perhaps surprising extent, the future strategic connection of the United States with Europe will also depend on our own domestic debate and the quality of American diplomacy. If we become anxious over the nuclear balance with the Soviet Union, the Europeans will get frightened. If we have confidence in our strategic posture, our Allies will feel secure. The perception of the security guarantee held by the Europeans will be influenced not only by what happens in SALT, but by the way we handle other problems such as trade, troops, monetary policy and the whole tone of the transatlantic political dialogue. We should therefore resist the temptation to link pending economic, political and security issues so as to try to trade a concession here against an advantage there. We should remember that the web of contemporary international politics is such that the more we negotiate with the East, the better we must structure our relations within the West.

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INSECURITY AND COÖPERATION: YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BALKANS

By John C. Campbell

THE fruits of détente in Europe are now being gathered. West German Chancellor Willy Brandt has completed his triad of treaties with former enemies in Moscow, Warsaw and East Berlin. The accord on West Berlin has confirmed that city's status and removed it, for the present at least, as a possible flashpoint of war. President Richard Nixon has made his voyage to Moscow to proclaim with the Soviet leaders a new era in Soviet-American relations, on which the return visit now sets its seal. Visions of sugarplums dance in the heads of Soviet planners and Western businessmen. Détente, of course, does not have the same purposes for all concerned, and some may find its fruits bitter or the sugarplums unripe. Nevertheless, as all prepare to sit down together in Helsinki at a conference on security and coöperation, the cold war seems far away.

These agreements, with all due reservations on the Western side, have the effect of nailing down the status quo—recognizing the consequences of the Second World War, as the Soviet pronouncements put it—in the central part of the continent. Basically they provide a settlement of the problems which have been at the heart of the 25-year tension of the cold war. Many uncertainties remain, of course, for the dynamism of politics on both sides of the East-West line will continue. Yet neither concern for the future nor legitimate skepticism about the present should overshadow what Brandt, Nixon and Soviet Party chief Brezhnev have done. Negotiations have produced agreements. Coöperation is developing. The main front in Central Europe is being stabilized.

Almost unnoticed is the contrast with the area to the south, where the Soviet security system has undergone serious erosion over the years. There the Kremlin's policies have been more flexible, and also less predictable. Why was it that the Soviets, who reacted firmly and with force in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and would have done so in Poland (1956, 1970) had they felt their primacy really in peril there, let Yugoslavia and Albania go without a fight and have tolerated serious deviations in foreign policy on the part of Romania?

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One can find good reasons. Stalin thought he could dispose of Yugoslavia's Tito by other means, and he did not want to risk a military move of uncertain consequences in view of America's hardening policies at that time. A decade later, Khrushchev tried to unhorse the Hoxha regime in Albania by subversion, but when that attempt failed he could not send in troops without violating the territory of Yugoslavia and consequently did nothing. As for Romania, a proper sense of caution in Bucharest keeps the challenge within limits, for the country is next door to the Soviet Union and could be chastised in short order if the Kremlin really thought it necessary. But it is a challenge none the less, in its basis the same as those of Yugoslavia and Albania: the primacy of national independence over proletarian internationalism, Moscow-style. That is an issue on which no national-minded East European Communist régime can relax with full confidence in its international rights or its proletarian credentials.

The Soviet leadership has not forgotten that at the height of the crisis over Czechoslovakia in 1968 both Tito and Romania's President Ceaușescu made ostentatious visits to Prague to embrace the then Party chief Alexander Dubček, raising visions of a resurrected Little Entente outside the Soviet fold. Nor have the leaders of Yugoslavia and Romania forgotten that the Soviets ostentatiously used both Hungarian and Bulgarian forces in the assault on Czechoslovakia. The scare felt in Belgrade and Bucharest after August 21 was real. Both Tito and Ceauşescu took the occasion to reject the proposition that has come to be known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, and this fundamental disagreement remains between them and the Kremlin, no matter how many fraternal greetings and harmonious communiqués are issued on the occasion of official visits.

The basic Soviet concern for the behavior of Communist nations in the Balkans can only have been increased by two developments in recent years, which give the region a greater importance in relation to conflicts in which the Soviet Union finds itself engaged with its two major rivals.

First, the progress of détente in Europe presents a contrast to the continuing tension and cold war in the Middle East, where the Soviet Union's expanding interests in the Arab world and its military presence in the Mediterranean lend a new significance to the countries which lie along its routes of access to those regions. Not only has this consideration led to more flexible

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policies toward Turkey and Greece, regardless of the character of the régimes in these two states; it has led also to a renewed concern with the strategic location of Yugoslavia and Albania. The Soviet Union has an obvious interest in unquestioned use of Yugoslav airspace and in naval facilities on the Adriatic coast, especially at its former submarine base in Albania's Valona Bay. The Mediterranean naval squadron, meanwhile, adds a threat from the south to complement the pressure of Soviet forces from the north.

Second, China has made her presence felt on the European scene precisely in those states of southeastern Europe whose main concern is to be independent of Soviet control. For the Soviet leaders, little Albania in its role of Chinese ally and propagandist was a minor nuisance which could be shrugged off or ridiculed. But Romania's exploitation of the Soviet-Chinese split, especially Ceauşescu's showy visit to China in 1971, was a real annoyance. And with the establishment of normal relations between Belgrade and Peking they could see in their more imaginative moments the whole Balkan area gradually being painted Chinese red. Not that China could provide much actual help to a small European country under the Soviet gun. Distant water will not quench fire, as Chou En-lai has remarked. But China's political presence is not to be denied.

With all this in mind, the Soviet leaders may not want the same international seal of approval on conditions in the southeast—these including not only the consequences of the Second World War but of the events of 1948—that they plainly seek for the rest of Eastern Europe. The contrast between the two areas raises for them the old question which 25 years of living with the fact of Titoism in Yugoslavia have not resolved. Will the new system of European security, which has so often been talked about in the past few years without anyone being clear as to the form it will take, sanctify the right of an East European Socialist state to have an independent foreign policy, or by accepting a Soviet sphere of influence deny it? Poland and Czechoslovakia and Hungary, for obvious reasons, are not posing that question now. In this year of détente and Soviet reasonableness it is not certain that Yugoslavia or Romania will pose it clearly either. But all those who will be signing pledges and declarations on European security should be aware of it.

At the present stage of Soviet policy caution seems to prevail

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over the spirit of adventure. The stake in improved relations with the United States is higher than even the optimists in Washington suspected a year or two ago, and there is no sign of Soviet readiness to jeopardize it by provoking a crisis in southeastern Europe. On the other hand, there is little sign of Western readiness to be provoked. One must ask whether the Soviets—cautious as their overall policy may now be—could resist trying to change the situation if they got the chance. The temptation may exist especially in Yugoslavia, ruled by a man over 80 and racked in the last two years by serious internal problems.

II

It is popular nowadays to play guessing games on the subject of Yugoslavia after Tito and to predict major crises both internal and international. Outsiders would do well to recall that Tito and his countrymen have made a practice of confounding self-appointed prophets and judges. Yet it is bootless to deny that Yugoslavia today is undergoing severe stress, even before Tito leaves the scene.

The basic causes lie in history, both recent and remote. Without minimizing its remarkable economic growth, Yugoslavia is not an advanced industrial country like Czechoslovakia. Without slighting the achievement of having held its nationalities together after the fratricidal conflicts of World War II, it can never achieve the solidity of a national state like Poland or Hungary. These handicaps give the society no wide margins of resiliency, and the very success of its bold reforms and new institutions has often added to the strain.

Economic, social and political developments have reacted upon each other, often in unexpected ways, as the country sought its undefined and unattainable goal of a proper balance between central authority (whether of party or of government) and the many other points to which power has been flowing under constitutional and other reforms: workers' councils, plant managers, banks and commercial entrepreneurs, local communities, and most important of all, the governments and party organizations of the six constituent republics and two autonomous regions. The combination of market socialism with "socialist self-management" has produced economic growth and an expansion of economic and political freedom. But the historic discord among nationalities, especially between Serbs and Croats, has meanwhile

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regained much of its old virulence, making the economic and social problems more difficult to solve and raising profound questions of political philosophy and public morale.

These ostensibly domestic issues go hand in hand with those of foreign policy. Underlying the entire performance of Tito and his régime has been their struggle against Soviet attempts to destroy the country's independence (coupled with a desire to be accepted as a Socialist state on their own terms) and their record of advantageous economic coöperation with the West without political conditions. Yugoslavia leaned to the West in periods when pressure was on from the East, but on issues of colonialism and Western imperialism it did not hesitate to follow a course parallel to Moscow's. The struggle with Stalin and with the Cominform, though decisively won in 1955, left a psychological heritage, evident both in the persistence of concern about "Cominformists" and in the ambiguity of Socialist Yugoslavia's relationship to "the international workers' movement." And on the other hand, while Tito and his colleagues welcomed Western economic help and accepted the steady liberalization of economic and political life which inevitably drew the country into closer ties with the West, here again attitudes were ambiguous, for the opening to the West brought not only higher living standards but also influences which some of the highest leaders, including the man at the top, found corrupting, dangerous, and the work of "the class enemy."

The conflict between "bureaucratism" and reform was central to internal developments and not unrelated to foreign policy; but the issues were rarely settled in clear-cut fashion because both tendencies were present in differing factions and in the minds of individual leaders. The adoption of the far-reaching economic reforms of 1965 and the dismissal of the country's number-one policeman, Aleksandar Ranković, in the following year, seemed to assure victory for liberalization and decentralization. The reforms were accompanied by additional financial assistance from the West and closer association with international economic institutions. The Yugoslavs obviously had no intention of abandoning nonalignment, but these events, capped by the shock waves of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, seemed to indicate that their independent road to socialism, both internally and internationally, would be passing through areas of greater compatibility and association with the West, without giving cause

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for open rift with the East.

For the long run that may well be a sound conclusion. Yet Yugoslav history, both before and during the Tito era, shows that long-run conclusions are no key to the near future. The pendulum has swung back toward closer relations with Moscow, which has obliged by pledging $540 million in credits. And in the past year the country has been shaken by events which have called into question the capacity of its leadership, the viability of its institutions and even its ability to survive as a united state. It is more than a struggle over the succession. President Tito is not above the battle. He is in the midst of it. And the reverberations inevitably carry beyond the frontiers.

III

For the future, Tito wishes to assure to his people the unity of the country and a steady, purposeful leadership. Those two fundamental aims do much to explain his actions on economic and constitutional reform and his reaction to recent events, especially in the two largest republics, Croatia and Serbia.

The challenge which arose in Croatia in 1971, ultimately taking the form of student strikes and riots, was a direct result of the devolution of political power to Party barons in the individual republics, a resurgence of deeply rooted Croatian nationalism, and controversies over specific issues such as how much foreign exchange earned in Croatia could be spent for Croatia. That Croatia was being milked by Belgrade for the benefit of the less-developed republics was a long-standing grievance. New constitutional reforms had indeed given wide powers to the republics, and the Croatian leadership was imposing a virtual veto on federal action needed to cope with pressing economic problems affecting the whole country. Enjoying a popularity both novel and stimulating for Communist leaders, the group led by Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabčević-Kučar, who held the key Party and governmental positions, talked of Croatia's right to statehood (without defining it) and tolerated political organization and action by nationalist elements outside the Party. For Tito and the central leadership in Belgrade this was, almost by definition, counterrevolution.

Vague charges of collusion with the enemies of socialism and of Yugoslavia, with a trail of conspiracy reaching across the frontiers, were allegations rather than proven facts, but it was

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true that the outburst of nationalism in Croatia itself encouraged an intensification of activity among Croatian organizations abroad, most of it of fascist, *ustasha* inspiration, and that these organizations were operating rather openly in West Germany, the United States, and elsewhere. Some emigré leaders were boasting of their contact with Soviet agents. It may or may not be true that some part of the Soviet establishment was supporting subversion in this way; many Yugoslavs thought it was. On the official side, Brezhnev at this very time had embarked on a conciliatory line with a visit to Yugoslavia in September 1971. Since then he has been in a position to enjoy the spectacle of Titoism in trouble of its own making.

Tito acted sharply and decisively to halt the "rot" in Croatia and replace the offending leaders with others in the Croatian Party who had opposed them. He did not use the army, though he publicly said he would do so if necessary. Then began a thorough purge of the Party, the press, the universities and other suspect institutions. Whether the nationalist currents would have taken an outright separatist form was a question Tito did not wait for time to answer. He waited rather long as it was. What is certain is the shock given him by the whole affair and his determination that it never will happen again. In this he is probably wrong. Croatian nationalism will not be easily disposed of by Tito, any more than it was by King Alexander and his successors before World War II.

The Croatian affair of 1971 is intimately related, though not strictly comparable, to the critical situations which later arose in other republics, especially Serbia, where Tito ousted much of the top leadership in the early autumn of 1972. The Party leadership in Serbia headed by Marko Nikezić had no dreams of separate statehood nor did it encourage any revival of "Greater Serbianism" to take advantage of the tribulations of the Croats. Nikezić had succeeded in greatly reducing the influence of the old guard, those of the Ranković stripe—that indeed was the main task Tito had put him there to accomplish. Precisely why Tito, in the early autumn of 1972, chose to crack down on the leadership in Serbia and elsewhere is not entirely clear even now. No doubt he was extremely touchy after the experience with Croatia and worried about disintegrative influences. Nikezić had been a believer in liberalization, including greater freedom of expression, and Stane Kavčič, the deposed leader in Slovenia, an

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advocate of looking westward.

Tito was also impatient with inflation and other economic troubles, which the post-1965 reforms had not touched or had made worse. He was increasingly critical, as were many others, of the uneven distribution of new wealth. Banks, commercial firms and entrepreneurs, the most conspicuous of them in Belgrade, were encouraged by the reforms and the new market socialism to do profitable business, and they did, enriching themselves in the process. Mercedes cars, summer villas, expense-account living, all became symbols of status, a status to which a factory hand in this "workers' society" could not aspire. Corruption was not the big issue, of course, and served mainly to provide scapegoats for those engaged in more serious disputes, but it sharpened the antagonisms between nationalities and to many it seemed but another symptom of a society losing its way.

Tito's answer to a vexing and displeasing situation was the almost visceral reaction of an old-fashioned Communist: the central authority of the Party had been eroded; the thesis of the Party as an educational rather than a commanding force had been proved wrong; unless order and discipline could be restored, the country would be threatened with internal disintegration and external perils. Tito was not alone in his reaction, of course. Other Party leaders had similar thoughts, as did many more once his decision was taken. Indeed, the inability of the country's political institutions to deal with its real problems and the growing acrimony among national groups had already convinced many Yugoslav citizens that "something must be done." And so great was the prestige and power of the President that few were in a position or of a mind openly to question his way of doing it. With the spirit of enforced conformity in high gear, relatively new and ambitious Party leaders are heading the drive against the excesses of liberalization and the organizations and individuals tainted with it. A number of prominent leaders, some of them long associated with Tito, have stepped, or been pushed, aside as the campaign goes on. The list includes three former Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Koča Popović, Nikezić and Mirko Tepavac.

Perhaps this desperate attempt to find in a revived Communist Party the answer to the many problems of a society in midpassage may be justified if it holds the country together at a time of incipient crisis. One may question, however, how much it can do

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to solve the problem of discordant nationalities or how it squares with the continued commitment to market socialism. One may question, as well, whether it strengthens the country's international position, although Tito has made clear that one strong reason for his new centralism at home is to ward off all perils from abroad, and that he is not joining anybody's camp. The problems of the succession when they come may be even more acute than if Tito had not taken the course he has chosen over the past two years.

IV

The time of succession will not inevitably bring political breakdown or intervention from outside. Yugoslavia's peoples, after all, have held together for over half a century except for the four years when they were torn apart by Hitler and his allies. Yet this will be inherently the severest of tests for the régime and the country. The constitutional arrangements, which include a collective presidency of 22 members (plus Tito) and a Party presidium of 52, all republics having equal representation, offer little assurance. The key may lie in the effective coöperation of Tito's closest associates, Edvard Kardelj (a Slovene), Vladimir Bakarić (the veteran Croatian politician), and representative leaders from Serbia, with the younger men like Stane Dolanc, who are now gaining power in the central Party apparatus. If the nationalist-centralist split reappears in Croatia, however, or if the army (which is mainly Serb) is called in, a real break between Serbia and Croatia is conceivable. It could tempt a foreign power to woo the Croats with promised help for independence or the Serbs with support for Serbian hegemony over all of Yugoslavia, and could tempt one or the other to accept it.

A more likely contingency is that people and Party will not stand together behind a centralized Party leadership; they did in 1948, but much has happened to both in the intervening years. And if they do not, there will have to be a new set of bargains on which the country's unity can rest: bargains between Party chieftains in the various republics, and probably also bargains between Party leaders and those who represent other forces in society. It could be a time of vulnerability to outside pressure.

It is unquestionably in the interest of the Yugoslav peoples to be allowed to work out their own political and social system without pressure or interference from outside. It is surely in the

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interest of other states in that region not to be drawn in, either by their own ambitions or by those of larger powers with which they are aligned. Finally, it is in the interest of European security and of world peace that those larger powers do not themselves intervene, directly or indirectly.

How are these dangerous possibilities to be avoided? Not by putting Yugoslavia and her succession crisis on the agenda of the United Nations or of a conference on European security. Yet the problem is one of pledges and understandings in which states other than Yugoslavia must have a part. The simplest and probably the most effective action can be taken by two men, President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev. If security in Europe is of importance to the two powers in their present global relationship, then it should be worth the effort for a specific understanding on Yugoslavia by which each would make clear its intention not to intervene in that country. A tacit or unannounced agreement might be as effective as a formal one. Even the proposal by one party of such an agreement could have the salutary effect of putting the other on notice that any intervention on its part would not be ignored or passively accepted.

Such self-denying ordinances would be in perfect accord with Yugoslavia's proclaimed policy of nonalignment, to say nothing of her right of sovereignty. They would confirm the facts of the balance of power in that area as they exist today. And finally they would be suitable to the situation whether the assumption is the continuance of the blocs or their transformation through détente.

European members of NATO could help by stating their opposition to any intervention in Yugoslavia. That might serve as an additional warning and a signal that European nations have a proper concern with containing crisis and violence anywhere on their own continent. But the most constructive diplomacy Western Europe can offer lies beyond the immediate question of Yugoslavia and rather in a broadening of relations with the countries of southeastern Europe. Here much depends on the general progress of détente, or whether and how the countries of Western and Eastern Europe find common ground. Some new equilibrium may be possible, one which combines a freer scope for political aspirations and economic advancement with increased security for all concerned. The big question is whether that conception would be entertained for a moment by the Soviet Union.

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V

To put it bluntly, security in the Balkans depends primarily on how the Soviet Union defines the requirements of its own security and world role. Let us assume that, whatever further progress is made toward stabilization in Europe, the Soviets will wish to limit sharply Western influence in the Socialist countries (including Yugoslavia) for security reasons and to protect their home front against contagion. Let us assume also that they will regard the Mediterranean and the Middle East as an area where they must project Soviet power in order to compete with America and with China. That is not an inaccurate description of what Soviet aims and policies have been for some years past. Will they bring greater or less insecurity in the future?

The answers to that question have a great deal to do with the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine but they cannot be found in any interpretation of its texts. The Kremlin may be moved to expand its area of control, or it may come to tolerate more independence for small nations. Despite the current vogue for détente based on the status quo, matters are not likely to stand where they are.

The communization of the Balkans—the expected result of the extension of Soviet power into that region in the closing stages of World War II—could perhaps be described more accurately in practice as the Balkanization of communism. Titoism was, moreover, the progenitor of a widespread phenomenon which fractured the Communist world. But it had a special meaning in its immediate vicinity, where strategic implications and ideological questions took the shape of a real-life political struggle within and across frontiers. We have seen also that, in contrast to what happened in central Europe, Russia has stayed her hand, and the issue remains. Geography and political circumstance may favor the assertion of independence in some cases and not in others, but the idea of national interest is no less real in Romania and Bulgaria, which are still within the Soviet alliance system, than in Yugoslavia and Albania, which are not.

The case of Romania deserves close scrutiny, which is what the Soviets have been giving it ever since the late Party chief Gheorghiu-Dej was able to persuade Khrushchev to take his troops out of the country in 1958. They have tolerated Romania's deviations and challenges on important international issues because they saw in them no mortal threat, but not without some gnashing of teeth over the consequences. Politically, the Roma-

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nians have treated the myth of the unity of the Socialist camp with contempt; they follow the line when it suits them and not when it does not. Militarily, they have weakened the Warsaw Treaty by limiting their participation in it, especially by refusing to permit maneuvers by treaty forces on Romanian soil.

Romania's independent line is now rooted in national policies of economic development which reject any real integration with the U.S.S.R. and other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; in international positions which have paid off both in material ways and in prestige; and in more than a decade of successful practice. President Ceaușescu has not hesitated to parade before the world his cordial relations with the United States and with China, and though he has not drawn from those relations all the political and economic benefits he hoped for, they have given him leverage in dealing with Moscow. Of course, he and the Soviet leaders are still able to be useful to each other in various ways, and both prefer the present modus vivendi rather than pushing their differences to a crisis point. In the past year, Ceaușescu has even trimmed his sails a bit, as economic problems and the general progress of détente between the Soviet Union and the West have worked to Romania's disadvantage. In contrast to Czechoslovakia in 1968, moreover, nothing in Ceaușescu's domestic policies seems to alarm the Soviets. His theme of nationalism strikes a popular note with the people, but Romanian socialism shows no sign of putting on a human face.

The importance of Romania and Yugoslavia to each other is self-evident. Each is convinced that a Soviet intervention in the other would soon be followed by the end of its own independence. Tito and Ceaușescu have met on numerous occasions. The two countries, traditional friends long before they acquired Communist governments, have expanded their economic relations, built jointly the huge new dam at the Danube's Iron Gates, and multiplied the visits of Party and cultural delegations. Both have sought increased trade with the West and participation in the work of international economic organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the International Monetary Fund, still shunned by the Soviet Union and most other East European countries. Both, too, have been recognized as mavericks by the Soviet Union in its ceaseless efforts to line up Communist governments and Parties in a united front against imperialists, revisionists, dogmatists and other enemies.

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Tito and Ceaușescu have been careful not to appear to be concerting their strategy against the Soviet Union. Tito is ever conscious of Romania's more exposed position as a neighbor and military ally of the Soviet Union. Ceaușescu has not had the free hand that his Yugoslav counterpart has had as spokesman and champion of the nonaligned, but he has gone Yugoslavia one better as a deviationist on a number of international matters, such as maintaining relations with Israel. Their solidarity with each other is most evident when one leader or the other expounds the fundamentals of his country's policy: national sovereignty, the inviolability of frontiers, nonintervention, the equality of nations large and small. That the Soviets preach the same principles does not put off the Yugoslavs and the Romanians, whose proposals on European security include some more pointed and specific items including a ban on military maneuvers and the massing of troops near international frontiers. Romania, at the preparatory sessions for the conference on security in Europe, deliberately stepped to the fore by insisting that the procedures recognize the absolute equality of all participating states regardless of size, structure or membership in military blocs.

VI

If events are allowed to drift, we may see a series of shocks and conflicts in the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean region bound to increase both local and global insecurity, with the Soviets seeking every opportunity to make events work for them. Violence between Israel and her Arab enemies is but one of the dangers. The heating up of unsettled disputes in Cyprus and the prospects of internal strife in Greece and Turkey are others. Such events may lead the Soviets to reassess their requirements for military deployment in the Balkans, to take steps against Yugoslavia or Romania they have avoided to date, or to seek a more favorable position at the Turkish Straits. Their transparent intention to keep troops in Hungary is not unrelated to these contingencies. This is a time, moreover, when the freer play of Balkan politics can revive some of the deep-seated national conflicts which have plagued that area in the past.

Just as within Yugoslavia the Serb-Croat struggle seems to be regaining its old intensity, so could relations among the Balkan nations again be inflamed by Hungarian aspirations in Romanian Transylvania, Bulgarian ambitions in Yugoslav Macedonia or

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in Greece, or Albanian claims to Yugoslavia's Kosmet area with its Albanian majority. Great danger lies in any attempt by an outside power to take advantage of these antagonisms. Stalin tried it in the course of his all-out efforts to bring down Tito. His successors have on occasion, as a means of pressuring Yugoslavia, encouraged Bulgarian chauvinism in regard to Macedonia. If they choose this path in the future, it can have disastrous consequences for the nations of the region and for world peace. The same can be said about any Western attempts to exploit old Balkan territorial conflicts as a means of striking at the Soviet Union.

In the light of all these considerations, two subjects now on the world's diplomatic agenda assume added importance. The first is security, coöperation and the reduction of arms and force levels in Europe, under discussion at Vienna, Helsinki and presumably elsewhere in the years just ahead. The second is the promotion of peace and political quiet in the eastern Mediterranean, the area which the highest officials in both Washington and Moscow have termed the most dangerous in the world. The Yugoslavs are absolutely right in their view that European security is not separable from the security of the Mediterranean. And the two superpowers, in tackling the latter subject, will be absolutely wrong if they think that agreement on keeping the Arab-Israeli conflict within bounds is all they need to do.

In time the entire area of the Balkans and the Middle East will take on new shapes and forms as international relations evolve. Who can be sure that, five or ten years hence, NATO and the Warsaw Pact will have their present structure, or will be looked on in the same way? In this regard the Balkan states have already taken some steps indicating a sense of common interest among themselves. In the past few years Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey have created a network of bilateral and multilateral arrangements in commerce, culture, tourism and other fields. Albania, which recently renewed relations with Greece (after more than 30 years) and restored full diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia, has had some part in this movement. One can be skeptical, after what happened to comparable movements for Balkan unity which appeared fitfully between the many wars those nations have fought. Yet the idea has persisted throughout a period of ideological conflict in which the group of six has included a nonaligned state, two members of the Warsaw Pact with

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differing ideas of allegiance to it, one ally of China, and two members of NATO.

In the days of high cold war, proposals for a special Balkan combination or zone of one sort or another bore the mark of the times. In 1954 a Balkan alliance linking Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey was concluded with NATO's blessing. It was denounced by the Soviet Union and its then Balkan allies as directed against them (as indeed it was in a defensive sense), and in fact did not survive Yugoslavia's retreat from tentative collaboration with the West into more rigid nonalignment. Then came Romania's proposal in 1957 for an atom-free zone in the Balkans, including Greece and Turkey. It was plain to all that this was in reality a Soviet proposal, to which Romanian Premier Stoica attached his name; soon thereafter, Khrushchev made similar proposals, one of which also included Italy. The objective was to weaken NATO by barring nuclear weapons from the territory of some of its members, while in the Soviet-dominated Balkan states the situation would remain unchanged. So the Western response was negative.

The Stoica proposal of 1957 has been renewed in recent years by Romania. The lineal connection is often stressed, as it is useful to associate the Soviet government with an idea that Moscow has never repudiated. But the difference in time and circumstance is not to be overlooked, and there are significant embellishments including suggestions for organized economic, cultural and eventual political coöperation in the region. Such a proposal coming from the Ceauşescu government is intended to serve Romania above all, but also Yugoslavia and any other state interested in seeing that Soviet power in the region does not go unbalanced and unchecked. Bulgaria, now closely tied to Russia, is a special case. Throughout its modern history it has sought the protection of a great power because of its conflicts with its neighbors. A genuine reconciliation with them could have its effect over time.

The future policies of Greece and Turkey and their requirements for security are another matter. To what extent they will seek new regional relationships as useful substitutes for the old ties with NATO and with the United States remains to be seen. All we need say here is that no one's eyes should be closed to such possibilities. It is some distance, in any event, from the regional concept and the present tentative commercial and other ties to the effectiveness of common policies in providing security. No

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nation has to abandon alliance ties before they are obsolete. The danger lies in having no alternative to them when they become so.

A respectable degree of regional cohesion, combined with a tacit code of nonintervention by outside powers, is the kind of pattern that may be emerging in other areas of the world such as Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Persian Gulf. It is still a rather nebulous concept for those regions, and to envisage it for a group of nations so close to the U.S.S.R. and including members of the "Socialist Commonwealth" requires more than a little imagination. Yet it is not unimaginable that the Balkan nations may increase, inch by inch, their cohesion and their ability to act in their own behalf; that a network of peaceful economic and other relationships between them and the rest of Europe will grow up, which no one will want to destroy; and that the weight of the United States and of China in the world balance, though neither attempts to build a specific anti-Soviet grouping in the area, can have some restraining influence on Soviet decisions. For a complex border region which has never known security it may be the only way out.

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McNAMARA'S WORLD BANK

By Escott Reid

ON March 31 of this year, Robert McNamara completed the first five years of his ten-year term as President of the World Bank Group. He has almost doubled in real terms the volume of lending by the Bank Group. He has more than doubled the size of the professional staff. He has changed the administrative structure. He has improved the relations of the Bank Group with the other international and national aid agencies. He has given the developing member-countries significant new help in their efforts to reduce their birth rates and to reconcile economic growth with the protection of their environment. He has set new criteria for lending.

He had been President for only a year and a half when he began to advocate new criteria for lending, new qualitative goals for the operations of the Bank Group. His argument ran, and runs, as follows: "Economic growth in a poor country, in its early stages, is likely to penalize the poorer segment of society relative to the more affluent sections . . . [unless poor countries] relate the goals of national growth to realistic targets of more equitable income distribution." A period of rapid economic growth, accompanied by great unemployment, by an increase in the disparities between regions and classes and by a continued growth of urban slums, may well create such political and social tensions that the period of rapid economic growth will be followed by a period of no growth or even of retrogression. A development policy which takes properly into account the need to reduce unemployment and to improve the conditions of the poor may result in a slower rate of growth of the economy in the short term but in a faster rate over the long term. "When the highly privileged [in a developing country] are few and the desperately poor are many —and when the gap between them is worsening rather than improving—it is only a question of time before a decisive choice must be made between the political costs of reform and the political risks of rebellion."

Therefore, he concluded, there must be a fundamental change in the emphasis, in the nature and in the direction of Bank Group lending, to enable the Bank Group to give as much help as it can to those of its developing member-countries which are deter-

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mined to achieve the three essentials of healthy development: rapid rates of growth in the production of essential goods and services for the whole population, in the number of productive jobs at proper pay, and in the share of the national production of essential goods and services going to the poorest two-fifths or so of the population. It does not matter if this emphasis on the goals of jobs and justice is "at the cost of some reduction in the pace of advance in certain narrow and highly privileged sectors whose benefits accrue to the few."

John White said in 1970 in his book on regional development banks that Eugene Black as president of the Bank in the fifties "made international development financing respectable." The task which Robert McNamara has set himself is to make respectable international development lending to help the poorest two-fifths of the peoples of the developing countries. This is a difficult and hazardous task, for it involves the Bank Group in efforts to influence the general development policies of the countries which borrow from it on issues much more politically delicate, much more traditionally domestic, than issues related to growth in the gross national product on which the Bank Group has in the past attempted to exert leverage or influence.

McNamara has urged a fundamental change in the emphasis, in the nature and in the direction of Bank Group lending. How rapidly is the change taking place? How can the pace of change be speeded up? What are the other principal areas in which McNamara during his second five-year term as President should seek to expand or to modify the activities and the ways of operation of the Bank Group?

II

During the last fiscal year of the World Bank Group for which statistics are available, the year ending in mid-1972, the World Bank lent Brazil $437 million. It lent Mexico, Iran and Turkey a total of $539 million. The loans to these four countries constituted one-half of the total lending by the Bank that year. These countries are not noted for their devotion to McNamara's new gospel of development. The explanation of this gap between precept and practice is that it takes from two to three years for the Bank Group to process a loan, so that a change in lending policy is not likely to take effect for this period. If this explanation were the whole story, the change which McNamara began

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to press for at the beginning of the fiscal year 1970 should have a marked effect on lending in the fiscal years 1973, 1974 and 1975. At present, however, it seems unlikely that much of the nine to ten billion dollars which McNamara expects the Bank Group to lend in these three years will do much to reduce the number of unemployed in the developing countries or to increase the share of the national income going to the poorest two-fifths of the people.

If one were to ask the officers of the Bank Group who are directly engaged in the process of making loans to explain this, most of them would reply that it is McNamara's insistence that the volume of lending by the Bank Group be maintained at its present level, or even be increased. Perhaps McNamara does not insist on this, but this is what they believe. These officers contend that there would be a much faster advance toward the qualitative goals of Bank Group lending if McNamara were to tell them that he considers these goals to be so important that he is prepared to accept at least a temporary reduction in the volume of lending by the World Bank itself, if this is needed to speed an advance toward the qualitative goals.

The connection between volume and quality is important for two reasons. The first is that the Bank Group's ability to persuade the governments of borrowing countries to adopt new policies will be greater if the Bank Group uses its loans as carrots and sticks. The Bank Group must be able to make clear to these governments that if they adopt policies leading to more production, more jobs and a more equitable distribution of income, and propose to the Bank Group the kinds of projects which will help them to implement these policies, they will receive a large volume of loans; if not they will receive little. Thus, a country which had been borrowing $200 million a year from the Bank Group might be told that lending to it could go up to $300 million a year, or drop to $50 million. This attempt to use leverage could be successful only if the Bank Group was, in fact, prepared to reduce drastically its lending to countries which had not accepted the new qualitative goals of development.

The second reason is that projects designed to yield high returns (in terms not only of production but also of jobs and a better distribution of national income) require a much greater investment of time by the professional staff of the Bank Group for each million dollars lent than do large loans for railways,

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ports, highways, power, telecommunications, steel plants, and so on, which in the past have made up the great bulk of Bank Group lending. If the professional staff of the Bank Group is under pressure to maintain or increase the present volume of lending, it will be reluctant to assume the heavy burden of helping the borrowing countries to identify and work out complex time-consuming projects. Instead, the staff will concentrate on putting through the traditional kinds of projects. This certainly happened during the first five years of McNamara's presidency. When he subjected the officers of the Bank Group to great pressure to double the volume of lending, the officers found themselves compelled to abandon or put aside a substantial proportion of the proposals or suggestions that came before them to help borrowers work out projects designed to increase employment without in the long run slowing down the rate of increase in the production of essentials.

It is therefore important that the officers of the Bank Group responsible for its operational activities should now be brought to feel that their contributions to the Bank Group and their worthiness for promotion are no longer to be judged by the volume of loans they process, but rather by how far the loans they process—*and* by their reluctance to recommend loans to countries not sufficiently concerned with the qualitative goals of development—contribute to speedy progress toward the qualitative goals of Bank Group lending. This would convince the developing member-countries that the Bank Group is sincere when it says that it would welcome requests from them for help in working out and financing policies, programs and projects which will lead to these goals.

The task of working out these policies, programs and projects is extraordinarily complex and demanding. It requires, as McNamara emphasized in his speech to the annual meeting of the Bank Group in September 1972, nothing less than a reorientation of the development policies of the developing countries. "Institutional reforms to redistribute economic power are critically required in many developing countries: land reform, corporate reform, tax reform, credit and banking reform. . . . Policies should be undertaken to eliminate distortions in the prices of land, labor and capital." "Given the intimate link between poverty and massive unemployment, unemployment and underemployment must be attacked head-on."

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One of McNamara's principal advisers on development policy is Mahbub ul Haq, who was for 13 years associated with Pakistan's economic planning. Mahbub ul Haq in a speech in 1972 said: "The concerns for more production and better distribution [of income] should be brought together and not treated separately. This invariably means that employment should be treated as a primary, not a secondary, objective of development since it is the most powerful means of redistributing incomes in a poor country."

A head-on attack on unemployment and underemployment can have six prongs. The first is small-scale industry, since small-scale industry is likely on the whole to be more labor-intensive than large-scale or medium-scale industry. The second is publicly-financed programs of small-scale development works in rural areas to conserve water and soil; these development works would be labor-intensive. The third is the building of mud roads from the farms to the nearest markets and of feeder roads from the markets to the main highways; these mud and feeder roads would be labor-intensive as compared with main highways, and they could be even more productive. The fourth is the use of labor-intensive techniques and technologies in other construction jobs such as the lining of irrigation canals and the building of dams. The fifth is agricultural credit to the poorest third of the farmers. The sixth is the creative adaptation to industries in the developing countries, where capital is scarce and labor is plentiful, of the capital-intensive, labor-saving technologies which have been worked out in the rich developed countries.

The latest published analysis of Bank Group lending for manufacturing operations covers the five years ending in mid-1971. During those five years the Bank Group lent $1.4 billion for manufacturing operations. Of this, only $37 million went to enterprises with fewer than 20 employees and only $202 million to enterprises with fewer than 100 employees. In the last two years the record on loans to small-scale industrial enterprises is better, but the Bank Group has still not granted any loans for small-scale rural development works. In the other four fields of activity, the other four prongs of an attack on unemployment and underemployment, progress is being made, but the pace of advance is slow—as McNamara would be the first to admit.

One explanation which McNamara has given for the slow pace of advance is lack of knowledge of how to substitute labor

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for capital in developing countries without increasing the real costs of producing essential goods and services. He has stressed the urgent need for much more research. The Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development has also stressed the need for much more research of two kinds—"imaginative research" and "an enormous amount of localized technical and economic research of a very practical sort." "It will," he has said, "undoubtedly be necessary to test various ideas in practice on an extensive basis before firm conclusions can be reached. But the stakes are so high that it is essential to press ahead with all these steps and even to accept the risks of some failures. They can be instructive too." The Chairman of DAC has criticized the Bank Group for the low level of its expenditures on research, "a level no industrial corporation or government department would tolerate."

To move ahead quickly with a large research program under which various imaginative ideas about substituting labor for capital are tested in practice on an extensive basis, the Bank Group must find ways to encourage its developing member-countries to submit to it many experimental labor-intensive projects. Some would be for a few million dollars. Some, for rural development in a country the size of India, could be for several hundreds of millions of dollars. Most would be in countries which have per capita incomes of not more than $300 and are eligible to receive interest-free loans from the International Development Association (IDA). There are two main ways by which the Bank Group can give the necessary encouragement to IDA-worthy countries to submit to it experimental labor-intensive projects. The Bank Group can decide to bear the risks of failures. And it can increase greatly the proportion of its loans for those projects which finance local costs.

Since, as the Chairman of DAC has pointed out, some experimental labor-intensive projects are likely to be failures, the low-income member-countries of the Bank Group with their limited resources will properly be reluctant to propose them to the Bank Group (or to carry them out with their own resources) if they must bear the costs of the failures, particularly since the benefits of the experiments, whether successes or failures, will also accrue to countries other than those in which the projects are undertaken. Their reluctance would be lessened if the Bank Group

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were to decide that if an experimental labor-intensive project financed by an IDA loan turns out to be a failure, the Bank would assume the responsibility of meeting all the future payments on the loan. This would convert the IDA loan into a grant. Since IDA loans are interest-free and run for 50 years, the cost to the Bank of taking over all amortization payments on IDA loans totalling, for example, $100 million would be one payment of only $13 million (discounting future payments at seven percent, the cost of money to the Bank). This payment could be made out of a special research fund financed from Bank profits.

The more labor-intensive a project is, the less foreign exchange it uses. The higher the proportion of the local costs of labor-intensive projects the Bank Group is prepared to finance, the greater the encouragement it will give. The financing by the Bank Group of local costs puts foreign exchange at the disposal of the borrowing governments; virtually all the developing countries, other than the oil-rich countries, suffer from severe shortages of foreign exchange. These countries can use the foreign exchange resulting from Bank Group loans for local costs to finance high-priority purposes in economic and social development, including essential imports and the payment of interest and amortization on new loans for high priority development projects. It would be helpful, therefore, if the Bank Group were to decide that it would finance all the direct and indirect foreign exchange costs and at least two-thirds of the local costs of experimental labor-intensive projects. (This would apply to financing by the Bank proper as well as by IDA.)

When McNamara became President of the Bank in 1968, only five percent of the lending by the Bank and IDA was for local costs. The main reason for this was the opposition of the governments of some of the rich member-countries. These governments argued that what they needed to rally the support of powerful export interests in their countries behind the World Bank Group was a simple, clear proof that their country got back in export orders all or more than all the money it made available to the Bank Group by permitting the Bank to sell its bonds on their capital markets or to their central banks, or by gifts from the government to IDA. Their objection to increased local cost financing was that it would result in a falling off of their exports which could be identified as directly attributable to Bank Group loans. Under McNamara's presidency the proportion of lending

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by the Bank and IDA which finances local costs has gone up from five to ten percent. We have here a great triumph for McNamara. But the triumph is by no means complete. If low-income member-countries are to be encouraged to propose a large volume of labor-intensive projects to the Bank Group, the ten percent must rise to 20 percent in the next few years and possibly to 30 percent by the end of the 1970s. To secure the acquiescence of the rich member-countries in this kind of increase, McNamara may well have to visit the capitals of the rich member-countries and argue vigorously with their governments. He may have to propose an amendment to the international agreements establishing the Bank and IDA.

III

Small-scale rural development works provide a good indication of the scale of operations required to make an impact on unemployment and income distribution in the low-income countries, the kinds of benefits likely to flow from well-planned and well-administered programs, and the kinds of difficulties likely to confront a government determined to combat the poverty of the poorest of its fellow citizens.

Dudley Seers recommended in 1971 in the study of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) which he made for the International Labor Organization that Ceylon should in the next few years have a program of small-scale rural development works which would employ 100,000 workers, this in a country of only 13 million people. The corresponding figure for India would be four million workers full-time or eight million half-time. For this the wage bill for the laborers might be about $500 million a year.

The programs would not be massive programs of rural relief. They would be integrated programs of small-scale, labor-intensive development works likely to yield high real rates of economic return in both the short and the long run, either by increasing agricultural production or by reducing the farmer's costs and by improving his ability to market his crops. The projects for increasing agricultural production would include measures to improve the quality of land and to conserve water and soil by leveling land, by contouring embankments, damming rivulets and streams, constructing ponds for holding rain water and irrigation and drainage channels, by digging surface wells, desilting existing canals and small reservoirs, and by planting trees.

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The other projects would consist mainly of improving the roads from the farms to the markets, thus reducing the costs to the farmers of improved seeds and fertilizer and the cost of bringing his crops to market. Labor otherwise unemployed would create valuable capital goods.

If a program of rural development works is restricted to projects yielding a high real rate of economic return, and in most developing countries there is no lack of such potential projects, the program will increase the production of food and put money in the hands of the poorer peasants, the underemployed artisans and the landless laborers. They will spend this money on the bare essentials of life which they now lack. They will buy more food to fill their empty bellies, thus providing a market for the increased production of food resulting from the projects on which they have been employed. They will buy more clothing to replace their rags; in most developing countries simple clothing material can be produced locally. Their employment on productive work at reasonable rates of pay will thus create more production and more employment; it will increase the share of the poor in the national income and, in most of the developing world, it will lead to almost no increase in the demand for imports. It will therefore not be a drain on scarce foreign exchange.

The power structure in many rural areas in many of the low-income countries, notably in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, is a serious obstacle to the success of large programs of rural development works. The rural élite will try to get control of any development works program to abort or twist it to serve their own purposes. The larger landowners will try to evade paying a fair price for the improvements made on their farms as a result of the works projects. The moneylenders will try to seize part of the wages of the laborers to pay off debts incurred at exorbitant rates of interest. Corrupt officials will try to charge the government for work which has not been done, or for wages which have not been paid. Governments determined to help the rural poor, and it is only to these governments that the Bank Group should make loans for rural works projects, will, therefore, have to work out measures providing reasonable assurance to the Bank Group that the projects will be so organized and monitored that they will in fact help the rural poor. In the long run, as Arun Shourie has suggested,[1] this means that in many very

[1] See Arun Shourie, "Growth, Poverty and Inequalities," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973.

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poor countries the governments will have to help the poorer farmers, the underemployed artisans and the landless laborers to organize themselves against those who hold power in the villages.

Some waste is inevitable on all development projects; on rural development works the waste may be above the norm. On these as on other Bank Group projects waste must be kept to a minimum. But as one senior official of the Bank Group said to me at the beginning of 1973 when we were discussing rural development projects, "At least, when we waste money on projects to employ the poorest farmers and the landless laborers, we will be wasting money on the right people."

In a speech in 1969, Mitchell Sharp, the foreign minister of Canada, said:

> Successful revolt, like successful government, calls for effective infrastructure, the kind of thing aid programs are designed to provide. There are countries where one can only hope that in due time the assistance they receive from us will give to the people the sinews they need to rise up and cast aside the cruel weight of unjust and unprincipled government.

The people who control unjust and unprincipled governments are not likely to use foreign aid to provide their poorer fellow citizens with the sinews for successful revolt. But governments which are determined to strengthen the economic, social and political power of their poorer fellow citizens will use foreign aid for these purposes, including loans from the World Bank Group for rural development works and for other programs designed to yield high returns in terms of production, jobs and a more equitable distribution of income.

IV

The Bank Group is not able at present to do nearly as much for its very poor member-countries as it can for its better-off developing member-countries. The very poor member-countries (those with per capita gross national products in 1970 of less than $160 a year) have a total population of 1,100 million—almost 50 percent more than the population of the better-off developing member-countries (those with per capita gross national products in 1970 of $160 to $1,400 a year). And it is the very poor countries which most need help. Their gross national products grew during the 1960s at a rate in real terms of only 3.7 percent a year, compared with 6.2 percent in the better-off developing

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countries. If these rates of growth continue, the better-off will double their gross national products in 12 years while the very poor countries will take 20 years to double theirs.

Hollis Chenery, a vice-president of the World Bank and McNamara's principal adviser on development policy, emphasized in a speech in 1970 the much greater importance of aid to the poorer countries compared with assistance to the better-off. His two categories were countries in the income range of $100 to $300 and countries at "higher income levels." He said:

> In general there should be a presumption that aid is provided for the purpose of accelerating growth, which would result in the highest per capita amounts going to countries in the income range of $100 to $300. At higher income levels, exports and private investments should be able to finance imports, and adequate domestic savings are mainly a question of government policy.

In the four years ending in mid-1972, lending by the Bank and IDA was distributed in the diametrically opposite way from that recommended by Hollis Chenery. The countries which he recommended should get the highest amounts per capita got 63 cents a year for every inhabitant. Countries in the income range of $440 to $1,400 received $2.16 a head, almost three and a half times as much. The Bank, which lends at an interest rate of 7¼ percent a year, was lending $1,675 million a year in this period; the International Development Association, which charges no interest on its loans, was lending only $650 million a year.

The reason for the skewed allocation of Bank and IDA loans is simple. In general, the poorer a country the less it can afford to pay 7¼ percent a year in foreign exchange on its borrowings. For this reason only 15 percent of Bank loans in the four years ending in mid-1972 went to very poor countries. The very poor countries got 80 percent of IDA loans but, since IDA had only about two-fifths as much to lend as the Bank, this 80 percent did not compensate for their lack of credit-worthiness for Bank loans.

The resources of IDA have fortunately been increasing more rapidly than those of the Bank; in the fiscal years 1973, 1974 and 1975, IDA will be lending at least half as much as the Bank. But if the Bank Group is to be able to treat its very poor members as well as its better-off developing members, the resources of IDA must be increased much more rapidly than those of the Bank. The difficulty, of course, is that it is much easier for the Bank to raise money by selling its bonds at an interest rate of about seven

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percent than it is for IDA to raise money by begging the governments of rich countries to make gifts to it, gifts financed out of taxes. Governments are now giving IDA a little over $800 million a year. By 1975 this may have gone up to $1,200 million and by 1978 to $1,500 million (in 1972 dollars). But if IDA is to do what it should do for its very poor member-countries, it must be able to lend about twice that amount. (It would need to lend even more if Peking were to take over the Chinese seats in the Bank Group and were to apply for loans from IDA.) The only readily conceivable way to increase IDA's resources to about three billion dollars a year is to provide IDA with interest-free special drawing rights (SDRs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1972 McNamara publicly associated himself with proposals, as he put it, to link the financing of aid, "either directly or indirectly, to future issues of Special Drawing Rights."

IDA could not expect to be the only agency receiving interest-free SDRs. The SDRs would have to be shared with regional banks and possibly also with the U.N. Development Program (UNDP). The regional banks would use special drawing rights to finance interest-free loans to very poor countries. Perhaps, beginning in 1975, an average of one billion dollars a year (in 1972 dollars) of SDRs might be made available to IDA and half a billion a year to the regional banks and the UNDP. In successive allocations of SDRs, these amounts might be increased and the share of the regional banks augmented as they take over more of the responsibility for making interest-free loans to very poor countries. By the mid-1980s, the volume of interest-free SDRs made available to IDA and the other international aid agencies might have gone up to three billion dollars a year (in 1972 dollars), on the assumptions that by then SDRs will have become the major international reserve asset and that all additions to reserves will be in the form of SDRs. By that time too, the mid-1980s, it is likely that the Soviet Union and the East European states will have become members of the IMF and of the Bank Group, and that the government in Peking will occupy the Chinese seats in both institutions.

Another way to increase the resources of IDA and of other international aid agencies is to turn over to them royalties derived from the exploitation of the seabed outside national jurisdiction. Almost three years ago President Nixon proposed to

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Congress that a treaty should be concluded under which these royalties would "be utilized principally for providing economic assistance to developing countries participating in the treaty." The nations of the world should conclude promptly a treaty on the lines of the Nixon proposal. The longer they delay the more difficult the task; vested interests will have been established, vested interests of governments which are constantly extending the area of the seabed over which they claim jurisdiction, vested interests of the dozen or more national and multinational corporations and consortia already actively working on the problem of how to mine one of the great potential resources of the seabed, the so-called manganese nodules which contain not only manganese but copper, nickel, cobalt and other metals.

V

The World Bank is now a very unequal partnership between the rich and the low-income countries. (Rich countries had per capita gross national products in 1970 of at least $1,600 a year and included a quarter of the population of the world. Low-income countries had less than $440 and included two-thirds of the population of the world.) Unless the Bank Group becomes a less unequal partnership, a change in its criteria of lending and an increase in its financial resources will not by themselves enable it to give to its low-income member-countries the help it should be able to provide. There are two reasons for this. The first is that at present not enough people with influence in the Bank Group know enough at firsthand of what life is like for the poorer people in the low-income countries and for their governments. The policies, the programs, the projects and the advice of the Bank Group would be sounder if the governments and the nationals of the low-income countries had more influence in shaping and implementing them. The second reason is that unless the influence of rich countries and their nationals is diminished, the influence of the Bank Group will decline. It will decline as more and more of the low-income countries become more and more unwilling to accept advice from outsiders. If the relative power of the rich countries within the Bank Group is not substantially diminished, the low-income countries will regard the management and staff of the Bank Group as outsiders.

Today, the six principal rich member-countries (the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Japan and Canada) possess

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about half the votes in the governing bodies of the Bank and IDA. The six most populous low-income countries (India, Indonesia, Brazil, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nigeria) possess only about one-thirteenth of the votes, although their populations total 930 million compared with 500 million in the six principal rich countries. The whole group of rich countries has only a quarter of the population of all the members of the Bank and IDA but possesses 64 percent of the votes in the governing bodies. In April 1973, nationals of rich countries held 68 of the top 80 positions in the management and staff of the Bank and IDA.

Three-quarters of the financial resources of the Bank and IDA comes directly or indirectly from the capital markets, the central banks and the governments of its six principal rich member-countries. Almost all the rest comes from the other rich countries. The rich countries will not provide three billion dollars a year or more to an agency in which their ability to influence policy is no greater than that of countries providing virtually none of the financial resources. This is a reality of international political life at the present stage of interstate relations. Nor would the rich member-countries be alone in rejecting out of hand a proposal that every member-state should have only one vote in the governing bodies of the Bank Group. The more populous of the low-income countries would also reject it. The 58 least populous of the low-income member-countries of IDA have a total population of 350 million. Under the one-state one-vote system, these low-income countries would be able to cast a majority of the votes in IDA, which has a membership of 111. The six most populous low-income countries with more than two and a half times the population of the 58 countries would have one-tenth of their votes. One million people in the 58 least populous low-income countries would have the voting power of 25 million people in the six most populous low-income countries.

It is thus obvious that there must be some kind of weighted voting in the governing bodies of the Bank Group. The present system of weighted voting in the Bank Group is based on relative economic strength as reflected in national income, imports, exports and central bank reserves. If, in addition, some weight were given to population, there would be a shift in voting power from the rich to the low-income countries. If, for example, each member-country were given 30 additional votes in the Bank and 90 additional votes in IDA for every million of its population, eight

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percent of the votes would be transferred from the rich countries to the low-income countries. The rich countries would have 56 percent of the votes instead of the 64 percent they now possess. They would still have control but they would have demonstrated the importance which they attach to gradually turning the Bank Group into a less unequal partnership between the rich and the low-income nations. (The United States now has 23 percent of the votes in the Bank and 26 percent in IDA. Under this proposal it would have 20 percent in the Bank and 22 percent in IDA. It would still be able to block amendments to the international agreements establishing the Bank and IDA, since amendments require either unanimity or the support of 80 percent of the total voting power and it is inconceivable that all the other members of the Bank would vote against the United States.)

To make this change in voting would require amendments to the international agreements establishing the Bank and IDA. To increase the proportion of senior officers of the Bank Group from the developing countries would require action only by McNamara. Since the needs of governments, banks, businesses and universities in developing countries for people who could become valuable members of the professional staff of the Bank Group are so great that they cannot be filled, the Bank Group would not wish to persuade many of them to become permanent members of its staff. The Bank Group should concentrate rather on borrowing experts from developing countries—men, say, in their early forties—to serve on its staff for five-year terms. These younger people could more easily be spared by their countries since the experience gained from service with the Bank Group would make them much more valuable on their return home. Their employers might therefore be prepared to coöperate with the Bank Group in granting them leaves of absence for five years. They would, of course, accept appointments only if given assurances that their stay in the Bank Group would not hinder their careers at home, and that the Bank Group would make full use of their abilities. The two conditions are interdependent. Their fulfillment would require a high degree of flexibility on the part of the management and staff of the Bank Group. By 1978 about one-third of the 200 or so senior posts might be held by these experts from developing countries.

George Woods, when President of the Bank during the five years preceding McNamara's appointment, reduced sharply the

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proportion of the principal officers of the Bank and IDA who were citizens of the United States. The proportion fell from 55 to 40 percent. During McNamara's first five years of office, this desirable trend was reversed. This is one of McNamara's main failures as President. In April 1973, the proportion of principal officers who were U.S. citizens was 45 percent (36 out of 80.) This preponderance of one nationality is not appropriate in international lending agencies like the World Bank Group.

About 1,200 new appointments to the professional staff of the Bank Group will have to be made between mid-1973 and mid-1978 when the staff will have increased to about 2,400. This large number of new appointments makes it possible for McNamara to achieve a more appropriate balance at all levels of the professional staff, from the vice-presidents down, among citizens of the United States, citizens of other rich countries and of middle-income and low-income countries—while at the same time maintaining high standards of efficiency, competence and integrity in the new appointments and leaving room for promoting present members of the staff on merit, regardless of nationality.

VI

To list these measures for strengthening the World Bank Group is easy. The obstacles which stand in the way of bringing them into effect are great. McNamara has to change some of his own policies and his style of administration. He has to overcome resistance to change in both the rich and the developing countries. The governments of many of the rich countries will be reluctant to provide IDA with greatly increased resources and to surrender some of their influence over the making of decisions by the Bank Group. The governments of many of the developing countries will resist efforts by the Bank Group to press them into doing more for the poorest two-fifths of their peoples. But a strong President of the Bank Group supported by statesmen in member-countries "with a wide vision, a social consciousness and a sense of history" has been able during his first five years of office to do much for the Bank Group and for international development. He can do even more in his second five-year term.

The World Bank Group has contributed much to institution-building in its developing member-countries. It is high time it paid more attention to institution-building at home. McNamara has set his personal imprint on the World Bank Group just as

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did his predecessors, Eugene Black and George Woods. His task now is to make the Bank Group less dependent on the personality of its president.

Under McNamara's leadership the board of executive directors of the Bank Group representing the member-governments has been given a larger share in the process of making decisions, and it has become more responsible, more creative. A similar healthy development has not taken place in the bureaucracy of the Bank Group. To correct this failure, McNamara needs to nurture in the Bank Group a style of administration in which the superior gives the subordinate ample opportunities to argue with him over the merits and demerits of alternative policies, and in which the subordinate gives the superior honest and informed advice even though he knows it will be unpalatable. McNamara inherited from George Woods a style of administration which did not possess these qualities. His greatest failure as President is that he has perpetuated this style of administration. This is not the way to strengthen the Bank Group as an institution. The more the professional officers of the Bank Group feel that they are participating in the process of making decisions on policy, the more responsible, the more creative they will become, and the stronger the Bank Group will become as an institution.

In the next five years, McNamara can greatly increase the ability of the Bank Group to help the developing nations reconcile the need to increase their production of essential goods and services for the mass of their people with the need to reduce their unemployment and underemployment and to increase the share of the national wealth going to the poorest two-fifths of their people. He can make the Bank Group a less unequal partnership between the rich and the poorer nations. He can make the administration of the Bank Group more efficient and more international. He can make the Bank Group into a strong, creative institution vibrant with argument at a high intellectual level. A president of the World Bank who sees himself as an international civil servant second only to the Secretary-General of the United Nations can become a great contributor to the long slow process of creating a world community, and the lasting peace that would go with it.

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THE AMERICAN QUARTER-CENTURY IN ASIA

By Dick Wilson

AS a European, and particularly as a Briton, I had the unusual good fortune to come first to Asia by way of America. The African and Indian friendships formed during college days at Oxford whetted my appetite for an understanding of the non-white world, but only when I arrived at Berkeley for a post-graduate year did I enter the life of the Chinese, the Japanese, the Filipinos, the Indonesians—who were there by the score, sharing with me the experience of being a foreign student in the United States.

And then I sailed on the *Oregon Mail* for Yokohama in 1953 with a cargo of military supplies for the Korean front, wheat for the Asian market, an earnest missionary and three cheerful Mennonite relief workers going to serve as noncombatants in Korea. It was my first exposure to the contradictions in U.S. policy toward Asia.

The Asia which I began to observe two decades ago was a post-colonial Asia already swept off its feet by the American presence. Technically the occupation of Japan had just ended, but its visual reminders, in the form of the paraphernalia of the U.S. military, were still strong. It was, I suppose, the high point of the American postwar "empire" in Asia, when every inquiry ended at the U.S. Embassy and every foreign visitor was presumed to hunger for hamburgers and french fries.

Only later did the pre-Americans (the French, Dutch, Germans, British—and their extensions, the Australians) begin to return to their earlier haunts, reminding Asians that the United States was not the only other country in the world. Only later did the Asians begin to extricate themselves from the mire of postwar poverty and chaos, to see Americans not as gods dropped from another planet but merely as rather better-off fellow-humans. And now the American era is over.

I have watched it flow and ebb away from three distinct vantage-points. The first was in 1953, when I traversed Asia from Yokohama to Bombay on a shoestring. With only a knapsack and a notebook, I stayed in Sendai, Matsue, Tokyo, Sapporo, Nara, Kobe, Hongkong, Singapore, Rangoon and Calcutta with the

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families of students met in California—and was taken into their hearts. To be an Englishman in Asia in those days, and to lack money, was to be lionized.

It is hard to believe that my first host in Asia, a Japanese businessman whom I had originally met in a Japanese bridge-game group at the Berkeley International House, actually emigrated to Argentina soon afterward because he was convinced that China would cut Japan off from her markets and permanently postpone his country's economic recovery. He lacked faith in the American alliance and even in economic ties to America: I wonder what his thoughts are today.

Five years later I returned to edit the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in Hongkong, and from 1958 to 1964 traveled extensively as a professional journalist in the region, including China itself. Then in 1969–72 I was based in Singapore as an adviser to a newspaper group there, and saw Southeast Asia a little more closely.

My credentials for Asia-watching were my Oxford and Berkeley degrees, youth, a yearning to understand the non-European world and a pragmatic instinct for the center of the road whether in party or ideological terms. I failed to see how communism could succeed in its aims, given the human material with which it had to work, or how it could satisfy anyone for long without succeeding. But if a nation like the Chinese chose to make a shot at it, that was, by my lights, their own affair—so long as they did not express their frustrations in the form of forcing others to copy.

Broadly, I accepted the American ideals for Asia (which I interpreted as political independence, democratic institutions and economic growth by the free enterprise system) but not by any means all of successive American administrations' assessments and interventions. I found these basic attitudes widely shared among the Asians I spent most time with—students and teachers, lawyers, journalists, administrators and other professional men, and businessmen.

Now the wheel has come full circle. America has disengaged from Vietnam, and the Nixon Doctrine holds sway in one form or another across the whole continent: Asian solutions for Asian problems. It is important to try to take stock of the overall impact of the United States on East Asia in the first postwar quarter-century, from the Japanese surrender to Henry Kissinger's first

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trip to Peking. Inevitably Americans, especially liberal Americans, tend to judge the whole of their country's contribution to Asia, in the harsh and blinding light of the Vietnam experience, as ill-conceived and tragic in its results. My purpose here is to examine the record as it appears to one who observed it at the time and from the Asian perspective.

II

Japan was the first object of U.S. postwar Asian policy, and it was in Japan that that policy won its surest successes. America came to Tokyo as a conqueror, but never lost sight of the goal of restoring the Japanese to a normal and viable existence, within a framework calculated to prevent further misconceptions and misadventures of the kind that had led them earlier into militarism and aggression.

The MacArthur régime was perhaps the most statesmanlike military occupation of a defeated enemy in history. It began with an overly naïve faith in pacifism and democracy, and the pacifist constitution had to be hastily reinterpreted after the Korean War had broken out to allow the creation of a 75,000-strong "police" force which subsequently developed into the present Self-Defense Forces. But the American role in Japan from 1945 to 1952 laid a sound foundation for the latter's reintegration into the world community.

The land reform in particular freed Japan in perpetuity from dictation by a landowning élite, and Japanese scholars and politicians concede that probably no indigenous government, ineluctably hostage to vested interests, could have achieved this short of peaceful revolution.

The Japanese found themselves, to their delight and surprise, well treated by the victors. The possibly apocryphal story of the Japanese farmer who, asked by an American researcher for his opinion of MacArthur, replied: "The Emperor could not have chosen a better man," is a good epitaph. But the Americanization of their lives was only skin-deep; the fundamentals of national tradition and culture were not affected as fully as some Americans (and others) supposed at the time. We may smile ruefully at the sardonic observation of Kenichi Yoshida, brilliant son of the first postwar Prime Minister, that: "The American occupation brought to Japan its own culture and living habits, and our people were able to study for themselves personally the

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behavior of the West, and so reassure themselves gratefully of the enduring superiority of the Japanese way of life."

Japan's status as the least easily assimilable great nation in the global club—founded, after all, by the Atlantic Anglo-Saxon-Gallic-Iberian group—was not really changed by the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or by the MacArthur shogunate. For all the external and superficial signs of Westernization and reasonably contented participation in the international capitalist system, Japan more than China seems to me the country whose internal tensions may again give her neighbors and the other powers cause for anxiety. This is not because of any inherent aggressiveness, but merely a consequence of four characteristics of twentieth-century Japan not shared, in combination and to the same degree, by any other large state: rapid internal modernization, great economic power, dependence on other countries for the maintenance of that power, and an inadequate understanding of world forces.

There is nothing that the United States could wisely have done differently, or would wish to have done, about the first three of these factors, but the fourth has been more responsive to outside influence. U.S. policies since 1945 have ensured that the Japanese tendency to misperceive the currents of international politics has been steadily eroded. It still exists, but there is now, thanks to the sympathetic spirit of the occupation and the exchanges of students and scholars, a possibility of its never again provoking a total breakdown in communications with the outside world.

Yet the period of therapy was all too short, insufficient to achieve fundamental alterations in a nation's *weltanschauung*. And from mid-1971 on, the patient has perhaps been put to the test too suddenly and traumatically.

In the game of twentieth-century diplomacy all major players are deemed theoretically equal, and each is expected to protect its self-interest vis-à-vis the others with the minimum of general dislocation. It does not seem to occur to many in Washington, especially on Capitol Hill, that these rules can appear strange to the product of East Asian civilization, whether he be Chinese or Japanese, and that the behavioral patterns of dependence, paternalism and hierarchy—the Confucian family model of relationships—retain a strong appeal in East Asia.

Thus a Japanese diplomat can argue that Peking harbors no resentment against Japan for her part in seeking to exclude the

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Chinese People's Republic from the United Nations in the fall of 1971: the Japanese were merely meeting the obligations of their alliance with the United States at that time—and such loyalty has appeal to the Chinese mind.

But the corollary is that many Japanese came to nurse high levels of expectation from the U.S. alliance. They supposed that a senior ally should and would behave as a close relative—someone with full authority within his own smaller household, and with an overriding inner-directed concern for protecting the common interests of the larger family. To hold this personalized familial view of international relations is inevitably, from time to time, to feel betrayed and unfairly singled out in the rough-and-tumble of the modern Western diplomatic world, where the multiplicity of both common interests and conflicts with another state is accepted as the norm.

No one would suggest that there is a rigid and sharp distinction of political behavior here as between Japanese and Americans. The United States is not always unresponsive to emotional appeals of this kind, while Japan has considerable experience of "younger brothers"—like the Republic of Korea—who both need and hate their patron, and toward whom it is virtually impossible to maintain an attitude of patient, consistent understanding and support. Many Japanese policymakers are also fully aware intellectually of the internal democratic constraints upon a U.S. president. The difference is one of emphasis only, but at moments of crisis it can be crucial.

Given this analysis of the Japanese problem, one is tempted to conclude that Americans in the 1960s would have been wise to have loosened the apron strings a little sooner and more gradually. The 1950s were a time of concern about the Japanese acceptance of their new role in the international capitalist system, protected from the threat of bullying by Soviet power. The Japanese expected to be punished by their conquerors in 1945. Instead they were encouraged to rebuild their national economy, this time within a truly international coöperative frame, and to develop their own democratic politics. By the early 1960s, these goals had been achieved. Ideally the period of dominant U.S. influence in Japan ought to have begun to be phased out then, so that successive Japanese leaders could have acquired experience in steering their national craft through regional and world waters. Some patient detachment could usefully have been

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experimented with and maybe accomplished, had it not been for the distorting and distracting pressures of the Vietnam War.

Just as the Korean War thwarted the American experiment of imposing total pacifism on Japan, so the Vietnam War created a situation where the United States could not afford to allow Japan to wander off on her own. Former Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer's difficulties in 1965 in keeping the Japanese press "straight" on the Vietnam question provided a vivid measure of the U.S. dilemma. If Washington had let go the reins in Japan, the thrust of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam might have been blunted by overt opposition from one of the key Asian "beneficiaries" of that intervention. Yet by bringing pressure on the Liberal Democratic Party leaders to rally convincingly behind the U.S. role in Vietnam (on the performance of which Japanese opinion was never invited), Washington helped to perpetuate a sense of dependence and to frustrate indigenous attempts to chart constructive diplomatic paths for Japan.

Now Japan has undertaken an international great-power role which has no precedent, namely the assumption of economic and political power without military backing, and this will require diplomatic skill and sophistication of the highest order. Its success will also depend on a high degree of understanding from the United States. The first postwar quarter-century of U.S.-Japan relations, culminating in the reversion of Okinawa, was a remarkable achievement of American wisdom. But the second quarter-century has not begun propitiously, and there are signs that the new pressures of multipolarity are reducing America's capacity for sympathy toward Japan. This marginally increases the risk that Japan may feel herself once again unaccommodated and unappreciated in an alien world order.

III

In Korea, too, American policy—first a limited U.S. occupation, then the war against the North and the close political alliance with the democratic forces of the Republic of Korea—has been surprisingly successful. The original intervention in the war was a loud and clear signal of U.S. determination to see that régimes demonstrating reasonable signs of viability and some grasp of the problems confronting their societies should not be pushed over by massed force from across a frontier.

That message meant a great deal to Asia. If it had not been

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muddied by the unwise decision to march beyond the 38th parallel to the Yalu, and by the subsequent mistaken assumption of belligerent intentions on the part of China when the Chinese made their predictable response, its effect would, of course, have been immensely greater, and the war itself shorter and less damaging. Korea's tragedy is to constitute a buffer between three giant neighbors—Russia, China and Japan. If MacArthur, Truman and Acheson expected to be able to establish Syngman Rhee north of the parallel without provoking a Chinese or Soviet retaliation they were guilty of grave misjudgment. Had the North Koreans been rolled back to their starting line, and the allied forces restrained from pursuing them beyond it, the United States would have ridden high on a wave of world admiration—and reduced the Communists to virtual impotence.

Let us be very clear here. The fact that the United States was ready to resist armed aggression from across an internationally recognized partition line, and proved willing to fight through to a peculiarly bitter end, undoubtedly strengthened the minds and hands of those throughout non-Communist Asia who aspired to independent viability free from dependence on the two Communist giants, China and the U.S.S.R.[1] But that encouragement would have been at least as effective, and far less draining on America's willpower and credibility as a conscientious world policeman, if the U.S. response had been more measured.

After the truce, the problem in Korea was to clean up the mess and the demoralization of the South, and this was tackled by the United States with characteristic vigor and, in the end, remarkable success. A new and almost unrecognizable South Korea climbed out of the ashes of war, and in the 1960s achieved not only an economic growth of impressive proportions but also a regime nearer to the democratic ideal and in better touch with the popular will than any other in Korea in modern times. The transition from Rhee, via the democratic politicians, to military rule and the "elected reign" of Park Chung Hee was accommodated by the United States—at least through 1971—with the minimum of stress and awkwardness, indeed with delicacy and good sense.

[1] Here the reader may cavil that I omit mention of the United Nations' part in the Korean War. Important as this was from many standpoints, including no doubt American opinion, to Asian eyes the crucial fact was that it was the United States that had acted—as of course it was plainly the decision of the United States to cross the 38th parallel and advance to the Yalu.

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IV

The major error of judgment in postwar Asia was, of course, in China. If only Truman or Eisenhower had come to the conclusion reached two decades later by Richard Nixon, had negotiated some sort of terms with the Communist régime (short, if necessary, of diplomatic recognition), and had maintained a dialogue with it and taken the trouble to understand, if not always to accept, its point of view. . . .

In late 1949 and early 1950, Truman was evidently ready to overrule the Chiang Kai-shek lobby and recognize the de facto victory of the Communists in the Chinese Civil War, just as the British had. But his opportunity, given the realities of internal American politics and the way in which the Democrats had their hands tied behind their backs on the issue of international communism, was too short: the Korean War opened only nine months after Mao's proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic in Tienanmen Square. Yet Eisenhower and Dulles, whose credentials for dealing with the Communists were unimpeachable (and used to advantage in bringing the Korean War to an end), allowed the entire 1954–58 period to elapse without any effort to respond to the possibilities of a détente with China. The blandishments of Chou En-lai at Geneva in 1954 and at Bandung a year later were contemptuously ignored, and that was a fundamental error.

These two periods are among the most tantalizing "ifs" and "might-have-beens" of recent history. Had Mao been assured from the start, as he is now, of America's lack of designs on Chinese territory and willingness to let the Communist government on the Chinese mainland be, it is surely possible that the Sino-Soviet split would have come earlier—for it was the common bogey of American imperialism which held the honeymoon between Peking and Moscow together as long as it did last. And if China had entered the United Nations in the 1950s her first formative decades of full international life would have been under the guidance of the remarkable Chou En-lai. Only after he has left the Chinese political scene are we likely to appreciate the measure of Chou's internationalism, and to regret to the full that it had so narrow a scope during the most fruitful period of his working life.

For it is my guess that the men who come to decide China's foreign policies after Chou will not be the polished diplomats,

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the Chiao Kuan-hua's or the Huang Hua's, but men cast in a rougher mold, probably not foreign-educated, who have survived all the internal upheavals of the Communist Party and built a local power base—probably army men or party bosses lacking Chou's interest in the details of world affairs or his capacity to follow them. So it will always be a matter of intense regret that the most enlightened internationalist whom modern China has thrown up was lost to world affairs, that this early opportunity to habituate an instinctively inward-looking, isolationist China to an active participation in the running of our planet's common business was forfeited. The next phase of China's foreign policy is quite likely to be the pursuit of China's national interests relatively narrowly defined.

And, of course, what a difference a more thoughtful and less panicky American policy toward China could have made, not only to the expansion of the Korean War but to the origins of the Vietnam War. If the Americans had continued to talk to the Chinese Communist leaders in 1949, many of the misunderstandings and agonies in Asia since then might have been avoided. And if the United States had been freed from its self-created blindness about China, had been observing and working with China more intimately, it could even have helped reduce Southeast Asian fears regarding Chinese expansionism—and perhaps acted as a steadying influence, reminding the Chinese leaders of the counterproductiveness of supporting weak liberation movements in Southeast Asia. Peking needed a disinterested foreign voice in the 1960s to convey another view of the realities of the region. Instead, the Robertson-Dulles-Rusk boycott narrowed Peking's policy options in Southeast Asia, and contributed to the very tension which the United States was professing to deplore.

Let the indictment here again be specific. There were three separate and distinct errors of judgment which entered into the myopic China policy of the 1950s and 1960s. The first was the initial characterization of the Communist régime as a transient phenomenon, lacking a solid domestic power base and depending on Soviet support for its continuation. The truth was, of course, that Mao came to power in spite of Stalin and not because of him —as was well known at the time to American specialists on both China and the Soviet Union.

The second error was the assumption that the Chinese Communist leadership would seek systematically, as a matter of prior-

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ity, to bully and harass the non-Communist regimes in Asia. In fact this goal was only a spasmodic one, and was generally accorded a relatively low priority in Peking's scheme of things, except insofar as it coincided with the strong desire to resolve China's land border ambiguities.

China's energies in this period were instead directed to rehabilitation after the ravages of the Sino-Japanese and Civil Wars, to coping with her Soviet neighbor and with what was perceived as American imperialism (at least after October 8, 1950, when U.S. forces drove north of the 38th parallel), and to restoring her territorial integrity (i.e. in Tibet in 1950 and, later, on the Indian frontier in 1962). U.S. misgivings about possible Chinese expansionism were to some extent excusable, given Peking's strident propaganda and the confused contemporary evidence about the origins of the Korean War and also of the Sino-Indian conflict. But, to repeat, Chinese attitudes should at least have been tested after the Korean ceasefire during the Bandung period.

The third mistake was the belief that China was sufficiently powerful and well organized to carry through on such ambitions beyond her frontiers, and would therefore have to be contained by a strong show of defensive force all around her. This misjudgment could have been avoided by the application of plain common sense, but common sense was clouded, especially in the 1950s, by ideological prejudice and distrust of specialist advisers who had known China intimately.

Before leaving America's tragic postwar relations with China, one should say a word about the prodigious effort which has been poured into Taiwan. This tiny island has received all the favors originally intended for a country 60 times its size, and its inhabitants cannot but be grateful to the United States; they would have labored under the same or a worse autocracy without American help, but their standard of living would be infinitely lower. With luck the fruits of this labor will be absorbed into the mainland and contribute to the mainstream of Chinese life once a modus vivendi between Peking and Taipei is established. And, with benefit of hindsight, it is just as well that the United States did not seek to bring a sense of reality into Taiwan's international posture by insisting on an abandonment of the myth of mainland rule by the Republic of China. That would have created a new and independent state of Formosa whose accommodation with the People's Republic of China in the 1970s

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would now be made even more difficult.

V

America's Vietnam involvement has produced sufficient polemics already. My objection is not to the idealism which inspired it but to the inadequate perception of the reality on which the ideals were intended to work. There never was a viable alternative to the Vietminh in Vietnamese politics: if successive intervenors, whether largely military (France and America) or largely political (Russia and China), had stayed their hands, Ho Chi Minh would long before his death have established his party as the dominant force not only in Vietnam but in all Indochina.

This is not because of any intrinsic superiority on the part of communism—far from it. It is simply because Ho had a grass-roots organization which, like Mao's or Tito's—but unlike the Communists in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Korea, Poland or Romania—was 100 percent indigenous. By good luck and able leadership Ho was able to harness Vietnamese nationalism to his cause, and there was nobody else in Vietnam who had bothered to build up a strong organization as an instrument of conscious and considered reform. However hostile the outside observer or statesman might be to communism as such, however clearly he might have predicted its ultimate failure and rejection, his best plan here—as in the Soviet Union itself, and also in China and Yugoslavia—would have been to let it run its course, and wait patiently to encourage and help its liberalization in due time.

Again, the United States misjudged the political process in a non-European culture. Because America knew there were Vietnamese who disliked communism, had suffered from it—even, in the southward flight of refugees, sought to escape it—she assumed they would and could unite and fight for an alternative system. The Diem or Thieu regimes might have made it had they been more effectively reformist, or had they been fighting Communists of the caliber, experience and commitment of any other Communist Party in Southeast Asia—perhaps, though the comparison becomes farfetched, of any Communist Party in Western or Eastern Europe save Tito's. But against a sophisticated indigenous organization the forces of non-Communist nationalism were outmatched from the start, and no outside intervention could change this basic fact.

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True, it may now be that a decade of war with the world's strongest power has so weakened North Vietnam that an alternative to communism will be practiced for some time to come in many parts of South Vietnam. But the human and ecological costs to Vietnam of the American intervention have been completely out of relation to such a modest possible result. And the psychological factors will tell as soon as the physical aspects of U.S. support to Saigon are withdrawn. I doubt very much if we shall see any non-Communist rump of Vietnam in, say, 10 or 15 years' time. And if there had been no intervention at all, the nature of communism itself and people's attitudes toward it would in any case have altered by then.

So, it would surely have been far better for America in 1954 to have taken the Geneva accords at their somewhat cynical face value—and accepted that the North would through some form of elections take over the South after a short interval. Furthermore, I believe that an American withdrawal from Vietnam, even with the post-1954 degree of commitment, would have been the better course at each one of the later points: by Kennedy in 1961, by Johnson in 1965, by Nixon in 1969.

VI

Such conclusions are now obvious, if one looks at the welfare of Indochina alone. And I would hold to them from the wider perspective of the Southeast Asian region as a whole, and of American national interests there and elsewhere around the periphery of China in the quarter-century we are discussing. In these areas the Vietnam intervention did, of course, produce some gains—and they were appreciated throughout the area at least in the late 1960s. Time was bought for the non-Communists in other countries to consolidate themselves and to win some ascendancy over local Communist rebels. To the extent that Asia needed an alternative to communism, this was indeed a gain—though bought at too high a cost—provided only that the time so bought has been well used and not wasted in lazy inactivity or sectional aggrandizement.

Whatever the gain, it cannot be measured in Asian progress toward America's own domestic ideals—the projection of which has sometimes seemed to Asians the foremost American interest and objective. America is an unusual power, her identity resting on a piece of political dogma rather than on the ethnic and lin-

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guistic factors which are commonly the determinants of nationhood. This particular dogma assumes the equality of individual human beings, their desire to bring their environment under control, their confidence in voting each other in and out of office in order to pursue the collective interests of the majority.

Asia does not work on such premises, though it may come to do so in the future. Authority, dignity and legitimacy are more important than equality, self-improvement or dissent. After a quarter-century under an American umbrella, the Thais are only marginally more interested than before in the democratic system, and after a much longer tutelage the Filipinos have just accepted a drastic diminution of their civil liberties in exchange for a little more order and socio-economic progress.

Over and over, statements of U.S. policy in Asia have stressed the objective of allowing people to "choose" their own system. Actually, most people in Asia do not want to choose and are baffled by being asked to do so. Village self-rule means something to them, but is not usually part of the package offered them. National parliaments are meaningless without the political infrastructure of individual emancipation, economic development and the building of a genuine sense of shared nationhood. State politics are left, in the average Asian society, to the élites—the priests, the nobility, the merchants, the intellectuals.

To be sure, there have also been more limited statements of American purposes, such as that of William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, in late 1971:

> The U.S. never intended to move into East Asia with the desire of establishing a sort of permanent hegemonic influence there. We came in rather reluctantly. We came as a result of the collapse of the previous system. We came in and established a military shield behind which we helped the countries on the periphery of China to build up their independence so that they could stand on their own and make their own decisions.

It may indeed be argued that national independence rather than internal democracy was the primary goal of U.S. policy in Asia, and this squares with the American underpinning of reactionary but nationalistic régimes. But it is worth recalling Lee Kuan Yew's bitter aside, that if the Americans rather than the British had been ruling Malaysia and Singapore in the 1950s, "I would have been in jail, probably tortured and dead"—as a suspected Communist. Acceptance of Asian communism at its

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face value, as international and anti-national, prevented Americans from allowing the left wing its due weight in the nationalist movements. So the two goals, of internal anticommunism and external nondependence, became inextricably mixed up.

Yet the U.S. shield has changed neither the instinctive pattern of political behavior (deference to established authority and reluctance to express overt dissent on issues short of life-and-death ones) nor the geographical milieu (propinquity and material inferiority to China) of the smaller states of East Asia. At most, it has tided these nations over, leaving them to cope in the 1970s through their own efforts, with the American presence now to be withdrawn. As things stand, Southeast Asia is having to come to terms with both the Chinese and the Vietnamese Communists (not to mention Japan and the U.S.S.R.) all at once—and against the insistent deadline, reinforced by congressional and precinct opinion, of the Nixon Doctrine.

I recently had a discussion with a close Thai friend, a man of outstanding ability and patriotism, who does not believe his country capable of playing the neutralist game perfected by India, of playing one big power off against another, China against the United States, Japan against the Soviet Union. He is convinced that his country's leaders simply do not think that way. If America is no longer available as a big uncle, then Thailand will probably negotiate as painless a nephewship as possible with Peking —unless the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) can be built up into a strong regional grouping capable of the muscle and determination to resist satellite status.

Yet the Guam Doctrine's reliance on regional cohesion could prove unreal; certainly it has been to this point. Of course it would be in the collective interests of the smaller states of East and Southeast Asia to band together, make regional economic and security arrangements, present a united front against the big powers. But the underlying sense of common purpose is lacking on the ground, in the paddy-fields, on the factory floor, in the housing estates. Even in Europe, with its far higher level of cultural, ethnic, religious and political homogeneity, unity has come only this year after stupendous and repeatedly ignored lessons of blood and destruction. Petty nationalism defeated the early pioneers and more recent advocates of European unity and may yet defeat its engineers in their frail base in Brussels.

Much of Asia is not yet even at the nationalistic stage. For

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many parts of Indonesian, Philippine and Malaysian society, the entire historical process of nationalism remains to be gone through, while U.S. Senators and State Department officials fly through the considerably Westernized airports and Hilton Hotels urging everyone to forget their nationalistic reservations and pull together with their neighbors against their common threat.

ASEAN has indeed done better than any of its rivals, and that in part is due to the absence of any overt American initiative in its formation. It is also slightly less heterogeneous than the Asian and Pacific Council, and owes nothing to any big power in the way that the South-East Asia Treaty Organization owes to the United States and Britain, or the Ministerial Conference on South East Asian Development to Japan. Yet there is little concrete to show for ASEAN's six years of existence, apart from noncontroversial minor coöperation in telecommunications, railways and tourism, and the less tangible but more important beginnings of a habit of consulting the others before making any dramatic foreign policy changes.

ASEAN foreign ministers have steadfastly ignored recommendations by the United Nations and other economic experts for industrial specialization and limited internal tariff-cutting. They have, it is true, concerted their China policy, their trade negotiations with the European Economic Community, and some aspects of their activities in the U.N. General Assembly. And yet how fragile ASEAN really is. It would need only a change of personality in one of the five foreign ministries or of the entire administration in one of the five member-countries for it to be put in jeopardy again.

And the quarrels are just as significant as the collaboration—military distrust on the Thai-Malaysian border, conflicts of interest over the regulation of the Malacca Straits, the disputed sovereignty of Sabah, alleged Philippine repression of its Muslim minority—the list could go on and on. ASEAN follows Christianity, Buddhism and Islam; embraces Chinese, Indians, Malays and Thai; speaks English, Dutch, Malay (or Bahasa Indonesia), Spanish, Tagalog, Thai and a whole string of minority languages, not to mention Chinese in many of its varied forms. To expect a Thai leadership in Bangkok to depend on ASEAN as a substitute for the U.S. military base at Sattahip in backing up a policy of firmness toward China is to be remote from Southeast Asian realities.

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Thailand is a special case, because alone of all the present clients of the United States she shares a de facto land frontier with China and faces a not unimportant insurgency in her border areas. It does not seem so urgent in Singapore or Djakarta as it does in Bangkok to clarify one's relations with Peking. But even the smaller countries less close to China, less sensible of her potential dominance, are not going to maintain a united diplomatic front or construct a credible military alliance merely because President Nixon urges them to do so.

Yet, though the future is uncertain, the balance sheet of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia is far from wholly negative. On the ruins of discredited empire a new system has been nurtured which works, which delivers more goods to more people than ever before in the region's history, and which enjoys the possibility of continuing socio-economic change without war. The independence of the Philippines, the restraining hand exercised on the Dutch over Indonesian independence, the support for Indonesia over the West Irian question and later for the new policies of the Suharto administration—all these were enlightened actions which helped to offset the blunders of the 1950s (notably those of the CIA) and have left a residue of trust and goodwill.

But if the United States had ditched Vietnam in 1954 or in the 1960s, substituting enhanced economic, diplomatic and military support for the other small countries of Southeast Asia, I believe that this new system would be even more viable and solidly grounded than it is today. Suppose the new Asia experts of the Kennedy-Johnson administrations had not taken their stand in Vietnam, but instead allowed Ho Chi Minh to overrun Indochina? If they had so acted in the context of a general abandonment of big-power responsibilities in East Asia, in a spirit of isolationism, leaving Thailand and the others to make their best way with the Chinese, the Vietnamese and the Soviets, then history would have condemned them for their callousness.

Had they done so, however, with a tough stance on a new front line and with the latter-day Nixonian combination of entering a dialogue with China while simultaneously retaining air and naval strike capacity in East and Southeast Asia, then history would have praised their foresight and courage. (For it would have taken great courage for a Democratic

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President to "sell out" to the Communists in Indochina, even if it was a Republican predecessor who had set the trap by underestimating the force of communism in China and Vietnam and overestimating it in the rest of Asia.)

As one saw it from Asia, in the early and mid-1960s in particular, there *was* a genuine danger that the small nations of Southeast Asia would be coerced, bullied, brought within the effective control of China or the Soviet Union—and a felt need in the area for an American presence to counter that threat. Nor was it only a question of freedom from big-power bullying. President Ishak of Singapore once pointed out that if Asian problems had been left fully to Asian solutions in the 1960s, then his own state would have disappeared entirely—into Sukarno's Indonesia.

Never mind that China and the U.S.S.R. were probably less capable of expansionism than U.S. administrations imagined. There were still decision-makers in the smaller countries who saw the threat from Moscow or Peking as quite enough to justify a kow-tow. Prince Sihanouk's *cri de coeur* of late 1967 was representative of many less mercurial leaders: "As long as the Americans are [in Cambodia], China cannot yet swallow Cambodia."

Sihanouk's country, as part of Indochina, could not have been underwritten; it was never physically possible for American military force to hold there or in Laos against North Vietnamese and/or Chinese forces. Nor did the local political conditions exist. But the nations at the next line of defense, Thailand and Malaysia, could have been explicitly assured that any overt aggression from beyond their frontiers would be met by U.S. arms, while at the same time American diplomats could have sought to introduce them to a more realistic assessment of their regional situation, including a less hostile attitude toward China.

No man can say with assurance that such a course would have worked; nor can a foreigner judge whether it would have been politically possible for an American president to conduct a strategic withdrawal and still command domestic support for the kind of firmness coupled with conciliation that I have described. Conceivably such a course might, if the Communists had been so stupid as to try it, have created a "Thailand War" almost as vicious and difficult as the Vietnam War—but

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with far more solid grounds for victory and with unequivocal international support.

I am inclined to think it would not have come to that, although there might have been a period of great strain and confusion. Rather, I believe, Southeast Asia would have adjusted to the reality of its geographical position rather more smoothly, safely and gradually than it is doing today, ten years later, after all the trials of the Vietnam War.

VII

Finally, let me dwell for a moment on American idealism. Right across the Asian continent there are now thousands of U.S.-trained scholars, administrators and professional men who have carried back with them a little piece of the American dream. For Asians as well as for Europeans, the United States remains, for all its apparent divisions and deficiencies, the most potent visible proof that men can make an international society whatever their differences of race, religion or language. This pervasive influence will go on, fed now through the 50,000 Asians studying in U.S. colleges and universities.

But the idealistic role of the United States as an actor in Asia is over. Singapore's Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam, put it well recently in a speech to foreign correspondents:

> Gone for ever is the America that we in Southeast Asia once knew—the sentimental, moralistic, naïve and more often than not generous America. . . . The U.S. [has now] matured emotionally and intellectually into a great power.

And to the extent that the behavior of a great power pursuing its national interests frankly and rationally is easier to predict, Rajaratnam welcomed the change.

The danger averted by the moralistic phase of U.S. policy was that of bullying by the other big powers. Most Asians have recognized that the United States has no territorial ambitions of its own in Asia, and has sought at most a political responsibility among the smaller nations in the west Pacific in order to prevent Soviet or Chinese hegemony. This American influence has in extreme cases caused the downfall of no longer favored leaders like Diem in Vietnam, but it has never entailed the repression which we associate with Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia more recently. Quite the contrary, the trend toward authoritarianism on the part of America's allies—from

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Chiang, Sarit and Thanom to Park and Thieu—is one that has been resisted and criticized by Americans.

But just as an injection of drugs can generally weaken the patient while curing his particular condition, so the massive American intervention in East Asia, over nearly a generation, has had a heavy debit side—and not only in Vietnam. Lee Kuan Yew in 1967 put the literal, physical application of this when he described the balance of power in Asia as "too directly dependent on an American intervention on so prodigious a scale that it cannot go on indefinitely." He elaborated: "It depends so much on outside bolstering that it must become tiresome to those who have to do the bolstering, and debilitating to those being bolstered."

And in a more insidious way it has been all too easy for Americans—and their protégés in Asia—to equate resistance to potential Communist aggression with stability and progress per se. In seeking to prevent a Communist revolution the United States has sometimes taken the position of preventing revolutions of any kind, perhaps because it lacked the knowledge or intuition to tell one revolution from another, or because it has come so far from its own natal revolution. It is still possible that history will say that the United States mistook the enemy in Asia, that, in the phrase of an editorial in the London *Observer* some years ago, "America's enemy is not Communism, it is chaos."

It is sad that so many Asians, especially among the young and the less privileged, should see the U.S. role, in Senator Edward Kennedy's words, as making Asia "safe for the mandarins and landlords," or as "the leading opponent of revolutionary change." The risk of this role is reduced now that the United States is disengaging from the very intimate and detailed presence it used to have in the continent. The decisions will increasingly be made indigenously, not necessarily by a mathematical majority or by widespread popular participation, but at least by the political forces which have been produced within each country.

Americans should derive satisfaction from their part in making this process possible, and one is hopeful that they will no longer feel rejected merely because their particular model of political life is not followed. If democracy is a good system, and if it suits the genius of a country, then nothing will stop it from emerging in the long run.

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You can try to save one country from another, and there can be nothing more honorable. But it is pretty hopeless, as a complete outsider, to try to save one element within a country from another unless the indigenous odds are at least even. The United States tried to do that in China as well as in Vietnam, and in so doing weakened the support which it was giving to the forces of freedom and progress in the other countries of East Asia—not disastrously, but measurably. The smaller non-Communist countries of Asia are more independent, and feel and know themselves to be more independent, than would have been possible without the postwar American umbrella. That is the U.S. legacy to the region. Future generations of Asians will doubtless express gratitude for it even while they observe that its benefits could have been richer and speedier without the tragic mistakes over China and Vietnam.

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General: Political and Legal

THE FELLOW-TRAVELLERS: A POSTSCRIPT TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT. By David Caute. New York: Macmillan, 1973, 433 pp. $8.95.

Once again David Caute demonstrates his mastery of twentieth-century radicalism. This is a fascinating account of those intellectuals still seeking the Enlightenment ideal of the rational and just society who condemned the West and excused the evils committed by Stalin and others while never fully committing themselves to communism.

THE NUREMBERG FALLACY: WARS AND WAR CRIMES SINCE WORLD WAR II. By Eugene Davidson. New York: Macmillan, 1973, 331 pp. $9.95.

To answer the question why the U.N. and Nuremberg doctrines have not kept the peace, the author concludes that human aspirations to outlaw aggressive war violate the fundamental human instinct for survival. He applies this thesis to such contemporary conflicts as the Middle East, Vietnam and Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe.

INTERNATIONAL CRISES: INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH. Edited by Charles F. Hermann. New York: Free Press, 1972, 334 pp. $12.95.

A well-orchestrated symposium on international crises, and a landmark study in the multidisciplinary and behavioral approaches to the subject. Heavy on methodology and statistics, and frequently jargon-ridden, this study illustrates both the strengths and limitations of the behavioral approach to international relations.

THE ORIGINS OF PEACE: A STUDY OF PEACEMAKING AND THE STRUCTURE OF PEACE SETTLEMENTS. By Robert F. Randle. New York: Free Press, 1973, 550 pp. $12.95.

An original and valuable comparative analysis of types of wars and peace settlements over the past 500 years. A major theme is that peace settlements form the constitutions of state systems. Good bibliography.

THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE: DECISION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. By Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson and others. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, 497 pp. $15.00.

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Utilizing a common format, the editors and contributors to this symposium have produced a well-integrated volume on several of the important functional international organizations—ITU, ILO, UNESCO, WHO, IAEA, IMF, GATT and UNCTAD.

CONVERSATIONS WITH THE BEWILDERED. By Eugen Loebl. Cambridge: Schenkman, 1972, 192 pp. (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, distributor, $5.95; paper, $2.95).

Advice from the disillusioned Old Left to the inexperienced New Left. Loebl, once one of Czechoslovakia's leading Marxists, calls for a new socialist humanism.

SOCIAL HIERARCHIES: 1450 TO THE PRESENT. By Roland Mousnier. New York: Schocken Books, 1973, 206 pp. $9.00.

Yet another book by a Frenchman on the subject of technocracy. Arguing that social order rather than class or caste is the principal form of social organization, Mousnier concludes that mankind has only two choices: technocratic authoritarianism or equalitarian inefficiency.

THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR: GREAT POWER RIVALRY AND GERMAN WAR AIMS. Edited by H. W. Koch. New York: Taplinger, 1972, 374 pp. $3.95 (Paper).

An intellectually stimulating symposium devoted to Fritz Fischer's now classic revisionist analysis of Germany's war aims and responsibility for the First World War which has profoundly altered contemporary German diplomatic history.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

WAR AND POLITICS. By Bernard Brodie. New York: Macmillan, 1973, 514 pp. $8.95.

An erudite, philosophical and wisdom-filled work, as might be expected from one of the doyens of American strategic thought. Most of the text is new, including two chapters on the Vietnam War.

COLD DAWN: THE STORY OF SALT. By John Newhouse. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973, 302 pp. $7.95.

A *tour de force* of contemporary history, blending inside information from interviews with a solid understanding and presentation of the issues. The specialist and the layman will profit equally. Almost inevitably, the account is focused heavily on Washington's struggles, with little light on the parallel struggles that must have been going on in Moscow or on the subtle and still-concealed process of the discussions in Helsinki and Vienna.

SALT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS. Edited by Morton A. Kaplan. Morristown (N.J.): General Learning Press, 1973, 251 pp. $5.95.

SALT: IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL IN THE 1970s. Edited by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973, 447 pp. $11.95.

Two informed and informative works, in which the authors emphasize the foreign policy and political aspects of SALT rather than the technical details. Although some of the material was written before the May 1972 SALT I agreement, both books remain highly relevant to the next phase of the negotiations.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE ATLANTIC SYSTEM. Edited by William T. R. Fox and Warner R. Schilling. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, 276 pp. $10.00.

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Seven essays by as many authors, including Klaus Knorr, Annette Baker Fox and Andrew J. Pierre, on arms control in Europe. The emphasis is on Western Europe, the United States and differing national perspectives rather than the problems of European security as seen from the East.

WESTEUROPAISCHE VERTEIDIGUNGSKOOPERATION. Munich: Oldenbourg (for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), 1972, 256 pp. DM. 33.

A usefully detailed examination, from a West German perspective, of the opportunities and pitfalls of European defense coöperation—in both nuclear weapons and conventional armaments.

A FAREWELL TO ARMS CONTROL? By Elizabeth Young. Baltimore: Penguin, 1972, 255 pp. $2.25 (Paper).

A highly personal and only partially satisfactory history of the nuclear policies of the five atomic powers. The British author emphasizes the role of intellectual fashions, especially in the United States, and concludes that the arms race is not about to end.

THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN POLITICS. By James Clotfelter. New York: Harper and Row, 1973, 244 pp. $2.95 (Paper).

THE TARNISHED SHIELD: A REPORT ON TODAY'S ARMY. By Colonel George Walton. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1973, 274 pp. $7.95.

THE MODERN MILITARY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY. By Charles Walton Ackley. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972, 400 pp. $10.95.

Three books which attest to the fact that the U.S. military establishment is in a period of trial and transition in the wake of Vietnam, rising defense budgets and the adoption of the all-volunteer armed forces concept. More explicit in their diagnosis than in their prescription.

BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY EAST OF SUEZ, 1947–1968. By Phillip Darby. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1973, 366 pp. $21.00.

An admirably scholarly survey and analysis of the military adjustments to empire devolution. Critical of the Whitehall assessments of British interests east of Suez, the author finds the defense arrangements for maintaining a world role inconsistent with the stated policy of decolonization.

LA GUERRE REVOLUTIONNAIRE: LES FORMES NOUVELLES DE LA GUERRE. By Général Beaufre. Paris: Fayard, 1972, 305 pp. Fr. 32.

General Beaufre examines the theory of revolutionary war, giving particular importance to psychological factors, and then demonstrates how it has been applied, from the Middle Ages to the present.

CODEWORD BARBAROSSA. By Barton Whaley. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973, 376 pp. $10.00.

ENEMY AT THE GATES: THE BATTLE FOR STALINGRAD. By William Craig. New York: Reader's Digest Press/Dutton, 1973, 457 pp. $10.95.

The onset and the climax of the German invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II. Whaley's book is analytical, examining the role of warnings and the art of surprise in the year preceding the German attack of June 22, 1941. Craig's volume is in the tradition of epic history.

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General: Economic and Social

POWER AND WEALTH: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL POWER. By Klaus Knorr. New York: Basic Books, 1973, 210 pp. $7.95.

Ancient questions neatly and systematically analyzed by a veteran scholar with a firm grasp of both economics and politics. The first volume in a promising new series, "The Political Economy of International Relations."

DER DRITTE WEG. By Ota Šik. Hamburg: Hoffmann and Campe, 1972, 450 pp. DM. 38.

A well-argued critique of Marxist theory, and some practice, makes up most of this book. The eminent Czech reformer, now in exile in Switzerland, also sketches the main features of "the third way," a democratic, participatory market socialism with Jeffersonian overtones.

INFLATION AS A GLOBAL PROBLEM. Edited by Randall Hinshaw. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972, 163 pp. $8.50.

Professor Hinshaw demonstrates once again that a well-edited report of a discussion among major authorities is one of the best ways of treating a complex, multifaceted subject.

HUMAN RESOURCES AS THE WEALTH OF NATIONS. By Frederick H. Harbison. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973, 173 pp. $6.50 (Paper, $2.50).

One of the leading thinkers on education and manpower policy for developing countries relates experience in those fields to the current concern about employment. Making clear the difficulties of a policy of maximizing human development, he disagrees with the fashionable tendency to see this approach as incompatible with efforts to increase GNP.

DISSENT ON DEVELOPMENT. By P. T. Bauer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, 550 pp. $15.00.

THE FRONTIERS OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES. By Paul Streeten. New York: Halsted/Wiley, 1972, 498 pp. $17.95.

A champion of liberalism and the market, Bauer has long been a sharp critic of planning, foreign aid and other major development orthodoxies. Streeten, far friendlier to controls and manipulation, has long chided Western economists for their failure to take adequate account of differences in societies and cultures. The reprinted essays of these two British economists make a pair of stimulating volumes.

TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. By Rutherford M. Poats. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1972, 255 pp. $7.50.

INDUCING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Robert A. Solo and Everett M. Rogers. Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1972, 238 pp. $8.50.

An experienced aid administrator, Poats sees a "renaissance in technical assistance" and suggests how it ought to be organized to make more use of U.S. nongovernmental talents. The second volume contains some very interesting papers on the diffusion of technology in a variety of circumstances.

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THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: AGENDA FOR ACTION, 1973. By Robert E. Hunter and others. Washington: Overseas Development Council, 1973, 163 pp. $2.50 (Paper).

Substantial and succinct papers on a wide range of subjects, from old issues—aid, trade, investment, population, security—to newer ones—environment, energy and oceans. There are useful statistical annexes.

THE MIGRATION OF WORKERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. By W. R. Böhning. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1972, 167 pp. $10.25.

An excellent, tightly packed and highly informative analysis of what appears to be a lasting feature of Western Europe's economy—foreign workers.

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN FOREIGN TRADE, 1946–1969: STATISTICAL COMPENDIUM AND GUIDE. By Paul Marer. Computer programs by Gary J. Eubanks. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972, 408 pp. $15.00.

A major source of otherwise unobtainable trade data about Eastern Europe.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND JAPAN. Edited by Robert J. Ballon and Eugene H. Lee. Tokyo: Sophia University in coöperation with Kodansha International, 1972, 340 pp. (New York: Harper and Row, distributor, $12.50).

Something of a "how-to" book about joint ventures in Japan, with some interesting accounts of Japan's own foreign investment.

The United States

WITNESS TO HISTORY, 1929–1969. By Charles E. Bohlen. New York: Norton, 1973, 562 pp. $12.50.

The title is modest. "Chip" Bohlen, to a degree equaled only by his friend George Kennan, helped shape American policy toward the Soviet Union from 1933 until the recent past. His memoirs are less subjective than Kennan's, but they are direct and informative. The author indicates when and why he disagreed with American policy.

THE RETREAT OF AMERICAN POWER. By Henry Brandon. Garden City: Doubleday, 1973, 368 pp. $8.95.

The long-standing correspondent of the London *Sunday Times,* Mr. Brandon has drawn on his deep knowledge of American affairs and many confidential contacts to write a very informative book of contemporary history. He does not let Vietnam blind him to the significance of other areas and problems.

KISSINGER: PORTRAIT OF A MIND. By Stephen R. Graubard. New York: Norton, 1973, 288 pp. $7.95.

A rigorous, admiring and clarifying analysis of Kissinger's books and articles, 1954–1969. The author, a close associate of his subject in the 1950s, eschews gossip and sticks to ideas.

NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, 1918–1971: FROM THE PAPERS OF ADOLF A. BERLE. Edited by Beatrice Bishop Berle and Travis Beal Jacobs. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973, 859 pp. $18.50.

Berle (1895–1971), intellectual and man of action, was *inter alia,* Assistant Secretary of State from 1938 to 1944 and a special adviser on Latin America in the Kennedy administration. The book, composed mostly of his diary, is filled with information, acute observation, and vigorous opinion—a major source for political and diplomatic history and a self-portrait of an extraordinary man.

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THE PAPERS OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON. VOLUME II: WASHINGTON TO SPRINGFIELD, 1941–1948. Edited by Walter Johnson and Carol Evans. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973, 620 pp. $15.00.

This volume covers most notably Stevenson's work as assistant to the Secretary of the Navy (1941–1943), and in the Department of State with responsibilities focused on the newborn United Nations (1945–1947). With six volumes to come, the Stevenson papers are already a primary historical source.

DOROTHY THOMPSON: A LEGEND IN HER TIME. By Marion K. Sanders. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973, 428 pp. $10.00.

An intimate biography of the incomparable foreign correspondent and columnist. Excellent for evoking the atmosphere of high politics and journalism in Europe between the wars.

THE STORM HAS MANY EYES: A PERSONAL NARRATIVE. By Henry Cabot Lodge. New York: Norton, 1973, 272 pp. $7.50.

Not a major memoir, but rather a collection of anecdotal, always discreet, and often entertaining essays on episodes in the author's long career.

"DOKTRINA NIKSONA." By G. A. Arbatov and others. Moscow: Nauka, 1972, 231 pp.

A group of experts from the Institute of the U.S.A. examine the Nixon Doctrine in its global aspects, relation to U.S. internal affairs, and application in the major regions of the world.

REPUBLIQUE IMPERIALE: LES ETATS-UNIS DANS LE MONDE, 1945–1972. By Raymond Aron. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1973, 338 pp. Fr. 30.

A sophisticated and sympathetic analysis by a distinguished scholar, especially illuminating on economic issues.

GOOD-BYE AMERIKA—WAS DANN? By Walther Leisler Kiep. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1972, 229 pp. DM. 19.80.

A leader of the Christian Democratic Party reflects soberly on West Germany's future in an era when the old alliance and complementary economic relations with the United States have eroded.

THE MYTH OF LIBERATION: EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE IN U.S. DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS SINCE 1941. By Bennett Kovrig. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973, 360 pp. $11.50.

Kovrig succeeds in describing confusion with clarity and in separating rhetoric from reality. A fine survey and critique.

THE NEW LEFT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR. By Robert James Maddox. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, 169 pp. $7.95.

The author examines selections from the writings of William Appleman Williams, D. F. Fleming, Gar Alperovitz, David Horowitz, Gabriel Kolko, Diane Shaver Clemens and Lloyd C. Gardner, and convicts them of "history by irrelevant evidence, misused quotations, jumbled figures, and distortions of documentary material." A combative book, but one to be reckoned with.

POSTWAR AMERICA: 1945–1971. By Howard Zinn. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973, 278 pp. $5.95.

An emotional, grimly poetic and unrelieved indictment of the United States as a land of violence and repression.

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AFTER YALTA. By Lisle A. Rose. New York: Scribners, 1973, 216 pp. $7.95.

The author, a counterrevisionist in full cry, reviews the familiar events of 1945–1946. He exonerates Truman, not of all mistakes, but of a deliberate design to provoke conflict with the Soviet Union.

NEWS FROM NOWHERE: TELEVISION AND THE NEWS. By Edward Jay Epstein. New York: Random House, 1973, 321 pp. $7.95.

An informative study based on extensive original research into "the processes by which news is gathered, synthesized, and presented."

The Western Hemisphere

THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT: ELEVEN CASE STUDIES. Edited by Richard A. Preston. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1972, 269 pp. $7.75.

An uneven but often original potpourri—including studies of the U.S. impact on aspects of Canadian scholarship, labor, literature, language, politics and the economy.

LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES. By Robert J. Alexander. New York: Praeger, 1973, 537 pp. $28.50.

A broad description by a prolific Latin Americanist, covering both historical and contemporary phenomena of all the important political party structures in the region.

POLITICS AND PLANNERS: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. By Gary W. Wynia. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972, 227 pp. $15.00.

The role of the *técnicos* in relation to the Central American Common Market and regional development in the Isthmus area, their successes and failures, receives fuller treatment here than has been accorded elsewhere.

SMALL EARTHQUAKE IN CHILE: ALLENDE'S SOUTH AMERICA. By Alistair Horne. New York: Viking, 1972, 349 pp. $12.50.

WE MUST MAKE HASTE—SLOWLY: THE PROCESS OF REVOLUTION IN CHILE. By David J. Morris. New York: Random House, 1973, 307 pp. $8.95 (Paper, $2.95).

PEASANTS IN REVOLT: A CHILEAN CASE STUDY, 1965–1971. By James Petras and Hugo Zemelman Merino. Austin: University of Texas Press (for the Institute of Latin American Studies), 1972, 154 pp. $6.50.

Three more additions to the swelling wave of studies of the Andes and Chile since Allende, each in a sense characteristic of one type of approach to the traumatic upheaval. The Horne volume presents a relatively balanced and colorful account by a keen observer, marked by firsthand intimacy; Morris contributes a traditional general appraisal that is partial to the Allende goals; Petras and Merino offer sociological analysis.

CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN VENEZUELA. By Daniel H. Levine. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, 285 pp. $13.00.

The author traces an interesting development—the emergence of broadly based political parties with continuing structures and loyalties and their role in defining and regulating political life.

THE VIRGIN ISLANDS. By Gordon K. Lewis. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, 382 pp. $12.00.

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A Caribbean scholar noted for the detailed intensity of his research turns his omnivorous scrutiny upon a neglected area. The work stresses the northern European capitalistic heritage of the islands and the hope that their Creole identity will be understood and accepted.

LABOUR RELATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT IN COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES. By Zin Henry. Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: Columbus Publishers, 1972, 283 pp. (Paper).

The subject of this meritorious study is important, among other reasons, because of the intimate connection between the labor-union movement and the political process in the Commonwealth Caribbean.

THE ERA OF TRUJILLO: DOMINICAN DICTATOR. By Jesús de Galíndez. Edited by Russell H. Fitzgibbon. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1973, 298 pp. $8.95 (Paper, $4.50).

The first appearance in English, in commercial format, of this famous study associated with the kidnapping and presumed murder of Galíndez. Competently edited, this version restores the source documentation largely omitted in the Spanish editions, condenses and, to an extent, rearranges the narrative material.

Western Europe

EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: THE FUTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP. By Karl Kaiser. Washington: Columbia Books, 1973, 146 pp. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $3.95; paper, $2.50).

This policy paper, reflecting the discussions of a series of conferences held in Europe and the United States in 1972, succinctly sets forth a European position on the restructuring of Atlantic relations and international politics in the years immediately ahead.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN PERSPECTIVE. By Gerhard Mally. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books (for the Atlantic Council of the United States), 1973, 349 pp. $12.50.

An excellently drawn perspective—clear, comprehensive, neither hesitant in its assessments nor perfunctory in viewing the prospects, all neatly placed in a theoretical framework of political integration.

THE HEART OF THE BATTLE . . . FOR A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT. By Edgar Faure. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972, 255 pp. $8.95.

Whether or not the former French Premier has drawn up an adequate new social contract, the reader will admire his skill in grappling with Marxism and the post-Marxian critiques of technological and consumer society, his prescriptions for "dis-alienating" man, and his suggestions for combatting the entropy of political democracy.

LA ROSE AU POING. By François Mitterrand. Paris: Flammarion, 1973, 223 pp. Fr. 16.

The veteran French Socialist leader argues (with verve and éclat if not always with astuteness) for alliance with the Communists in implementing a common reform program of the Left and replacing capitalism with a collectivist society that will assure personal liberty.

L'ALTERNATIVE. By Roger Garaudy. Paris: Laffont, 1972, 251 pp. Fr. 14.

The alternative (to both the jungle laws of capitalism, however refined, and to

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neo-Stalinist bureaucratic centralism) that Garaudy sketches is "Socialist self-management," to be initiated by a general strike of workers, intellectuals and those in the tertiary sector, in order to institute the "great social, political and cultural mutation that will put at the service of man the gigantic productive forces" of society.

EUROPE: THE RADICAL CHALLENGE. By Hugh Thomas. New York: Harper and Row, 1973, 211 pp. $8.50.

An elegant contribution to the debate over Britain's entry into the Common Market, investigating the immense range of opportunities for substantial change thus presented. Professor Thomas' stance is that of the social democrat, modified by the insight and perspective of the historian; the result is a balanced, lucid brief.

DIPLOMACY AND PERSUASION: HOW BRITAIN JOINED THE COMMON MARKET. By Uwe Kitzinger. London: Thames and Hudson, 1973, 432 pp. (Levittown, N.Y.: Transatlantic Arts, distributor, $12.00).

An engrossing and exemplary work of contemporary history, covering the diplomacy of Britain's negotiations in 1970–1972 to join the European Communities and the domestic politics whereby Parliament made that accession legally possible.

DEUTSCHE GESCHICHTE SEIT DEM ERSTEN WELTKRIEG. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1971, 1973, 2 v. DM. 60 each.

In these two hefty volumes, six colleagues at the Institute for Contemporary History present separate book-length studies of the Weimar Republic, inter-war European international relations, Hitler's Third Reich, the Second World War, Germany divided, and the development of the German economy since 1918—accounts which are balanced, coördinated and well-written.

ENGLAND UND DAS DRITTE REICH. By Oswald Hauser. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1972, 317 pp. DM. 38.

This first of a two-volume study of Britain's policy of appeasement, covering the years 1933–1936, provides fuller insight (from Cabinet and Foreign Office minutes) into a policy that was as much "realistic" choice as "optimistic" drift.

HELMUTH VON MOLTKE: A LEADER AGAINST HITLER. By Michael Balfour and Julian Frisby. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973, 388 pp. $16.95.

Von Moltke's opposition took the form of mitigating the evils of Nazism (insofar as he could), keeping alive a regard for international law and planning for what was to come after Germany's defeat. Based largely on his letters, this objective book is an engrossing glimpse of wartime Germany and the portrait of a truly good man.

THE REBIRTH OF ITALY, 1943–50. Edited by S. J. Woolf. New York: Humanities Press, 1972, 264 pp. $9.50.

An excellent collection of essays on the transition from fascism to a capitalist, parliamentary democracy—more rewarding than most symposia because of the expertness of the contributors and the briefness of the period treated.

A PIECE OF TRUTH. By Amalia Fleming. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973, 257 pp. $6.95.

JOURNAL OF RESISTANCE. By Mikis Theodorakis. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1973, 334 pp. $8.95.

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Two prominent Greeks render moving accounts of their recent imprisonments. Though the complexities of Greek politics remain confusing, the inhumanity of the Colonels' regime is here made sickeningly clear.

MEMORIES OF A MOUNTAIN WAR. GREECE: 1944–1949. By Kenneth Matthews. London: Longman, 1972, 284 pp. £3.50.

Vignettes of firsthand vividness, honesty and perceptive empathy by a BBC correspondent place the Greek Civil War in a long and clear perspective that any historian would be proud to have achieved.

HALF OF SPAIN DIED: A REAPPRAISAL OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. By Herbert L. Matthews. New York: Scribners, 1973, 276 pp. $10.00.

As writings on the Spanish Civil War acquire the remoteness of the historian's "objectivity," it is useful to have the recollected immediacy of one who was there throughout as correspondent for *The New York Times*.

LE PORTUGAL BAILLONNE: UN TEMOIGNAGE. By Mário Soares. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1972, 314 pp. Fr. 25.10.

This understated autobiography by the foremost Portuguese socialist is both an objective history of the opposition to Salazar and his continuing system and, as the title states, "witness" for a muzzled nation. Measure and reasonableness mark this a document of prime importance.

DIPLOMAT. By Gunnar Hagglof. London: Bodley Head, 1972, 221 pp. £2.50.

Delightful memoirs of the distinguished Swedish diplomat who played a crucial part in Sweden's policy of neutrality during the Second World War. Strongly anti-Nazi himself, Hagglof's story provides a valuable account of Sweden's role in the war.

SICHERHEIT AUF FINNISCH: FINNLAND UND DIE SOWJETUNION. By Nils Ørvik. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1972, 210 pp. DM. 12.

A probing study of the interaction of Finland's neutrality and its Treaty of Friendship and Coöperation with the Soviet Union, which details the effects on Finland's security and defense, economic relations and domestic politics as well as the implications for Scandinavia and other European countries.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

THE SOVIET UNION IN WORLD AFFAIRS: A DOCUMENTED ANALYSIS, 1964–1972. By W. W. Kulski. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1973, 526 pp. $17.50 (Paper, $5.95).

An indefatigable writer on Soviet foreign policy examines the developments of the post-Khrushchev period. Summarizing and commenting on a large quantity of published Soviet material, he pays particular attention to the writings of the increasingly prominent specialists in academic institutes.

SOVIET STRATEGY—SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING SOVIET POLICY-MAKING. By C. G. Jacobsen. Glascow: MacLehose/The University Press, 1972, 236 pp. £4.75/$12.50.

Expert inquiry and some old and new interpretations in a field that has already attracted much attention from Western officials and scholars.

RELIGION AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1945–1970. By William C. Fletcher. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of In-

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ternational Affairs), 1973, 179 pp. $11.25.

A welcome, though rather general and uneven "initial attempt" by an author with special knowledge to deal with a difficult, elusive and neglected subject.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY. By Mose L. Harvey, Leon Gouré and Vladimir Prokofieff. Coral Gables (Fla.): Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1972, 219 pp. $5.95 (Paper, $4.95).

A convenient summary and analysis based on Soviet public statements, especially timely at a point when the transfer of technology is assuming a prominent place in Soviet-American relations.

THE ANGLO-SOVIET ACCORD. By Richard H. Ullman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, 509 pp. $17.50 (Paper, $9.50).

This third and final volume of a detailed survey of British policy toward Russia in the period 1917–1921 deals with the events of the years 1920–1921 leading to the trade agreement and de facto British recognition of Russia. The author makes masterful use of his material to present a full background of Lloyd George's statecraft.

THE BERLIN CRISIS OF 1961: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN THE KREMLIN, JUNE–NOVEMBER 1961. By Robert M. Slusser. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973, 509 pp. $17.50 (Paper, $8.50).

In this day-by-day account the author goes a long way toward showing that respectable recent history of international relations, even on such a subject as Soviet policy-making, can be written without access to the secret documents. A real contribution to our understanding of the Khrushchev era.

SOTSIALIZM I OSVOBODIVSHIESIA STRANY. By R. A. Ul'ianovskii. Moscow: Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury, 1972, 557 pp.

A politically authoritative writer gives the current interpretation of Leninist theory on socialism, national liberation and the noncapitalist path, with specific attention to such questions as agrarian reform and economic independence in Asian countries.

EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT: DAS EUROPAISCHE STAATENSYSTEM IN DER SOWJETISCHEN AUSSENPOLITIK, 1966–1972. By Gerhard Wettig. Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1972, 213 pp. DM. 28.

A thorough exposition of Soviet proposals, aims and tactics on the question of European security, with a consideration of alternatives for the West.

THE SOVIET UNION IN ASIA. By Geoffrey Jukes. Berkeley: University of California Press (for the Australian Institute of International Affairs), 1973, 304 pp. $8.75.

General but systematic and informative treatment of the military, political and economic factors in Soviet policy toward Asian countries, Communist and non-Communist.

JUDENRAT: THE JEWISH COUNCILS IN EASTERN EUROPE UNDER NAZI OCCUPATION. By Isaiah Trunk. New York: Macmillan, 1972, 664 pp. $14.95.

A painstaking inquiry into the role of the Councils through which the Nazis applied their solutions to "the Jewish problem." Facing forthrightly the moral and

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other questions this subject has raised, the author concludes that Jewish participation or nonparticipation in the deportations had no substantial influence on the final outcome of the holocaust.

POLEN NACH DEM STURZ GOMULKAS. By Harald Laeuen. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1972, 260 pp. DM. 16.

An informed and sympathetic account of the first year of Gierek's rule. Most of it deals with internal affairs but the final two chapters touch on Eastern Europe and on policy toward Germany.

REFORM RULE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE DUBCEK ERA 1968–1969. By Galia Golan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973, 327 pp. $18.50.

This second of the author's books on the reform movement describes the events and controversies of Dubček's period as First Secretary of the Communist Party both before and after the Soviet invasion. Its wide range of contemporary press material is its principal merit.

MEMOIR OF A REVOLUTIONARY. By Milovan Djilas. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973, 402 pp. $12.00.

However one may judge Djilas as a philosopher or a political figure, his skill in portraying his native land and his own extraordinary career is unique. This volume continues the story begun in *Land Without Justice,* from his arrival in Belgrade as a student in 1929 to the coming of war to Yugoslavia in 1941.

TITO, MIHAILOVIC AND THE ALLIES, 1941–1945. By Walter R. Roberts. New Brunswick (N.J.): Rutgers University Press, 1973, 406 pp. $15.00.

The best comprehensive book to date on the subject, and especially on American policy or lack of policy.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY: THE YUGOSLAV CASE, 1945–1953. By A. Ross Johnson. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972, 269 pp. $15.00.

One of the many merits of this careful analysis of Yugoslav ideology, against the background of the relationship with the Soviet Union, is the attention given to the statements and undercurrents of the period from 1945 to 1948.

REVOLUTION ADMINISTERED: AGRARIANISM AND COMMUNISM IN BULGARIA. By Nissan Oren. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973, 204 pp. $8.50 (Paper, $4.00).

A stimulating discussion of Bulgaria's internal and external politics, particularly the relationship with the Soviet Union, by a scholar who already has an excellent study of the Bulgarian Communist Party to his credit.

The Middle East and North Africa

REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER CASE STUDIES. Edited by P. J. Vatikiotis. Totowa (N.J.): Rowman and Littlefield, 1972, 231 pp. $10.00.

Thoughtful essays by well-known experts exploring a number of theoretical and practical questions on revolution in several Middle Eastern countries, with comparative discussions of revolutions in Eastern Europe, Latin America and China.

ARAB POLITICS IN THE SOVIET MIRROR. By Aryeh Yodfat. Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press/New York: Halsted Press, 1973, 332 pp. $17.50.

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An Israeli scholar's chronicle of Soviet interpretations of the Arab scene, based on a comprehensive survey of the published record. He is sharp to note and record changes in attitude and differences in appraisal.

PALESTINE PAPERS, 1917–1922: SEEDS OF CONFLICT. Compiled and annotated by Doreen Ingrams. New York: Braziller, 1973, 198 pp. $6.95.

The documentary record, in well-selected and annotated excerpts from Cabinet and other papers now available, of the origins and circumstances of the Balfour Declaration and the early years of British policy in Palestine.

THE POLITICS OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM. By William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber and Ann Mosely Lesch. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973, 234 pp. $6.95.

These able young scholars present original individual studies on the unrealized attempts of Arab Palestinians, leaders and people, to achieve political goals from the beginning of the mandate to the aftermath of the Six-Day War.

THE FACE OF DEFEAT: PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND GUERRILLAS. By David Pryce-Jones. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973, 179 pp. $5.95.

A journalist who has previously written perceptively on Israeli society gives his sympathetic impressions of the frustrations of the dispossessed Arabs of Palestine.

SYRIA UNDER THE BA'TH 1963–66: THE ARMY-PARTY SYMBIOSIS. By Itamar Rabinovich. Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press/New York: Halsted Press, 1972, 276 pp. $15.50.

This well-documented account dispels much of the confusion about what happened to the country, the party and the military during the first factious years of Ba'th rule.

THE ARABIAN PENINSULA: SOCIETY AND POLITICS. Edited by Derek Hopwood. Totowa (N.J.): Rowman and Littlefield, 1972, 320 pp. $11.50.

A collection of essays of generally high quality, some historical (R. M. Burrell's contribution on the Persian Gulf deserves special mention) and some contemporary.

ARABS AND BERBERS: FROM TRIBE TO NATION IN NORTH AFRICA. Edited by Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud. Lexington, (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1972, 448 pp. $15.00.

A series of contributions on society and politics in the Maghreb, especially significant for new evaluations of the Berbers' role.

South and Southeast Asia

PAKISTAN: FAILURE IN NATIONAL INTEGRATION. By Rounaq Jahan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, 248 pp. $12.50.

Many social scientists see economic development as more urgent than political development. In this postmortem on Ayub Khan's Pakistan, economic growth did not unite but divided; nationhood, long denied, required war and revolution to bring it to birth.

MASSACRE. By Robert Payne. New York: Macmillan, 1973, 168 pp. $5.95.

Novelist and biographer Payne turns his considerable talents to a history of the tragic birth of Bangladesh and an analysis of the general phenomenon of mass

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slaughter. He is successful in the first effort, but in the second fails to make sense of the spectacle of institutionalized evil.

THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA, PAKISTAN, BANGLADESH. By W. Norman Brown. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, 462 pp. $16.00.

The third edition of a classic text (last published in 1962 as *The United States and India and Pakistan*), revised and expanded to encompass events of the past decade and the current situation in the subcontinent.

AMERICANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE ROOTS OF COMMITMENT. By Russell H. Fifield. New York: Crowell, 1973, 417 pp. $10.00.

Careful, uniquely comprehensive and balanced, with full use of the flood of recent material. The focus is on the period through "the watershed of 1954," and the treatment of the 1960s is brief and almost without interpretation.

MY WAR WITH THE CIA: THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK. By Norodom Sihanouk, as related to Wilfred Burchett. New York: Pantheon, 1973, 271 pp. $7.95.

Prince Sihanouk, at this writing leader of a Cambodian government-in-exile, tells a story of family rivalries, great-power imperialisms and intelligence skulduggeries. A grim tale, and a cautionary one for American policy-makers and those who must deal with them.

CAMBODIA IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN WAR. By Malcolm Caldwell and Lek Tan. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973, 446 pp. $15.00.

Recent history of Cambodia written from a pro-Sihanouk and anti-U.S. position. The authors concur with President Nixon that Cambodia represents a test case of the Nixon Doctrine. However, they suggest that the Doctrine is seriously flawed and that the test may prove unsuccessful.

NOTES OF A WITNESS: LAOS AND THE SECOND INDOCHINESE WAR. By Marek Thee. New York: Random House, 1973, 435 pp. $12.50 (Paper, $2.95).

The author, Polish delegate to the ICSC in Laos in 1956–1957 and 1961–1963, gives a vivid picture of the development of the power struggle in the serio-comic Laotian setting. Here, as elsewhere, he argues, the tail of local politics wags the dog of great-power strategy.

East Asia and the Pacific

THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTE. By Tai Sung An. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973, 254 pp. $8.95.

This dispute presents perhaps the most serious danger to world peace for the next decade—one that offers the strategic thinkers of both countries the possibility of the most appealing gains or most appalling losses. An's careful analysis, however, estimates the chances of war at no better than one in ten, and the horrific prospects he presents could deter hawks on both sides.

CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES. Edited by Jerome Alan Cohen. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, 417 pp. $15.00.

Aspects of Chinese foreign policy involving international law—notably disputes with Russia, Japan and India, as well as cases dealing with foreign diplomats and foreign organizations. Cohen and his collaborators conclude that China's approach to the law, like that of other countries, is pragmatic, not principled.

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TO PEKING—AND BEYOND: A REPORT ON THE NEW ASIA. By Harrison E. Salisbury. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973, 308 pp. $7.95.

A spicy meal from Sinophile Salisbury, mingling fat lumps of fact with juicy shreds of speculation on the new China. Possibilities for the future: one out of three humans Chinese in three decades; the Soviet Union broken up; a Sino-Japanese alliance. Hard to put down.

STRANGER IN CHINA. By Colin McCullough. New York: Morrow, 1973, 292 pp. $8.95.

One of the few sources of English-language reporting out of China during the Cultural Revolution was the Toronto *Globe and Mail*. The reporter who wrote those dispatches here shows his good eye for local color as well as his good ear for the telling anecdote.

EVERY FIFTH CHILD: THE POPULATION OF CHINA. By Leo A. Orleans. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972, 191 pp. $8.50.

Careful sifting of available evidence leads the author to enter a figure of approximately 800 million in the China population sweepstakes. He suggests that Chinese agriculture can feed this number; that population pressure will not be a motive for expansion; and that the ratio of Chinese to the world population total is not growing but declining.

BUDDHISM UNDER MAO. By Holmes Welch. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, 666 pp. $16.00.

The third volume of a weighty trilogy, detailing one more version of the conflict between God and Caesar. Religions try to capture and use the state; states try to capture and use religion. All the complex, farcical and important consequences of this struggle in the Chinese setting are touched on.

DISCORD IN THE PACIFIC: CHALLENGES TO THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN ALLIANCE. Edited by Henry Rosovsky. Washington: Columbia Books (for the American Assembly, Columbia University), 1972, 251 pp. $3.00 (Paper).

Papers from the third Japanese-American Assembly (Summer 1972) which reflect and analyze the uneasy uncertainty contingent upon the altered relationship of the two nations. They range from the magnificent to the mediocre.

COMMUNISM IN KOREA. PART I: THE MOVEMENT. PART II: THE SOCIETY. By Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 1,533 pp. (in 2 pts.). I, $25.00; II, $30.00.

A relentlessly thorough analysis of the history and current functioning of the North Korean state. The authors find that traditional Korean society has offered particularly fertile soil for a highly coercive and ideological modernizing bureaucracy.

THE CRISIS OF LOYALTY: A STUDY OF AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Bruce Grant. Sydney: Angus and Robertson (in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs), 1972, 107 pp. A$3.25 (Paper, A$2.50).

The "loyalty" in crisis is the docile eagerness to deserve American protection which has been the theme of Australian diplomacy since the 1940s. Grant urges a new self-definition, a new concept of national interest—a nation no longer satellite and a policy no longer provincial.

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NO NEUTRAL GROUND. By Joel Carlson. New York: Crowell, 1973, 382 pp. $8.95.

An extraordinary casebook demonstration of the progressive manipulation of the South African judicial process to further the economic discrimination and political repression integral to the apartheid system, by the exiled South African lawyer. It is also a compelling series of human and legal adventures in which, until the end, good is able to triumph over evil—though never to change the system.

A SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE OF SOUTH AFRICA. By William Redman Duggan. New York: Praeger, 1973, 181 pp. $15.00.

An excellent handbook on South Africa and a persuasive argument for the point of view of the author, an ex-Foreign Service officer and Africa specialist. He argues that the best hope for change in South Africa would be in the concerted application of a carrot-and-stick approach by the United States and other Western nations.

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The author of this brief account of General Idi Amin's career is an extremely skillful journalist, and her "inside" information about disputed events and conversations between Amin and other chief personae in the drama sheds a fair amount of illumination on the character of the Ugandan strongman.

A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY: THE TANZANIAN EXAMPLE. By John R. Nellis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972, 217 pp. $12.25.

A schematic analysis of the Tanzanian political system through an economic "model" (in which ideology is assumed to stem from material self-interest alone). The author asserts that Nyerere's government is buying time by appealing to the masses over the heads of the self-seeking élites and concludes that this policy will eventually backfire by creating more politically aware citizens aspiring to élite prerogatives.

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THE PRICE OF LIBERTY: PERSONALITY AND POLITICS IN COLONIAL NIGERIA. By Kenneth W. J. Post and George D. Jenkins. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973, 494 pp. $27.50.

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SOURCE MATERAL

By Donald Wasson

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